论工程项目建设的合同管理

工程项目的建设周期长,生产要素价格变化频繁,使得工程造价复杂可变。对工程造价的控制与管理贯穿于工程建设的全过程：包括立项决策阶段、设计阶段、工程招标及承发包工程阶段、施工阶段、竣工验收阶段、结算价段和财务决算价段,其中后五个价段均与施工合同有关,所以要做好工程造价控制工作,就必须加强施工合同的管理。     

谈工程造价的确定与控制

工程造价的确定包含两种含义：对业主而言就是以尽可能少的投资或以同样多的投资获得较大的投资效益；对承包商而言就是在建成符合业主或者国家规定的标准和要求的建设项目的同时，尽可能地降低成本，以赚取较多的利润。在实际工作中，采取各种有效措施，加强该阶段工程造价的管理和控制，尽而提高建设资金的投资效益、社会效益，特别是企业的经济效益，有着十分重要的意义。一、施工阶段工程造价的控制措施１．加强合同管理。根据《中华人民共和国合同法》、《建设工程施工合同管理办法》的规定，依照招标文件、投标文件，双方签订施工合同…     

投资决策、设计过程及估算编制中的工程造价控制

为了更好地控制工程造价,应把控制工作重点转移到投资决策阶段、设计阶段、估算编制阶段,特别要抓住关键的设计阶段,正确处理好技术与经济的对立统一关系,努力降低工程造价,保证工程造管理目标的实现。     

清单计价下施工单位控制风险和提高预期收益方法探讨

清单报价模式下施工单位需要承担价格风险.文章就招标阶段、合同签订阶段及施工过程中施工单位风险进行分析,并大力采取经营策略,从清单计价策略、企业定额利用、工程合同管理等方面,加大企业经营管理力度,使利润最大化,保持企业的长久发展.     

工程造价控制策略

工程项目管理中,如何有效地进行工程造价的管理,在确保工程质量的前提下,加强合同和材料管理,严格签证管理,把好结算审核关。工程造价应贯穿于工程建设的各个阶段,才能更好的完成各项工程的造价控制,完善工程造价管理模式,达到工程造价控制目标。     

浅谈建设项目全过程造价控制

工程造价全过程控制是工程造价管理发展的必然趋势,根据笔者多年从事建设项目全过程造价控制的实践,分别从投资决策、设计、招标、施工、竣工结算等五个阶段阐述了全过程造价控制应做到并注意的问题。     

浅析建设工程施工招标文件的编制重点

建设工程施工招标文件的编制是一项较为复杂的工作,招标文件编制的质量直接影响招投标活动和建设工程项目后期的管理与实施。建设工程施工招标文件编制过程中,应根据项目的特点和需要,在编制时应抓住以下重点:工程概况的描述、工期、投标人资格审查标准的确定、投标报价要求、评标标准和办法、拟签订合同的专用条款等实质性内容。     

中国钢铁联合采购招标系统业务介绍

一、钢铁企业招标采购的做法先对比一下采用网上招标与传统招标的相同点、不同点。１．传统采购招标一般流程和特点（１）采购方发布定向招标邀请（大范围自由招标很少），用电话、传真和邮件通知。（２）供应商到采购方获取编制好的成套标书文件。（３）供应商根据自己经营的产品准备投标并填写标书。（４）投标标书加封，按时限邮寄或送到采购方。（５）采购方开标，供应户可现场观看各投标内容。（６）专家评标。（７）新增供应户资质审定。（８）公布中标单位。（９）供求双方签定采购供应合同。（１０）招标过程伴随有大量电话、传真、…     

浅谈工程量清单计价

文章阐述了工程量清单的概念、编制原则、内容费用组成、计价方法及特点，同时介绍了国外工程造价管理经验，使有关人员对工程量清单计价有一定了解，并对编制工程量清单有一定的指导作用。     

建设项目全过程的工程造价控制

建设工程项目管理的主要内容就是对项目工期、造价及质量进行控制和管理,全过程的工程造价控制就是在建设项目决策阶段、设计阶段、实施阶段、竣工决算审计阶段把建设工程造价的发生额控制在批准的工程造价限额以内,随时纠正发生的偏差,保证项目投资目标的实现,本文着重从编制投资估算、实施阶段工程造价的控制、竣工决算审计等关键环节,就加强全过程工程造价控制的方法进行探讨.     

工程投标编制与技巧

建筑企业在投标时应在充分理解招标文件、施工图纸和做好投标前的现场考察的基础上，根据企业自身的管理水平及市场价格情况做好投标书．本文介绍了投标价格编制、施工组织设计编写、定额和费用的选用、报价分析和最后报价中的一些技巧性问题．     

加强工程造价管理与投资控制的思考

要加强造价管理，提高投资效益，必须全面实现“量”与“价”的分离。设计阶段是造价确定与投资控制最重要阶段，要想在设计阶段控制工程造价，就一定要在设计阶段进行设计招投标和设计方案的竞选，并对备选方案及技术经济进行优化和评价，真正达到以最优的设计、最经济的投资，建造最好的工程项目的目的。     

Implementation of Quality Criteria in Tendering and Regulating Infrastructure Management Contracts

In recent years, several public authorities have been making advances in developing bidding terms for contracts regulating the management of infrastructure. Up to now these bidding terms have focused on granting the contract to the bidder who, having agreed to comply with the requirement of a specified level of quality, as stipulated in the contract, submits the lowest tender in terms of price. As a result, the experience of implementing quality-related incentives for the management of infrastructure has been scarce. This paper demonstrates that, if infrastructure quality is verifiable and the social benefit derived from it is measurable, there is a better way both to tender and to regulate those contracts, based on a combination of price and quality standards. In addition, the paper proposes a new procurement procedure to encourage bidders to provide better quality levels. The last part of the paper provides a practical example of how to calculate a quality index for contracts regulating the management of infrastructure. The paper ends with a set of conclusions related to the advantages of the new tendering mechanism and its possible application.     

建设单位在建设项目实施过程中如何控制工程造价

建设实施阶段、建设单位在招投标、合同管理，材料价格，施工管理（监理）、工程决算等几个方面，加强管理能够有效地控制工程造价。     

Contractor’s Opportunistic Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Price Level in the Construction Market

The competitive bidding system has been to blame for abnormally low bids, which are considered as one of the main causes of poor project quality. Previous studies have regarded the pricing of bidders as an optimum decision based on contractor’s cost and market competition level. However, the sell to produce characteristic of construction projects may induce contractors to offer a low bid and then make up the amount initially sacrificed from beyond-contractual reward (BCR) gained through cutting corners and claims. System dynamics was adopted in this study to develop a contractor’s pricing model with consideration of the dimensions of cost, market competition, and BCR. The model was then examined by statistical analysis of data collected from 44 highway projects in Taiwan. It was found that the equilibrium market price is significantly associated with BCR, which is assumed to be determined by the strictness of the owner’s construction management, including both soundness of contract and tightness in construction supervision. Research results suggest that contractors divide the market into different segments according to the owner’s strictness of construction management and the equilibrium price level of each market segment varies. The price level for projects with a strict owner is remarkably higher than for those with relatively less strict owners. Improvement in the construction management system of projects is crucial to lower the possibility that contractors gain BCR and do opportunistic bidding, and to further enhance project quality.     

浅谈EPC项目总承包投标报价

EPC项目投标报价对承包商具有非常重要的意义,但在具体工作中却经常会出现对招标文件理解不透、对现场情况不了解、不注重价格分析和工作沟通的主动性欠缺等问题。为做好此项工作,应熟悉招标文件,了解现场情况,参加标前会,做好市场调研,组织各专业的协调会议,控制投标报价质量,对投标报价的风险费用作具体分析,及时发现漏项,修正和调整投标报价,中标后就合同中存有争议或模糊不清的条款与业主谈判,以降低风险,增加收益。     

Estimating Cost Discrepancies in Highway Contracts: Multistep Econometric Approach

This paper investigates the likelihood of occurrence and quantifies the magnitude and rate of discrepancies in highway project final costs with respect to their contract award amounts. Using data from Indiana, we develop a multistep econometric approach that can be used to estimate the effects of factors associated with the contract bidding process, project type, and the project physical environment on cost discrepancies in highway contracts. Estimation findings indicate that for a given project type and project year, contracts of larger size or longer duration are generally more likely to incur cost overruns. In addition, for contracts that incur cost overruns, the cost overrun rate decreases nonlinearly with increasing contract size up to a certain point after which the cost overrun rate increases with increasing contract size. Our approach allows for the possibility that cost overrun amounts are not linearly related to contract award amounts (contract size), and shows that greater analytical flexibility needs to be incorporated into any investigation of contract cost overruns. Agencies interested in improving their financial forecasts can replicate our proposed methodology using local contract data.