How communication goals determine when audience tuning biases memory.

After tuning their message to suit their audience's attitude, communicators' own memories for the original information (e.g., a target person's behaviors) often reflect the biased view expressed in their message--producing an audience-congruent memory bias. Exploring the motivational circumstances of message production, the authors investigated whether this bias depends on the goals driving audience tuning. In 4 experiments, the memory bias was found to a greater extent when audience tuning served the creation of a shared reality than when it served alternative, nonshared reality goals (being polite toward a stigmatized-group audience; obtaining incentives; being entertaining; complying with a blatant demand). In addition, the authors found that these effects were mediated by the epistemic trust in the audience-congruent view but not by the rehearsal or accurate retrieval of the original input information, the ability to discriminate between the original and the message information, or a contrast away from extremely tuned messages. The central role of epistemic trust, a measure of the communicators' experience of shared reality, was supported in meta-analyses across the experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multiple communicators with unique target information transmit less stereotypical impressions.

Four studies examined how multiple communicators who have unique target information transmit less stereotypical impressions. Co-communicators with unique information should feel accountable for providing unique perspectives and consequently will try to be accurate. This accuracy goal should increase their focus on stereotype-incongruent behaviors, resulting in more counterstereotypical transmissions. Study 1 showed that communicators with unique information about an alcoholic target abstractly characterized incongruent attributes and allocated more transmission time to them. Study 2 showed that the effect of communicators' unique information on receivers' less stereotypical impressions was mediated by focus on incongruent attributes. Because the first 2 studies used a target whose stereotypical features were negative, Studies 3 and 4 provided a replication with a target whose stereotypical features were positive. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selection mechanisms in reading lexically ambiguous words.

Readers' eye movements were monitored as they read sentences containing lexically ambiguous words. The ambiguous words were either biased (one strongly dominant interpretation) or nonbiased. Readers' gaze durations were longer on nonbiased than biased words when the disambiguating information followed the target word. In Experiment 1, reading times on the disambiguating word did not differ whether the disambiguation followed the target word immediately or occurred several words later. In Experiment 2, prior disambiguation eliminated the long gaze durations on nonbiased target words but resulted in long gaze durations on biased target words if the context demanded the subordinate meaning. The results indicate that successful integration of one meaning with prior context terminates the search for alternative meanings of that word. This results in selective (single meaning) access when integration of a dominant meaning is fast (due to a biasing context) and identification of a subordinate meaning is slow (a strongly biased ambiguity with low-frequency meaning). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Statistical learning induces discrete shifts in the allocation of working memory resources.

Observers can voluntarily select which items are encoded into working memory, and the efficiency of this process strongly predicts memory capacity. Nevertheless, the present work suggests that voluntary intentions do not exclusively determine what is encoded into this online workspace. Observers indicated whether any items from a briefly stored sample display had changed. Unbeknown to observers, these changes were most likely to occur in a specific quadrant of the display (the dominant quadrant). Across 84 subjects and 5 groups of observers, change detection accuracy was significantly higher for items in the dominant quadrant, suggesting that memory encoding was biased towards the dominant quadrant. Only 9 of the 84 subjects were able to correctly specify the dominant quadrant when asked whether any location was more likely to contain the changed item, but more sensitive forced-choice procedures did reveal above-chance discrimination of the dominant quadrant. Nevertheless, because forced choice performance was unrelated to the size of the bias and no observer reported a biased encoding strategy, the bias was unlikely to depend on voluntary encoding strategies. The encoding bias was not due to a reduction in the response threshold for indicating changes in the dominant quadrant (Experiment 2). Finally, separate measures of the number and resolution of the representations in memory suggested that encoding was biased in a discrete slot-based fashion (Experiment 3). That is, although items in the dominant quadrant were more likely to be encoded into memory, mnemonic resolution for the favored items was not affected. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Eyewitness testimony: False alarms on biased instructions?

In two experiments we investigated the effects of biased instructions on the accuracy of eyewitness identification in a field setting in which some of the subjects were unaware of their participation in an experiment. In Experiment 1, 76 students observed a theft and were later asked to identify the perpetrator from a target-absent lineup, receiving either unbiased or biased instructions. One half of the subjects were debriefed prior to the identification procedure. Instructional bias was found to increase the rate of don't-know responses for undebriefed subjects, whereas debriefed subjects were unaffected by type of instructions. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether cultural or methodological factors could account for the results. Using identical instructions, as in Malpass and Devine (1981), 63 students who had or had not been debriefed received either biased or unbiased instructions. The American findings were replicated only for debriefed subjects, indicating an increase in false alarms as a function of biased instructions. The findings demonstrate that witnesses are less susceptible to biased instructions than has been suggested by previous research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From social talk to social action: Shaping the social triad with emotion sharing.

Seemingly trivial social talk provides fertile ground for emotion sharing (a narrator and audience's realization that they experience the same emotional response toward a target), which in turn creates a coalition between the narrator and the audience, configures the narrator and audience's relationship with the target, and coordinates their target-directed action. In this article, the authors use 4 studies to investigate this thesis. In Studies 1 and 2--where participants rated scenarios in which narrators told them anecdotes--the authors found that when there was emotion sharing (a) participants were more bonded with narrators, (b) the narrator and audience's relationship with the target (as reflected in action tendencies) was determined by the emotionality of the anecdotes, and (c) they coordinated their target-directed actions. Study 3 demonstrated that this effect was indeed due to emotion sharing. Study 4 provided behavioral evidence for the effects of emotion sharing using a 2-person trust game. Together, these studies reveal that the everyday act of social talk is a powerful act that is able to shape the social triad of the narrator, the audience, and the social target, with powerful consequences for social structure and group action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fanning the flames of prejudice: The influence of specific incidental emotions on implicit prejudice.

Three experiments examined the impact of incidental emotions on implicit intergroup evaluations. Experiment 1 demonstrated that for unknown social groups, two negative emotions that are broadly applicable to intergroup conflict (anger and disgust) both created implicit bias where none had existed before. However, for known groups about which perceivers had prior knowledge, emotions increased implicit prejudice only if the induced emotion was applicable to the outgroup stereotype. Disgust increased bias against disgust-relevant groups (e.g., homosexuals) but anger did not (Experiment 2); anger increased bias against anger-relevant groups (e.g., Arabs) but disgust did not (Experiment 3). Consistent with functional theories of emotion, these findings suggest that negative intergroup emotions signal specific types of threat. If the emotion-specific threat is applicable to prior expectations of a group, the emotion ratchets up implicit prejudice toward that group. However, if the emotion-specific threat is not applicable to the target group, evaluations remain unchanged. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of jury deliberations on jurors' propensity to disregard inadmissible evidence.

The goal of this research was to examine the effect of jury deliberations on juror's propensity to disregard inadmissible evidence. Extant research is inconclusive; some research indicates that jurors do follow judicial instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence, but other research suggests that jurors do not. Two experiments examined whether jurors were affected by inadmissible evidence. The results revealed that although mock jurors were biased by inadmissible evidence prior to deliberations, the bias was tempered following deliberations. In Experiment 1, post deliberation jurors disregarded incriminating evidence that was ruled inadmissible because of due-process concerns. Experiment 2 replicated these results with less incriminating inadmissible evidence and also revealed that jurors did not accurately gauge the impact that the inadmissible evidence had on their verdicts. Theoretical and judicial policy implications are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decomposing the hindsight bias: A multinomial processing tree model for separating recollection and reconstruction in hindsight.

After having received feedback about the correct answer to a question, a memory judgment about one's own past answer, the original judgment (OJ), is often biased toward the feedback. The authors present a multinomial model that explains this hindsight bias effect in terms of both memory impairments and reconstruction biases for nonrecollected OJs. The model was tested in 4 experiments. As predicted, the parameters measuring OJ recollection could be influenced selectively by contrasting items whose OJs were or were not retrieved successfully earlier (Experiment 1). Increasing the feedback-recall delay reduced reconstruction biases exclusively (Experiment 2), whereas discrediting the feedback enhanced recollection of the OJs to feedback items (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, the model's guessing parameters, but no other parameters, varied as a function of the number of response alternatives. The authors discuss implications for hindsight bias theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sources of sentence constraint on lexical ambiguity resolution

Results from a series of naming experiments demonstrated that major lexical categories of simple sentences can provide sources of constraint on the interpretation of ambiguous words (homonyms). Manipulation of verb (Experiment 1) or subject noun (Experiment 2) specificity produced contexts that were empirically rated as being strongly biased or ambiguous. Priming was demonstrated for target words related to both senses of a homonym following ambiguous sentences, but only contextually appropriate target words were primed following strongly biased dominant or subordinate sentences. Experiment 3 showed an increase in the magnitude of priming when multiple constraints on activation converged. Experiments 4 and 5 eliminated combinatorial intralexical priming as an alternative explanation. Instead, it was demonstrated that each constraint was influential only insofar as it contributed to the overall semantic representation of the sentence. When the multiple sources of constraint were retained but the sentence-level representation was changed (Experiment 4) or eliminated (Experiment 5), the results of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 and were not replicated. Experiment 6 examined the issue of homonym exposure duration by using an 80-msec stimulus onset asynchrony. The results replicated the previous experiments. The overall evidence indicates that a sentence context can be made strongly and immediately constraining by the inclusion of specific fillers for salient lexical categories. The results are discussed within a constraint-based, context-sensitive model of lexical ambiguity resolution.     

From automatic antigay prejudice to behavior: The moderating role of conscious beliefs about gender and behavioral control.

Two experiments tested whether the relation between automatic prejudice and discriminatory behavior is moderated by 2 conscious processes: conscious egalitarian beliefs and behavioral control. The authors predicted that, when both conscious processes are deactivated, automatic prejudice would elicit discriminatory behavior. When either of the 2 processes is activated, behavioral bias would be eliminated. The authors assessed participants' automatic attitudes toward gay men, conscious beliefs about gender, behavioral control, and interactions with gay confederates. In Experiment 1, men's beliefs about gender were heterogeneous, whereas women's beliefs were mostly egalitarian; men's responses supported the predictions, but women's responses did not. In Experiment 2, the authors recruited a sample with greater diversity in gender-related beliefs. Results showed that, for both sexes, automatic prejudice produced biased behavior in the absence of conscious egalitarian beliefs and behavioral control. The presence of either conscious process eliminated behavioral bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Guessing strategies, aging, and bias effects in perceptual identification

In the typical single-stimulus perceptual identification task, accuracy is improved by prior study of test words, a repetition priming benefit. There is also a cost, inasmuch as previously studied words are likely to be produced (incorrectly) as responses if the test word is orthographically similar but not identical to a studied word. In two-alternative forced-choice perceptual identification, a test word is flashed and followed by two alternatives, one of which is the correct response. When the two alternatives are orthographically similar, test words identical to previously studied items are identified more accurately than new words (a benefit) but tests words orthographically similar to studied words are identified less accurately than new words (a cost). Ratcliff and McKoon (in press) argue that these are bias effects that arise in the decision stage of word identification. We report five experiments that examined the alternative hypothesis that these bias effects arise from postperceptual guessing strategies. In single-stimulus perceptual identification, repetition priming benefits were equally great for young and older adults who claimed to use deliberate guessing strategies and those who did not (Experiment 1). In contrast, only groups of young and older people who claimed to deliberately guess studied words in a two-alternative forced-choice task (Experiments 2 and 5) showed reliable benefits and costs. Costs and benefits were abolished in the two-alternative forced-choice task when a very long study list was used, presumably because the increased retrieval burden made the use of deliberate guessing strategies less attractive (Experiment 3). Under conditions similar to those of Experiment 3, repetition priming was observed in single-stimulus perceptual identification (Experiment 4). These results are consistent with the view that costs and benefits in the forced-choice perceptual identification task arise from deliberate guessing strategies but that those in the single-stimulus task do not. The possibility that the observed relationship between strategy reports and priming effects reflects erroneous postexperimental assessments of strategies by participants is also considered.     

Influence and inference: What the active perceiver overlooks.

We propose that perceivers who engage in social influence tasks (inducers) concentrate primarily on the relation between their influencing behaviors and the responsive behaviors of their target and ignore other important sources of information relevant to social inference (e.g., other concurrent sources of influence on the target person). As a result, inducers' inferences about the target person are biased by their own personal power. In Experiment 1, weak inducers drew more dispositional inferences about the targets of their influence attempts than did strong inducers when the magnitude of the inducers' power was revealed in the course of the social interaction, but not when inducers were informed about the magnitude of their power prior to the social interaction. These results suggest that inducers concentrated on information that they considered relevant to the assessment of their personal power and ignored information about concurrent sources of influence on the target person's behavior. In Experiment 2, inducers' judgments were unaffected by the presence or absence of information about concurrent sources of influence, whereas observers' judgments were significantly affected. The results of both experiments suggest that active perceivers, who are immersed in the social interactions they seek to interpret, differ from passive perceivers in a variety of theoretically predictable ways. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Item-Specific Efficacy Judgments in Mathematical Problem Solving: The Downside of Standing Too Close to Trees in a Forest

Educational researchers assess self-efficacy by asking students to rate their capability of succeeding at specific target tasks (e.g., math test items) and then testing their performance to actually solve similar test items. Pajares and colleagues (Pajares & Kranzler, 1995; Pajares & Miller, 1994, 1995, in press) argued for the use of identical items to assess self-efficacy and performance in order to maximize self-efficacy's predictive power. In two studies, structural equation models (SEM) demonstrated that this variation led to positively biased estimates of paths from self-efficacy to performance and negatively biased estimates of paths from self-concept to performance. Whereas corrections for this bias did not substantially alter the size of effects or substantive interpretations, results from both studies were consistent with a priori predictions about the nature of this bias. Researchers are encouraged to use similar but not identical items to assess self-efficacy and performance, a construct validity approach to interrogate their interpretations, more diverse outcome measures, and SEM approaches like those demonstrated here.     

Prototypes and particulars: Geometric and experience-dependent spatial categories.

People use geometric cues to form spatial categories. This study investigated whether people also use the spatial distribution of exemplars. Adults pointed to remembered locations on a tabletop. In Experiment 1, a target was placed in each geometric category, and the location of targets was varied. Adults' responses were biased away from a midline category boundary toward geometric prototypes located at the centers of left and right categories. Experiment 2 showed that prototype effects were not influenced by cross-category interactions. In Experiment 3, subsets of targets were positioned at different locations within each category. When prototype effects were removed, there was a bias toward the center of the exemplar distribution, suggesting that common categorization processes operate across spatial and object domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Unpriming: The Deactivation of Thoughts Through Expression.

Unpriming is a decrease in the influence of primed knowledge following a behavior expressing that knowledge. The authors investigated strategies for unpriming the knowledge of an answer that is activated when people are asked to consider a simple question. Experiment 1 found that prior correct answering eliminated the bias people normally show toward correct responding when asked to answer yes-no questions randomly. Experiment 2 revealed that prior answering intended to be random did not unprime knowledge on subsequent attempts to answer randomly. Experiment 3 found that exposure to the correct answer did not influence the knowledge bias but that exposure to the incorrect answer increased bias. Experiment 4 revealed that merely expressing the answer for oneself was sufficient to unprime knowledge. Experiment 5 found that each item of activated knowledge needs to be unprimed specifically, in that correctly answering 1 question does not reduce the knowledge bias in randomly answering another. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preference for novel flavors in adult Norway Rats ( Rattus norvegicus).

The authors fed rats 1 of 2 distinctively flavored, roughly equipalatable diets for 3 days then offered them an ad libitum choice between the 2 diets. For 3 days, subjects exhibited a reduced relative intake of whichever diet they had previously eaten (Experiment 1). Such reduction in relative intake was as effective as a toxicosis-induced conditioned aversion in determining subjects' food choices (Experiment 2). The strength of exposure-induced reduction in relative intake did not depend on similarity of the 2 diets offered for choice either to each other or to subjects' maintenance diet (Experiment 3) but did require continuous exposure to a diet (Experiment 4). These experiments provide the first evidence of a robust, exposure-induced decrease in food preference in rats lasting for days rather than minutes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias.

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Confirmation bias in sequential information search after preliminary decisions: An expansion of dissonance theoretical research on selective exposure to information.

Research on selective exposure to information consistently shows that after having made a decision, people prefer supporting over conflicting information. However, in all of these experiments participants were given an overview of all available pieces of information, selected them simultaneously, and did not process the requested information during the selection phase. In the present research the authors show that an even stronger preference for supporting information arises if information is presented and processed sequentially instead of simultaneously (Experiment 1), and they demonstrate that this stronger confirmation bias is due to sequential presentation and not to sequential processing of information (Experiment 2). The authors provide evidence that the increase in confirmation bias under sequential presentation is caused by heightened commitment due to the participants' increased focusing on their decision (Experiments 3 and 4). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)