Operational Concepts of Nonmonotonic Logics Part 2: Autoepistemic Logic

The subject of nonmonotonic reasoning is reasoning with incompleteinformation. One of the main approaches is autoepistemic logic inwhich reasoning is based on introspection. This paper aims at providing a smooth introduction to this logic,stressing its motivation and basic concepts. The meaning (semantics)of autoepistemic logic is given in terms of so-called expansionswhich are usually defined as solutions of a fixed-point equation. Thepresent paper shows a more understandable, operational method fordetermining expansions. By improving applicability of the basicconcepts to concrete examples, we hope to make a contribution to awider usage of autoepistemic logic in practical applications.     

Autoepistemic logic of first order and its expressive power

We study the expressive power of first-order autoepistemic logic. We argue that full introspection of rational agents should be carried out by minimizing positive introspection and maximizing negative introspection. Based on full introspection, we propose the maximal well-founded semantics that characterizes autoepistemic reasoning processes of rational agents, and show that breadth of the semantics covers all theories in autoepistemic logic of first order, Moore's AE logic, and Reiter's default logic. Our study demonstrates that the autoepistemic logic of first order is a very powerful framework for nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, deductive databases, and knowledge representation.This research is partially supported by NSERC grant OGP42193.     

基于四值语义的缺省逻辑

基于公式变换,给出一组缺省理论的变换方法,将命题语言L中的缺省理论变换到对应的命题语言L^-＋中,保证了所得到的缺省理论的所有扩张均不平凡,并通过一种弱变换可同时保证缺省扩张的存在性．为缺省理论定义了各种四值模型,使得缺省逻辑具有非单调超协调推理能力,并证明了L^-＋中的缺省扩张与L中缺省理论的四值模型之间具有一一对应关系．四值模型描述了公式变换的语义,基于四值语义的缺省推理通过缺省理论的变换技术能在标准的缺省逻辑中实现．     

A Correct Logic Programming Computation of Default Logic Extensions

We present a method of representing some classes of default theories as normal logic programs. The main point is that the standart semantics (i.e., SLDNF-resolution) computes answer substitutions that correspond exactly to the extensions of the represented default theory. This means that we give a correct implementation of default logic. We explain the steps of constructing a logic program LogProg(P, D) from a given default theory (P, D), give some examples, and derive soundness and completeness results.     

'Classical' Negation in Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Logic Programming

Gelfond and Lifschitz were the first to point out the need for a symmetric negation in logic programming and they also proposed a specific semantics for such negation for logic programs with the stable semantics, which they called 'classical'. Subsequently, several researchers proposed different, often incompatible, forms of symmetric negation for various semantics of logic programs and deductive databases. To the best of our knowledge, however, no systematic study of symmetric negation in non-monotonic reasoning was ever attempted in the past. In this paper we conduct such a systematic study of symmetric negation. We introduce and discuss two natural, yet different, definitions of symmetric negation: one is called strong negation and the other is called explicit negation. For logic programs with the stable semantics, both symmetric negations coincide with Gelfond–Lifschitz' 'classical negation'. We study properties of strong and explicit negation and their mutual relationship as well as their relationship to default negation 'not', and classical negation '¬'. We show how one can use symmetric negation to provide natural solutions to various knowledge representation problems, such as theory and interpretation update, and belief revision. Rather than to limit our discussion to some narrow class of nonmonotonic theories, such as the class of logic programs with some specific semantics, we conduct our study so that it is applicable to a broad class of non-monotonic formalisms. In order to achieve the desired level of generality, we define the notion of symmetric negation in the knowledge representation framework of AutoEpistemic logic of Beliefs, introduced by Przymusinski.     

Splitting Finite Default Theories: A Comparison of Two Approaches

Default logic is computationally expensive. One of the most promising ways of easing this problem and developing powerful implementations is to split a default theory into smaller parts and compute extensions in a modular, local way. This paper compares two recent approaches, Turner's splitting and Cholewinski's stratification. It shows that the approaches are closely related – in fact the former can be viewed as a special case of the latter.     

An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic

When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this interpretation yields a semantics for default logic based on temporal epistemic models. A comparison between the various semantics for default logic will show the differences and similarities of these approaches and ours.     

A Default Logic Based Framework for Context-Dependent Reasoning with Lexical Knowledge

Lexical knowledge is increasingly important in information systems—for example in indexing documents using keywords, or disambiguating words in a query to an information retrieval system, or a natural language interface. However, it is a difficult kind of knowledge to represent and reason with. Existing approaches to formalizing lexical knowledge have used languages with limited expressibility, such as those based on inheritance hierarchies, and in particular, they have not adequately addressed the context-dependent nature of lexical knowledge. Here we present a framework, based on default logic, called the dex framework, for capturing context-dependent reasoning with lexical knowledge. Default logic is a first-order logic offering a more expressive formalisation than inheritance hierarchies: (1) First-order formulae capturing lexical knowledge about words can be inferred; (2) Preferences over formulae can be based on specificity, reasoning about exceptions, or explicit priorities; (3) Information about contexts can be reasoned with as first-order formulae formulae; and (4) Information about contexts can be derived as default inferences. In the dex framework, a word for which lexical knowledge is sought is called a query word. The context for a query word is derived from further words, such as words in the same sentence as the query word. These further words are used with a form of decision tree called a context classification tree to identify which contexts hold for the query word. We show how we can use these contexts in default logic to identify lexical knowledge about the query word such as synonyms, antonyms, specializations, meronyms, and more sophisticated first-order semantic knowledge. We also show how we can use a standard machine learning algorithm to generate context classification trees.     

What Should Default Reasoning be,by Default?

This is a position paper concerning the role of empirical studies of human default reasoning in the formalization of AI theories of default reasoning. We note that AI motivates its theoretical enterprise by reference to human skill at default reasoning, but that the actual research does not make any use of this sort of information and instead relies on intuitions of individual investigators. We discuss two reasons theorists might not consider human performance relevant to formalizing default reasoning: (a) that intuitions are sufficient to describe a model, and (b) that human performance in this arena is irrelevant to a competence model of the phenomenon. We provide arguments against both these reasons. We then bring forward three further considerations against the use of intuitions in this arena: (a) it leads to an unawareness of predicate ambiguity, (b) it presumes an understanding of ordinary language statements of typicality, and (c) it is similar to discredited views in other fields. We advocate empirical investigation of the range of human phenomena that intuitively embody default reasoning. Gathering such information would provide data with which to generate formal default theories and against which to test the claims of proposed theories. Our position is that such data are the very phenomena that default theories are supposed to explain.     

Tableau-based characterization and theorem proving for default logic

In this paper, we present a new method for computing extensions and for deriving formulae from a default theory. It is based on the semantic tableaux method and works for default theories with a finite set of defaults that are formulated over a decidable subset of first-order logic. We prove that all extensions (if any) of a default theory can be produced by constructing the semantic tableau ofone formula built from the general laws and the default consequences. This result allows us to describe an algorithm that provides extensions if there are any, and to decide if there are none. Moreover, the method gives a necessary and sufficient criterion for the existence of extensions of default theories with finitely many defaults provided they are formulated on a decidable subset of FOL.This work was completed while the author was at CNRS, Marseille.     

Sequent calculi for skeptical reasoning in predicate default logic and other nonmonotonic logics

Sequent calculi for skeptical consequence in predicate default logic, predicate stable model logic programming, and infinite autoepistemic theories are presented and proved sound and complete. While skeptical consequence is decidable in the finite propositional case of all three formalisms, the move to predicate or infinite theories increases the complexity of skeptical reasoning to being ₁¹-complete. This implies the need for sequent rules with countably many premises, and such rules are employed. AMS subject classification 03B42, 68N17, 68T27This paper grew directly out of the authors dissertation, written under the direction of Anil Nerode.     

On nonmonotonic reasoning with the method of sweeping presumptions

Reasoning almost always occurs in the face of incomplete information. Such reasoning is nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions drawn may later be withdrawn when additional information is obtained. There is an active literature on the problem of modeling such nonmonotonic reasoning, yet no category of method-let alone a single method-has been broadly accepted as the right approach. This paper introduces a new method, called sweeping presumptions, for modeling nonmonotonic reasoning. The main goal of the paper is to provide an example-driven, nontechnical introduction to the method of sweeping presumptions, and thereby to make it plausible that sweeping presumptions can usefully be applied to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning. The paper discusses a representative sample of examples that have appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning, and discusses them from the point of view of sweeping presumptions.     

累积缺省逻辑的扩充

针对缺省理论的一大热点问题—缺省扩充,将Grigoris Antonion的语义算子理论算法及V.W.Marek和M.Frusz-cyuski的语构算法用于计算累积缺省逻辑(CDL)的扩充,系统地讨论了CDL及其新变种CADL与QDL的理论的扩充问题,从而使得具有累积性的缺省逻辑扩充的计算问题系统化,同时指出这两种方法可用于其他类型的缺省理论扩充的计算。