Modification of moral judgment through role playing.

Studied 42 male and 54 female undergraduates to examine the impact of actual role playing on the change of moral judgment maturity (as assessed by L. Kohlberg in 1969). Ss showed both immediate and delayed increases in moral judgment maturity when role playing a moral dilemma against an opponent who employed reasoning above the S's initially assessed stage. Change scores exceeded those of control groups who either performed extraneous tasks or who passively received role-playing arguments. More change was exhibited by Ss at the lower stages. The flexibility of S's responses during role playing was associated with immediate but not delayed change in moral judgment maturity. Ss did not show greater change in response to reasoning 1 stage higher than their own (vs 2 stages higher or 1 stage lower) as had been previously observed by E. Turiel (see record 1966-07567-001). No sex differences were observed in initial stages or in amount of change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Designing and validating a measure of moral judgment: Stage preference and stage consistency approaches.

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral judgment is discussed in light of the recent challenge by C. Lind (1995) with the Moral Judgment Test (MJT), which is widely used in Europe. The 2 tests represent alternative methods as well as support different conclusions about moral judgment. The key difference is a stage-consistency (MJT) vs. a stage-preference (DIT) approach. Construct validity is defined in terms of 7 types of studies, and the approaches are compared. The stage-preference approach systematically outperforms the stage-consistency approach. Benchmarking by using classic studies in moral judgment illustrates an empirical, multistudy, quantitative approach to moral judgment research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Life experience and mode of coping: Relation to moral judgment in adulthood.

Two studies examining Gibbs's (1977, 1979) hypothesis on the relation between mode of coping with human needs and moral development in adulthood are presented. It was hypothesized that mature levels of moral reasoning would be related to affirmative coping, whereas conventional reasoning would be related to abortive coping. In Study 1, 70 adults (M?=?44.3 years of age) were given the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and classified as either principled or conventional moral reasoners. From this original sample, 13 principled and 15 conventional women were administered an Existential Coping Interview (ECI), designed to assess affirmative and abortive coping with human needs (after Fromm, 1955) arising from an experience of loss. Results indicated that conventional moral reasoners dealt abortively with Fromm's existential needs, whereas principled reasoners exhibited affirmative coping strategies. In Study 2, 75 adults 20 to 78 years of age were administered the ECI; measures of moral reasoning (DIT), openness to experience, and coping; and an impact of life events scale. A positive relationship was demonstrated between existential coping and principled reasoning, openness to experience, and problem-focused coping strategies. Discussion focuses on the cognitive definition of life experience and situational and contextual variability influencing moral development in adulthood. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Family patterns of moral judgment during adolescence and early adulthood.

Family patterns of moral reasoning were compared in a cross-sectional sample from the Oakland Growth Study (H. E. Jones, 1939a, 1939b) and a longitudinal sample from L. Kohlberg's (1958) study of moral judgment development. The 221 offspring in the 2 samples (121 male and 100 female) ranged from 10 to 33 yrs old. Age, sex, cognitive stage, IQ, SES, and education were controlled in the data analyses. There were consistent family patterns of moral reasoning in the 2 samples when both sex and background variables were controlled. Developmental patterns indicated that, during adolescence, parent moral judgment was related to offspring moral reasoning but was a stronger predictor of moral judgment among girls than boys. During young adulthood, fathers' moral judgment and education were the strongest predictors of both sons' and daughters' moral reasoning. However, education, not parent moral reasoning, limited the moral stage attained by adult offspring. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

DIT2: Devising and testing a revised instrument of moral judgment.

The Defining Issues Test, Version 2 (DIT2), updates dilemmas and items, shortens the original Defining Issues Test (DIT1) of moral judgment, and purges fewer participants for doubtful response reliability. DIT1 has been used for over 25 years. DIT2 makes 3 changes: in dilemmas and items, in the algorithm of indexing, and in the method of detecting unreliable participants. With all 3 changes, DIT2 is an improvement over DIT1. The validity criteria for DIT2 are (a) significant age and educational differences among 9th graders, high school graduates, college seniors, and students in graduate and professional schools; (b) prediction of views on public policy issues (e.g., abortion, religion in schools, rights of homosexuals, women's roles); (c) internal reliability; and (d) correlation with DIT1. However, the increased power of DIT2 over DIT1 is primarily due to the new methods of analysis (a new index called N2, new checks) rather than to changes in dilemmas, items, or instructions. Although DIT2 presents updated dilemmas and smoother wording in a shorter test (practical improvements), the improvements in analyses account for the validity improvements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Deciding versus reacting: Conceptions of moral judgment and the reason-affect debate.

Recent approaches to moral judgment have typically pitted emotion against reason. In an effort to move beyond this debate, we propose that authors presenting diverging models are considering quite different prototypical situations: those focusing on the resolution of complex dilemmas conclude that morality involves sophisticated reasoning, whereas those studying reactions to shocking moral violations find that morality involves quick, affect-laden processes. We articulate these diverging dominant approaches and consider three directions for future research (moral temptation, moral self-image, and lay understandings of morality) that we propose have not received sufficient attention as a result of the focus on these two prototypical situations within moral psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral reasoning and moral conduct: An investigation prompted by Kohlberg's theory.

Investigated level of moral judgment in 53 male undergraduates using hypotheses concerning the relation to cheating of moral judgment, guilt, knowledge that another person cheated, and several motivational variables. Hypotheses were based in part on L. Kohlberg's (1976, 1981) propositions about moral judgment and behavior. Moral reasoning was assessed by administering a test regarding definition of issues, and cheating was determined by the accuracy of self-report of rotary pursuit performance. Falsely low practice times provided an incentive to cheat. As expected, results indicate that the lower the moral judgment score, the more likely an S was to cheat and the sooner he began to cheat. Cheating measures were also related to anticipatory guilt, test anxiety, need for approval, and practice trial scores. Although Ss low in moral judgment cheated more, highs also succumbed when temptation became strong. Results provide information on the relative influence on cheating behavior of situational factors, nonmoral motives, and moral reasoning. (36 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of children's prosocial moral judgment.

Examined (a) the development of children's reasoning about prosocial moral dilemmas (those situations in which the needs of one individual conflict with those of others in a context in which the effects of laws, rules, punishment, authorities, and formal obligations are minimized or irrelevant), and (b) the relationship of structure of prosocial moral judgment to story solution. 125 elementary and high school students responded to 4 moral dilemmas involving prosocial conflicts. Elementary school children's reasoning tended to be hedonistic, stereotyped, approval and interpersonally oriented, and/or tended to involve the labeling of others' needs. Stereotyped images of persons and interpersonally or approval-oriented reasoning decreased in frequency with age, whereas clearly empathic considerations and judgments reflecting internalized values increased in use with age. Empathic moral concerns comprised much of the Ss' moral reasoning. Type of moral judgment was related to the way Ss said a moral conflict should be resolved. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Culture, context, and the development of moral accountability judgments.

Examined the impact of contextual factors on Indian and American adults' and children's (N?=?180) tendencies to hold agents morally accountable for justice breaches. Results revealed that Indians more frequently absolved agents of moral accountability for breaches performed under emotional duress or by young children than did Americans. Breaches were less frequently categorized in moral terms when moral reasoning and accountability judgments were assessed simultaneously than when only moral reasoning was assessed. Discussion considered (1) the impact of nonmoral beliefs on cultural and age differences in everyday moral judgment; (2) the use of personal-choice reasoning in weighting of extenuating circumstances; and (3) the methodological importance of focusing simultaneously on responsibility appraisals and social domain categorizations in understanding contextual influences on moral reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A measure of moral values.

Presents a measure of moral values which seems to have acceptable conceptual and psychometric properties, and evidence concerning the personological correlates of mature moral judgment. Using a brief, semiprojective task, moral judgments were elicited from 3 differing groups of male undergraduates (n = 92) which could be reliably (r = .88) scored for maturity of moral judgment. Additional data from 71 Ss indicates that Ss whose moral judgments were rated as mature tended to be sensitive to injustice, well socialized, empathic, and autonomous, and based their judgments on an intuitive understanding of morality. Those whose judgments were rated as immature tended to be insensitive to injustice, less socialized, nonempathic, and conforming, and their moral reasoning had a rational as opposed to an intuitive flavor. (16 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development in moral judgment research.

Two recent articles challenge cognitive developmental interpretations given to moral judgment research using preference data. One article, by J. J. Moran et al (see record 1979-28407-001), suggests that preference data may reflect preference for language sophistication rather than for levels of moral reasoning. The other article, by R. M. Martin (see record 1978-11439-001), suggests that preference for statements of moral reasoning may reflect a prior commitment to an action choice rather than an evaluation of moral reasoning. The evidence in both articles is critiqued, subsequent research dealing with the problems raised is cited, and a reconceptualization of the issues is recommended. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adolescent moral judgment and perceptions of family interaction.

Oakland Growth Study (H. E. Jones, 1939) Ss and 98 adolescent offspring (qged 10–18 yrs) responded to Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interviews (A. Colby et al, 1987) and reported their perceptions of family interaction during 2 waves of longitudinal follow-up at the Institute of Human Development, University of California, Berkeley. Relationships between adolescent moral judgment and parent and adolescent perceptions of family structure, decision making, value orientation, moral transmission, and interpersonal relationships were assessed, with age, sex, IQ, and parent moral judgment controlled. Adolescent moral judgment was most consistently related to reports of positive intrafamilial relationships and cognitive stimulation of moral reasoning. Sex differences in relationships between family interaction and moral judgment were also found. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Does the Defining Issues Test measure psychological phenomena distinct from verbal ability? An examination of Lykken's query.

This study examined the incremental validity of the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a test purporting to measure moral reasoning ability relative to verbal ability and other major markers of the construct of general intelligence (g) . Across 2 independent studies of intellectually precocious adolescents (top 0.5%), results obtained with the DIT revealed that gifted individuals earned significantly higher moral reasoning scores than did their average-ability peers; they also scored higher than college freshmen, who were 4 to 5 years older. The relative standing of the intellectually gifted adolescents on moral reasoning, however, appears to be due to their superior level of verbal ability as opposed to any of a number of the other psychological variables examined here. The hypothesis that the DIT is conceptually distinct from conventional measures of verbal ability was not confirmed. Investigators conducting subsequent studies involving the assessment of moral reasoning are advised to incorporate measures of verbal ability into their designs, thereby enabling them to ascertain whether moral reasoning measures are indeed capturing systematic sources of individual differences distinct from verbal ability.… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of young children's prosocial moral judgment: A longitudinal follow-up.

34 4–5 yr old children whose prosocial moral judgment had been assessed in preschool were reinterviewed 18 mo later. At the follow-up, Ss used significantly more needs-oriented and approval-oriented reasoning and less hedonistic reasoning than earlier. High religious participation at the time of the follow-up was positively related to the use of needs-oriented reasoning and negatively related to hedonistic reasoning. (3 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of a moral development discussion group on delinquent and predelinquent boys.

50 delinquent or predelinquent 13–15 yr old males in institutional or dayschool special education programs were divided into 3 groups: moral discussion group; a placebo group that received a values clarification program, which was similar in content to the moral discussion group approach; and a control group, which received no treatment. The discussion and placebo groups addressed hypothetical, real-life, classroom behavior, and S-presented dilemmas. Pre- and posttest scores were obtained on a moral judgment interview and a self-control rating scale. Results indicate that the moral discussion group had a significant impact on Ss' moral reasoning ability as compared with the placebo and control groups. Findings also indicate that gains in moral reasoning did not necessarily lead to improved classroom behaviors. (80 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Social discourse and moral judgment.

Reviews the book, Social discourse and moral judgment by Daniel N. Robinson (see record 1992-98331-000). It is not every day that a group of such original scholars in any field come together to debate a topic of genuine significance. Social Discourse and Moral Judgment is the result of such an occasion, a symposium dedicated to examining social constructionist contributions to the study of moral judgment, conducted at Georgetown University during March of 1991. Although all of the articles in this volume assume some level of familiarity with psychological theory and vocabulary, Social Discourse and Moral Judgment should appeal to the philosophical novice as well as those well-versed in social constructionist theory. While it is entirely impossible to adequately describe or summarize the complex argument and debate presented in this volume in so brief a space, some examination of the issues discussed should serve to illuminate its worth. Although there are many themes which reoccur throughout the book, discussion of only three (agency, individualism and relativism) are dealt with in this review. As a genuinely significant contribution to research in morality and moral judgment, this book has only two drawbacks. The first, which Robinson acknowledges, is simply that there were not more selections presented from the final discussion, and that the selections presented are sometimes sketchy and hard to follow. The second drawback is that there is no critique of the social constructionist position from a clearly hermeneutic or other continental perspective. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Susceptibility to faking of the Defining Issues Test of moral development.

Administered the Defining Issues Test (DIT) by J. Rest et al to 146 student teachers on 2 occasions with instructions to either fake bad, fake good, or record their own views (standard instructions). Results support the general theory of a sequence of cognitive stages of moral judgment in which Ss recognize stages they have passed through as immature and can respond appropriately when asked to fake low, while stages higher than the S's own are unattainable thus preventing faking upwards. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A story of a pot: or A cross-cultural comparison of basic moral evaluations: A response to the critique by Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana (1988).

Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana's (1988) critique of Nisan (1987) merely serves to emphasize the difficulty involved in distinguishing between the moral and the conventional without reference to the cultural meaning of the act. Their criticism of the findings is shown to be based on underestimation of the comprehension of the subjects and on implausible interpretation of the results. It is suggested that the research of Turiel on the distinction between the moral and the conventional dealt with prima facie moral evaluations of decontextualized acts; the more complex and contextualized a moral judgment is, the more it is affected by culture and age. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of moral justifications and moral reasoning on altruism.

Studied 167 female college students to test the predictions that for Ss whose moral reasoning is predominantly at the lower stages, a curvilinear relation would exist between the level of justification and altruism; altruism should increase from a Level 1 to Level 2 justification and then decrease from Level 2 to Level 3. The pattern of results for the interaction and the trend analyses provide qualified support for the predictions made on the basis of comprehension and preference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)