High-Pressure (up to 140 MPa) Dynamic Viscosity of the Methane and Toluene System: Measurements and Comparative Study of Some Representative Models

The dynamic viscosity of toluene and methane mixtures containing 25.03, 37.19, 49.95, 64.11, and 95.00 mol% methane has been measured using a falling-body viscometer. The measurements (280 data points) have been performed in the temperature range 293.15 to 373.15 K and at pressures up to 140 MPa. The data have been discussed in the framework of recent representative models (hard-sphere scheme, friction theory, and free-volume model) as well as with simple mixing laws and empirical models (particularly the LBC model and the self-referencing model) used in the literature. This comparative study shows that the average absolute deviation of the models is between 4.9 and 26.8%, and the maximum deviation is between 11.6 and 49.5%.     

Heat transfer and pressure drop in a new type of corrugated channels

An experimental investigation of heat transfer and pressure drop from a new type of corrugated channels is presented. The investigation has been carried out for Reynolds numbers in the range of $\text{800 <}\text{Re}\text{< 5000}$ for one corrugated and one smooth channel. It is found that the heat transfer from the corrugated channel is up to 3.5 times higher than for the smooth one. The pressure drop is however large (5 – 6 times the value of a smooth channel) and it is suggested that the corrugation height and length should be altered in order to balance the increases in heat transfer and pressure drop.     

The role of government in health insurance markets with adverse selection

This paper analyzes the welfare economics of three arrangements for purchasing health insurance: competitive markets in which consumers are free to choose among options with different levels of coverage and prices; systems with compulsory partial pooling which permit private firms to sell supplementary coverage; and government-run pools that purchase comprehensive coverage at a single price for all consumers. Competitive insurance markets are assumed to face the problem of 'adverse selection'. This refers to a situation in which the insurer cannot observe characteristics of individuals that affect the cost of insurance and that are known to the individuals. Competitive markets with adverse selection are not efficient because low risks cannot purchase comprehensive insurance coverage. However, government-run pools with comprehensive coverage are an inefficient solution to the problem of adverse selection. Compulsory partial coverage may represent an attractive alternative to both competitive markets and comprehensive pools. We discover two situations when government intervention of this type will succeed: when there are not many high risks in the population, and when the risk types are similar. We discuss the implications of these results for health insurance programs in several countries. Our results also have implications for the allocation of public funds for disease-prevention projects. A project targeted at high risks will produce external benefits for low risks, even though they are not directly affected by the program. However, a successful project might eliminate the market for private insurance; in this case the government should consider mandating partial insurance coverage.