Measuring and analyzing agents’ uncertainty in argumentation-based negotiation dialogue games

Nowadays, multiagent systems have become a widely used technology in everyday life, and many authors have adopted the view of communication or interaction between agents as a joint activity regulated by means of dialogue games. Dialogue games are a set of communication rules that agents can combine in their complex interactions. In these games, uncertainty is an important problem that each agent faces when making decisions, especially in the absence of enough information. This paper focuses on the uncertainty in a particular type of dialogue games, namely argumentation-based negotiation. There exist several proposals on this type of dialogue games in the literature, and most of them are concerned with proposing protocols to show how agents can communicate with each other, and how arguments and offers can be generated, evaluated and exchanged. Nevertheless, none of them is directly targeting the agents’ uncertainty about the exchanged arguments and how this uncertainty could be measured at each dialogue step to assist those agents make better decisions. The aim of this paper is to tackle this problem by defining a new set of uncertainty measures in negotiation dialogue games from an external agent’s point of view. In particular, we introduce two types of uncertainty: Type I and Type II. Type I is about the uncertainty index of playing the right move. For this, we use Shannon entropy to measure: (i) the uncertainty index of the agent that he is selecting the right move at each dialogue step; and (ii) the uncertainty index of participating agents in the negotiation about the whole dialogue. This is done in two different ways; the first is by taking the average of the uncertainty index of all moves, and the second is by determining all possible dialogues and applying the general formula of Shannon entropy. Type II is about the uncertainty degree of the agent that the move will be accepted by the addressee. In this context, we introduce a new classification for the arguments based on their certainty to be accepted by the addressee.     

基于Q学习的DDoS攻防博弈模型研究

新形势下的DDoS攻防博弈过程和以往不同,因此利用现有的方法无法有效地评估量化攻防双方的收益以及动态调整博弈策略以实现收益最大化。针对这一问题,设计了一种基于Q学习的DDoS攻防博弈模型,并在此基础上提出了模型算法。首先,通过网络熵评估量化方法计算攻防双方收益;其次,利用矩阵博弈研究单个DDoS攻击阶段的攻防博弈过程;最后,将Q学习引入博弈过程,提出了模型算法,用以根据学习效果动态调整攻防策略从而实现收益最大化。实验结果表明,采用模型算法的防御方能够获得更高的收益,从而证明了算法的可用性和有效性。     

中美文化差异对国际商务谈判的影响

经济全球化浪潮下的中关经贸合作达到前所未有的高度,但文化差异却时常成为中关商务谈判的障碍。本文通过文化差异对中关商务谈判的影响做出分析,指出文化在中美商务谈判活动中具有的重要作用并提出相应对策。     

基于博弈论的多机器人任务分配算法

为了寻找一种合理有效的多机器人任务分配算法,基于多机器人协作救火任务环境,以博弈论纳什均衡为基础,研究多机器人的任务分配问题。根据任务模型特点和纳什均衡的主要特征提出了一种基于博弈论的任务分配算法。博弈的效用函数同时考虑了距离、火势和燃烧时间等因素,机器人根据此效用函数选择行为策略,促使机器人尽快扑灭惩罚值较大的火灾而获得较大的奖励值。利用任务总收益函数值的大小评价算法的优劣性。收益函数与火势、燃烧时间和机器人扑灭火灾数有关,这切合实际救火模型。实验结果证明了该任务分配算法的有效性。     

Multi-channel power allocation based on market competitive equilibrium in cognitive radio networks

Cognitive radios such as intelligent phones and Bluetooth devices have been considered essential goods in next-generation communication systems.Such devices will have to share the same frequency band owing to the limited bandwidth resource.To improve spectrum efciency,we formulate multi-channel power allocation as a market competitive equilibrium(CE)problem,and prove that its solution exists and is unique under the condition of weak interference.We then propose two distributed power allocation algorithms achieving CE,namely the fast convergent power allocation algorithm(FCPAA)and the social-fairness-aware FCPAA(SFAF).Theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithms lead to better system performance in terms of the guaranteed interference temperature constraint using the price mechanism instead of a strategy based on the Nash equilibrium.Moreover,it is shown that the FCPAA maximizes total utility,and converges more quickly than the method addressed in prior research with the help of improved round-robin rules.However,the FCPAA cannot ensure the same social fairness among secondary users as the SFAF scheme in both the non-fading channel and Rayleigh fading channel;the SFAF balances the individual utility by adjusting each user’s budget at the expense of a small quantity of system total throughput.     

基于协作度的分布式自动协商联盟形成机制

现有联盟形成的研究中大都没有考虑到不同Agent的协作资源和协作态度不同的异质性,而是假定所有Agent具有相同的协作资源和协作态度.为此提出一种基于协作度的分布式自动协商联盟形成机制(collaborative degree-based distributed automatic negotiation coalition formation mechanism,CDBDN),通过对处在网络拓扑结构中Agent的协作资源和协作态度的描述建立Agent协作度的概念.以分布式的应用环境为背景,建立分布式协商协议(distributed negotiation protocal,DNP)来实现分布式自动协商方式构建联盟.该机制建立了分布式协商协议和引入了Agent协作度,提出基于Agent 协作度的协商策略.实验结果表明,该机制在联盟形成的效率、Agent协商效率和个体效用方面都表现出有较好的性能.     

Solving linear generalized Nash equilibrium problems numerically

This paper considers the numerical solution of linear generalized Nash equilibrium problems (LGNEPs). Since many methods for nonlinear problems require the nonsingularity of some second-order derivative, standard convergence conditions are not satisfied in our linear case. We provide new convergence criteria for a potential reduction algorithm (PRA) that allow its application to LGNEPs. Furthermore, we discuss a projected subgradient method (PSM) and a penalty method that exploit some known Nikaido–Isoda function-based constrained and unconstrained optimization reformulations of the LGNEP. Moreover, it is shown that normalized Nash equilibria of an LGNEP can be obtained by solving a single linear program. All proposed algorithms are tested on randomly generated instances of economic market models that are introduced and analysed in this paper and that lead to LGNEPs with shared and with non-shared constraints. It is shown that these problems have some favourable properties that can be exploited to obtain their solutions. With the PRA and in particular with the PSM we are able to compute solutions with satisfying precision even for problems with up 10,000 variables.     

Game‐Based Valley‐Fill Charging Coordination for Large‐Population Plug‐in Electric Vehicles

Charging coordination of large‐population autonomous plug‐in electric vehicles (PEVs) in the power grid can be formulated as a class of constrained optimization problems. To overcome the computational complexity, a game‐based method is proposed for the charging problems of the PEV population, which is composed of homogeneous subpopulations, such that individuals update their best charging strategies simultaneously with respect to a common electricity price determined by the total demand. To mitigate the oscillation behavior caused by the greedy behavior for the cheap electricity by individuals, a deviation cost is introduced to penalize against the deviation of the individual strategy from the average value of the homogeneous subpopulation. By adopting a proper deviation cost and following a best strategy update mechanism, the game systems may converge to the socially optimal valley‐fill Nash equilibrium. Simulation examples are studied to illustrate the results.     

Role Negotiation and Interaction: An Exploratory Case Study of the Impact of Management Consultants on ERP System Implementation in SMEs in Taiwan

Abstract

With growing pressures for collaborative information systems (IS) partnerships, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) implementation has been an important activity for improving supply chains efficiency in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). Historically ERP consultants usually take a product-selling approach in SMEs, providing limited management consultancy services. However, a more constructive role for management consultants has become an emerging and challenging issue. This study explored the involvement of management consultants in ERP implementation, particularly with internal managers, ERP consultants and other project members. Extensive interviews were conducted with management consultants as well as 47 project members from four different SMEs in Taiwan employing ERP consultants. Using a grounded theory methodology, prior literature was used to sensitize the findings to key concepts of importance. The results were then analyzed and we described how owner-managers regard management consultants and how the consultants use role negotiation skills to work with both internal managers and ERP consultants. The study found resistance toward management consultants primarily from managers in SMEs, and not owner-managers. The relationships between management consultants and SME managers also differed from similar relationships in large organizations. Suggestions are also provided for academics and practitioners along with areas for future research to extend these exploratory findings.     

Sampling average approximation method for a class of stochastic Nash equilibrium problems

We consider a class of stochastic Nash equilibrium problems (SNEP). Under some mild conditions, we reformulate the SNEP as a stochastic mixed complementarity problem (SMCP). We apply the well-known sample average approximation (SAA) method to solve the SMCP. We further introduce a semismooth Newton method to solve the SAA problems. The comprehensive convergence analysis is given as well. In addition, we demonstrate the proposed approach on a stochastic Nash equilibrium model in the wholesale gas–oil markets.