风险偏好视角下 PPP 项目控制权初始分配

为有效提高 PPP 项目中政企合作水平和效率,以政企控制权初始分配作为研究节点,基于政企风险偏好和有限理性状态,构建风险投资期望效用模型,得出不同风险偏好组合下的初始控制权分配情景。并从政企风险偏好组合下的 4 种情景,运用算例模拟论证不同风险偏好对控制权初始分配及政府风险投资期望效用的影响。结果表明,政府风险中性时社会资本初始控制权份额与其风险规避程度呈负相关且有最低限度,反之与其风险趋向程度呈正相关且有最高限度。不同风险偏好组合对政府风险投资期望效用有不同影响。因此,政府应充分考虑双方风险偏好,确定最优初始控制权分配份额,以促进PPP 项目高效实施。     

基于实物期权的 PPP 项目政府担保与收益限制水平决策研究

How to confirm the minimum revenue guarantee and toll revenue cap depends on the relevant experience of decisionmakers in PPP projects. But there is no effective standard because minimum revenue guarantee and toll revenue cap areoften subjective and thus leads to the unreasonable risk distribution in PPP projects. Based on the real option theory and PPP case,this study established a government’s minimum purchase guarantee level model to determine the government minimum purchaseamount in PPP projects,and developed a revenue ceiling model to clarify the corresponding revenue ceiling. The findings arevaluable to the interest distributing and risk sharing of PPP projects,so as to improve the project performance and promote thesuccess of the project.     

GPRS无线数据传输的控制器设计

介绍了基于GPRS无线数据传输的通信控制器的设计方案,该方案在单片机中实现了精简的TCP/IP协议和PPP协议,通过控制GPRS模块,使其经GPRS连入Internet网络。该系统具有实时性强、传输数据量大、稳定可靠和低成本等优点,可应用于工业监控、煤田水位遥测和地质灾害监测等系统中。     

基于CDMA网络的多处理器结构视频监控系统

该文针对CDMA网络提出了一种基于多处理器结构的无线视频监控系统设计方案。首先介绍了无线图象监控系统的三种应用模型,接着分析了该视频系统设计中的一些关键技术,包括无线视频数据NAT穿越技术和无线视频终端设计中的几个关键技术,最后进行了总结。     

基于GPRS的电力线路监控系统

简述了GPRS无线业务特点及其工作原理,重点讲述了基于GPRS的电力线路监控系统的组成、原理以及软硬件设计。该系统通过数据测量单元在线实时监测输电线路上振动信号、温度、湿度、风速、风向等数据,并将其传到监控中心,通过中心管理系统对电力线路振动情况进行统计、分析,做出正确的预测和评估,实现故障预警。实践证明,GPRS技术非常适用于要求实时性的、大数据量传送的应用场合。     

基于ALCM-PPP模型的PPP项目建造阶段资产管理研究以跟踪审计为核心

首先分析资产全生命周期理念在PPP项目中的适用性,并以广州地铁11号线地下综合管廊为例说明应用效果。然后将资产全生命周期管理(ALCM)的理念融入PPP项目的建造过程中,建立ALCM-PPP模型,识别出在PPP项目建造阶段应重点展开审计的内容,包括PPP项目合同条款设置、施工技术和工序、工程量、隐蔽工程及竣工结算等内容。最后从上述审计内容阐述PPP项目建造阶段资产增值路径。     

To what extent does organizational learning influence the stakeholder pressure–green procurement nexus? Evidence from Ghana

The United Nations has described global warming as reaching a code red point for humanity and requires drastic measures to avert further terrible warming. Green procurement practices have been recognized as sustainable measures towards a low carbon trajectory, yet its implementation is still at the embryonic stage mainly due to weaknesses in organizational creativity skills and learning strategies. For the first time, we provide a theoretical framework that links stakeholder pressure, organizational learning, green procurement, and environmental performance within a public–private partnership environment. The analysis in this study is performed using the partial least square structural equation modelling and a sample of 295 respondents from Ghanaian infrastructure projects. Overall, we have found that exploratory and exploitative learning are necessary to translate stakeholder pressure to implement green procurement practices effectively. Also, firms that yield to stakeholder pressure develop their creative skills and increase their environmental performance. We recommend that managers should consider frequent market research and consistent stakeholder dialogue to create a culture of learning towards green practice implementation and promote environmental sustainability.     

基于风险偏好和公平偏好的 PPP 项目社会资本选择研究

为补充政府部门关于如何选择社会资本方的理论解释,建立了政府部门与社会资本方的 stackelberg 博弈理论模型,分析效益最大化下政府选择何种特征的社会资本对其更有利。结果表明:不论政府方是风险中性还是风险规避,从政府补偿、激励支出及项目初始投资最优来看,风险规避度低、公平偏好度高的社会资本方是其最佳选择,能够实现社会效益的最大化,并针对提高民营企业参与 PPP 项目的积极性提出了管理建议。     

Public interest and early termination of PPP contracts. Can fair and reasonable compensations be determined?

This article analyzes the different ways to terminate public-private-partnership (PPP) contracts early. It discusses how early terminations should be addressed to mitigate the consequences in terms of attractiveness, bankability, unfairness and litigation. The different ways to compensate private partners are examined. A new methodology for calculating the due compensation is proposed whenever governments voluntarily terminate a PPP contract based on the public interest. We posit that early termination clauses of contracts that comprise fair and reasonable compensations are required to provide meaningful incentives and contestability to acceptable returns on essential public services avoiding political and conflicting issues.