Carbon tariffs and cooperative outcomes

In the absence of an international environmental agreement (IEA) on climate change, a country may be reluctant to unilaterally implement environmental actions, as this may lead to the relocation of firms to other, lax-on-pollution countries. To avoid this problem, while still taking care of the environment, a country may impose a carbon tariff that adjusts for the differences between its own carbon tax and the other country's tax. We consider two countries with a representative firm in each one, and characterize and contrast the equilibrium strategies and outcomes in three scenarios. In the first (benchmark) scenario, in a first stage the regulators in the two countries determine the carbon taxes noncooperatively, and in a second stage, the firms compete à la Cournot. In the second scenario, the regulators cooperate in determining the carbon taxes, while the firms still play a noncooperative Cournot game. In the third scenario, we add another player, e.g., the World Trade Organization, which announced a border tax in a prior stage; the game is then played as in the first scenario. Our two major results are (i) a border-tax adjustment (BTA) mimics quite well the cooperative solution in setting the carbon taxes as in scenario two. This means that a BTA may be a way around the lack of enthusiasm for an IEA. (ii) All of our simulations show that a partial correction of the difference in taxes is sufficient to maximize total welfare. In short, the conclusion is that a BTA may be used as a credible threat to achieve an outcome that is very close to the cooperative outcome.     

Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints

Carbon tax policy is widely adopted by many countries to curb carbon emissions. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms have more incentive to improve carbon reduction levels by reducing their carbon tax costs. However, firms need to bear carbon reduction costs that may cause shortage of capital. Thus, firms may face problems of financial constraints, which may demotivate firms to produce greener products. To address the decision‐making challenges of firms in the contexts of carbon tax policy and financial constraints, we consider a supply chain with a manufacturer who produces green products and a retailer who sells these products. Our study develops five models to investigate the two firms’ optimal wholesale price, carbon reduction level and ordering quantity, according to the manufacturer and retailer with or without financial constraints. Our goal in this study is to explore how carbon tax policy and banks’ interest rates affect the profits of the two firms, supply chain and consumer surplus. Certain managerial insights are obtained as follows. We demonstrate that carbon tax policy and banks’ interest rates demotivate the manufacturer to produce greener products and demotivate the retailer to order more products. If the interest rate to the manufacturer (retailer) is relatively low, then the manufacturer with financial constraint benefits (harms) the consumers compared with the retailer with financial constraint. Importantly, our analysis suggests that carbon tax policy harms the firms but benefits consumers, and the government in some conditions should reduce unit carbon tax.     

造价咨询企业增值服务初探

由于绝大部分的造价咨询企业准入门槛较低,因此各地造价咨询企业如雨后春笋涌现,市场竞争日渐激烈,收费费率却一路走低。如何拓展服务范围,提高市场竞争力和收费范围、标准?或者说,同一单业务,除预结算编审费外,是否有其他的收入来源?本文试就此问题展开探讨,期待能给同行一些启示。     

Supplementing an emissions tax by a feed-in tariff for renewable electricity to address learning spillovers

In the presence of learning spillovers related to renewable energy technologies, an optimal strategy to mitigate climate change should complement an emissions tax by a subsidy for renewables. This article addresses the question how such subsidy should be designed. It is shown that the widely-used approach of a revenue-neutral fixed feed-in tariff can yield an optimal outcome under restrictive conditions only. It has to be adapted continuously as the electricity price changes. Moreover, funding the tariff by a surcharge on the electricity price has important implications for the design of the emission tax. The optimal tax rate has to be below the Pigovian level, differentiated across fossil fuels and adapted over time as the patterns of technological development change. These requirements may pose a formidable challenge for practical decision-making. However, it is important to point out that the eventual choices made with respect to the design and funding of a feed-in tariff have to be based on a careful and more comprehensive policy assessment, including, inter alia, economic effects beyond the electricity sector and existing institutional constraints.     

Dedicating new real estate transfer taxes for energy efficiency: A revenue option for scaling up Green Retrofit Programs

As the labor market in the U.S. remains weak, with high unemployment and sluggish job growth, policymakers at various levels of government are looking for new ways to support job growth and investment during an increasingly tight fiscal climate. Policies that promote the “Green Economy” in general and energy efficiency in particular remain politically popular as potential win–win solutions that will create jobs and curb greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, efforts to promote energy efficiency in the residential sector through rebates and incentives alone have yet to reach critical mass. This paper outlines a policy option for state and local governments to use real estate transfer taxes to generate stronger incentives for home buyers to undertake significant retrofit projects at the time of sale. The economic impact of the proposed energy efficiency transfer tax (EETT) is then modeled for the State of North Carolina, using standard input–output techniques. Ultimately, based on housing sales figures from 2010, a new EETT of 2.5 percent on home purchases would generate a net positive increase of approximately 3485 direct construction jobs and 5900 annually total jobs for the state.     

The geographic concentration of housing vouchers,Blacks, and poverty over time: a study of Cincinnati,Ohio, USA

Using data from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) concerning Housing Choice Voucher (HCV, formerly called Section 8) recipients, the authors provide a spatial analysis in Cincinnati, Ohio, USA. ‘Hot spot’ analysis is utilized to detect areas with significant densities of voucher recipients compared with the surrounding environs. Results show that the implementation of Cincinnati's HCV program between 2000 and 2005 in conjunction with public housing transformation has not led to a greater dispersion of voucher recipients and either poverty or racial deconcentration. Many HCV households remain concentrated in hot spots. The implications for US low-income housing policy are discussed.     

Area-specific subsidies and population dynamics: Evidence from the Australian zone tax offset

This paper studies the effect of the zone tax offset (ZTO), a place based income subsidy implemented in rural Australia since 1945. The policy was intended to improve the welfare of inhabitants and provide an incentive for settlement. Our empirical approach exploits the geographical discontinuity in the eligibility for the subsidy to identify its causal effect on population growth. Using data on population by locality from the historical censuses we find that the ZTO had a positive but only temporary effect on population growth in the targeted areas.     

税务筹划及其运用

介绍筹划的概念及其特点．并就企业在组建及以后的投资、筹资、经营活动中，如何应用税务筹划，减轻税负，合法实现纳税利益提出方法和途径。     

借鉴国外权利金改革油气资源税费

我国现有的油气资源税费体制存在诸多问题，影响了国家对资源所有权在经济上的实现，弱化了级差收益的调节作用以及资源的有效利用，而且在一定程度上阻碍了油气田企业的可持续发展。国外主要产油国或地区对油气资源普遍实行权利金制度，为了与国际接轨，提高油气田企业的国际竞争力，要改善现有的油气资源税费体制，建议借鉴国外的先进经验，合并油气资源税费，统一征收权利金。     

资源性产品进出口税率调整对煤炭行业的影响

2006年国家财政部等部委联合下文，规定从2006年9月15日起，煤炭、天然气等资源性产品取消出口退税。继而又下发了相关办法，要求从2006年11月1日起，调整部分进出口商品暂定关税税率。同时，还将以暂定税率形式对110项商品加征出口关税，其中，煤炭、焦炭、原油等4项能源类产品为5％。论述了进出口税率的调整给煤炭企业带来了一定的影响，提出煤炭企业应采取措施，减少其出口成本压力。