原油价格与油田经济开发期

介绍了油田经济开发期的概念,给出了原油价格与经济开发期之间的定量关系,在不同的原油价格下计算了某油田经济开发期,说明原油价格直接影响油田的经济开发期。     

基于K-近邻法的股价曲线的模式识别分类研究

本文将模式识别分类技术应用于股票市场进行搜索选股。本项目采用股票价格走势来构造特征空间,依据样本股票价格走势类型对股票市场上的所有股票进行模式识别分类,并将所获得的分类结果中的第一类股票作为搜索选股的目标股票。通过对沪深两市股票进行的实证研究分析,结果表明:采用模式识别分类技术依据股票价格走势进行搜索选股是可行的,具有良好的实时性和较高的针对性,实用性较强,并可进一步改进。     

需求依赖广告费用和销售价格的newsboy型产品库存模型

在假定随机需求是关于销售价格和广告费用的一般函数的前提下,提出一个新的ｎｅｗｓｂｏｙ模型,给出了寻求最优广告费用、销售价格及订货量的分析方法,并且还分析了需求的不确定性对最优销售价格和广告策略的影响．最后,通过数值实例验证了模型的求解过程并得到相关管理启示．     

Stackelberg Strategies for Selfish Routing in General Multicommodity Networks

A natural generalization of the selfish routing setting arises when some of the users obey a central coordinating authority, while the rest act selfishly. Such behavior can be modeled by dividing the users into an α fraction that are routed according to the central coordinator’s routing strategy (Stackelberg strategy), and the remaining 1−α that determine their strategy selfishly, given the routing of the coordinated users. One seeks to quantify the resulting price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the cost of the worst traffic equilibrium to the system optimum, as a function of α. It is well-known that for α=0 and linear latency functions the price of anarchy is at most 4/3 (J. ACM 49, 236–259, 2002). If α tends to 1, the price of anarchy should also tend to 1 for any reasonable algorithm used by the coordinator. We analyze two such algorithms for Stackelberg routing, LLF and SCALE. For general topology networks, multicommodity users, and linear latency functions, we show a price of anarchy bound for SCALE which decreases from 4/3 to 1 as α increases from 0 to 1, and depends only on α. Up to this work, such a tradeoff was known only for the case of two nodes connected with parallel links (SIAM J. Comput. 33, 332–350, 2004), while for general networks it was not clear whether such a result could be achieved, even in the single-commodity case. We show a weaker bound for LLF and also some extensions to general latency functions. The existence of a central coordinator is a rather strong requirement for a network. We show that we can do away with such a coordinator, as long as we are allowed to impose taxes (tolls) on the edges in order to steer the selfish users towards an improved system cost. As long as there is at least a fraction α of users that pay their taxes, we show the existence of taxes that lead to the simulation of SCALE by the tax-payers. The extension of the results mentioned above quantifies the improvement on the system cost as the number of tax-evaders decreases. Research of G. Karakostas supported by an NSERC Discovery Grant and MITACS. Research of S. Kolliopoulos partially supported by the University of Athens under the project Kapodistrias.     

Non-Cooperative Tree Creation

In this paper we consider the connection game, a simple network design game with independent selfish agents that was introduced by Anshelevich et al. (Proc. 35th Ann. ACM Symp. Theo. Comp. (STOC), pp. 511–520, 2003). Our study concerns an important subclass of tree games, in which every feasible network is guaranteed to be connected. It generalizes the class of single-source games considered by Anshelevich et al. We focus on the existence, quality, and computability of pure-strategy exact and approximate Nash equilibria. For tree connection games, in which every player holds two terminals, we show that there is a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the optimum network. In contrast, for single-source games, in which every player has at most three terminals, the price of stability is at least k−2, and it is -complete to decide the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Hence, we propose polynomial time algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria, which provide relaxed stability and cost efficiency guarantees. For the case of two terminals per player, there is an algorithm to find a (2+ε,1.55)-approximate Nash equilibrium. It can be generalized to an algorithm to find a (3.1+ε,1.55)-approximate Nash equilibrium for general tree connection games. This improves the guarantee of the only previous algorithm for the problem, which returns a (4.65+ε,1.55)-approximate Nash equilibrium. Tightness results for the analysis of all algorithms are derived. Our algorithms use a novel iteration technique for trees that might be of independent interest. This work has appeared in part as an extended abstract at the 31st Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2006) and the 17th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2006). Supported by DFG Research Training Group 1042 “Explorative Analysis and Visualization of Large Information Spaces”.     

Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Selfish Users with Elastic Demands

We examine how to induce selfish heterogeneous users in a multicommodity network to reach an equilibrium that minimizes the social cost. In the absence of centralized coordination, we use the classical method of imposing appropriate taxes (tolls) on the edges of the network. We significantly generalize previous work (Yang and Huang in Transp. Res. Part B 38:1–15, [2004]; Karakostas and Kolliopoulos in Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 268–276, [2004]; Fleischer et al. in Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 277–285, [2004]) by allowing user demands to be elastic. In this setting the demand of a user is not fixed a priori but it is a function of the routing cost experienced, a most natural assumption in traffic and data networks. Research supported by MITACS and a NSERC Discovery grant.     

价格着色Petri网的最小成本可达问题

针对实际业务流程建模中成本预算分析的需要,在着色网的基础上扩展价格信息,提出价格着色网。讨论价格着色网的变迁步规则,根据提出的经济标识,给出最小成本构造算法,以一个业务流程实例演示该模型的应用,证明其能够较好地解决业务流程建模中的成本预算分析问题。     

Modified neo-fuzzy neuron-based approach for economic and environmental optimal power dispatch

At the central energy management center in a power system, the real time controls continuously track the load changes and endeavor to match the total power demand with total generation in such a manner that the operating cost is minimized while all the operating constraints are satisfied. However, due to the strict government regulations on environmental protection, operation at minimum cost is no longer the only criterion for dispatching electrical power. The idea behind the environmentally constrained economic dispatch formulation is to estimate the optimal generation schedule of generating units in such a manner that fuel cost and harmful emission levels are both simultaneously minimized for a given load demand. Conventional optimization techniques become very time consuming and computationally extensive for such complex optimization tasks. These methods are hence not suitable for on-line use. Neural networks and fuzzy systems can be trained to generate accurate relations among variables in complex non-linear dynamical environment, as both are model-free estimators. The existing synergy between these two fields has been exploited in this paper for solving the economic and environmental dispatch problem on-line. A multi-output modified neo-fuzzy neuron (NFN), capable of real time training is proposed for economic and environmental power generation allocation.This model is found to achieve accurate results and the training is observed to be faster than other popular neural networks. The proposed method has been tested on medium-sized sample power systems with three and six generating units and found to be suitable for on-line combined environmental economic dispatch (CEED).     

钻井一公司财务工作面临的问题及解决建议

针对江汉石油管理局钻井一公司财务工作状况应着力改善财务队伍结构,加快人才培养;依据工程合同和完井结算资料,建立市场价格信息采集库,采用责任会计,发挥物资设备管理站材料管理职能;对内部价格分项分析评价,充分发挥内部价格的监督机制作用。还应努力完善核算体系,强化会计核算对经营管理的服务功能;加强财务分析,提高财务管理的宏观把握能力;从财务会计向管理会计延伸,丰富财务管理的内涵;强化外部市场财务管理,提高财务监管水平。     

基于小波分析方法的装备价格指数变化研究

针对传统时间序列方法对物价指数的非平稳现象适应性较差的问题,提出运用小波分析方法,将原始数据分解成不同频率段的平稳信号,进而采用传统方法进行处理,从而提高了预测精度,获得令人满意的效果。