小型水利工程的简易招标方法

针对小型水利工程的特点，提出“标单价，评总额”的简易招标方法，这样既达到了节目工程投资目的，又便于招标投标各方的现场操作。     

Should we collude? Analyzing the benefits of bidder cooperation in online group-buying auctions

Cooperation among bidders in traditional auctions is typically forbidden. This is because it is viewed as being harmful to the interests of sellers, who hope to obtain fair prices for their sale items. It also may be harmful to other bidders who are not able to take advantage of any cooperation that is occurring. In online group-buying auctions, in contrast to traditional auctions, cooperation results in higher welfare, leading to market expansion that benefits buyers and sellers, as well as the auction intermediary. This has not been well understood in prior research, however. In this article, we show how the online group-buying auction mechanism on the Internet can be effectively enhanced to produce higher welfare for the participants. The key to achieving this, we find, is for the auction intermediary to provide a means for bidders to cooperate, so as to collectively express greater demand. Such cooperation, it turns out, permits the group-buying auction mechanism to dominate the fixed-price mechanism from the seller’s point of view under some circumstances. Through an analytical modeling analysis, we offer insights into how sellers can set their group-buying auction price curves more effectively, so as to take advantage of bidder cooperation to improve auction performance. We further argue that the goal of the auction intermediary should be to offer an information sharing mechanism to facilitate bidding ring formation, as a means to maximize the value of this market mechanism.     

从合理低价中标到最低价中标的探讨

阐述合理低价中标到最低价中标是市场经济体制下建筑市场发展的必然趋势,分析了低价中标在实际运作过程可能存在的问题,提出了实施低价中标法应具备的条件和措施。     

电力市场环境下发电公司投标智能决策支持系统

随着“厂网分开、竟价上网”的推进，发电公司迫切需要一套有效的报价辅助决策系统来协助报价人员报价以获得更大的利益。发电公司投标智能决策支持系统(GCBIDSS)是用于辅助发电公司进行报价决策的计算机系统，作者在介绍了智能决策支持系统的概念之后，重点对GCBIDSS的系统结构、工作流程、设计原则、开发思路及基本功能进行了详细介绍。实例仿真表明系统友好的用户界面能帮助决策者，用户充分利用系统的功能作出有效、实时的决策。     

浙江电网发电市场竞价上网辅助决策系统的设计

发电厂竞价上网辅助决策系统是一个集发电竞价上网、生产经营活动管理分析和决策等功能的应用系统。本文针对浙江电网发电市场的特点，对发电厂竞价上网辅助决策系统进行了设计，提出了电厂竞价上网决策的新模式。系统主要包括了数据采集、查询；生产经营活动管理分析；竞价上网决策等三部分。该系统的设计为发电企业提高决策水平，降低决策成本，增强用户的市场竞争力和竞争意识，等起到了积极的作用。     

国外电厂项目投标建设相关问题的探讨

为适应WTO要求，参与国际竞争，对国外电厂项目投标、建设相关问题进行探讨。     

Bidding strategies in online single-unit auctions: Their impact and satisfaction

Online bidders use different strategies in their biddings. However, we are unsure of the bidders strategies and their effectiveness in achieving auction goals. Our study was an attempt to identify bidding strategies empirically in online single-unit auctions and evaluate their outcome in terms of cost saving, perceived bidder enjoyment, and bidder satisfaction. A research model was developed and used to examine the relationships. Both objective and subjective data of online single-unit auctions were collected from Taobao.com to validate our postulated hypotheses. We found three main bidding strategies: early, snipe, and agent-supported ratchet bidding based on their behavior patterns. These resulted in different levels of winning outcome and cost saving, but had no significant effect on perceived enjoyment. The hypotheses of the relationship between auction outcomes and bidder satisfaction of their bidding strategies were confirmed.     

对招标工作中评标委员会组成人员结构合理性的探讨及对策

结合工作实践,从招投标的法律、条例、办法入手,从评标委员会组成人员结构谈起,分析评标委员会组成人员结构的合理性,针对利弊,提出应对措施。     

Generators' bidding behavior in the NYISO day-ahead wholesale electricity market

This paper proposes a statistical and econometric model to analyze the generators' bidding behavior in the NYISO day-ahead wholesale electricity market. The generator level bidding data show very strong persistence in generators' grouping choices over time. Using dynamic random effect ordered probit model, we find that persistence is characterized by positive state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence is more important than unobserved heterogeneity. The finding of true state dependence suggests a scope for economic policy intervention. If NYISO can implement an effective policy to switch generators from higher price groups to lower price groups, the effect is likely to be lasting. As a result, the market price can be lowered in the long-run. Generators' offered capacity is estimated by a two-stage sample selection model. The estimated results show that generators in higher-priced groups tend to withhold their capacity strategically to push up market prices. It further confirms the importance of an effective policy to turn generators into lower price groups in order to mitigate unexpected price spikes. The simulated market prices based on our estimated aggregate supply curve can replicate most volatility of actual DA market prices. Applying our models to different demand assumptions, we find that demand conditions can affect market prices significantly. It validates the importance of introducing demand side management during the restructure of electricity industry.     

承包商在水利工程投标阶段的风险管理

分析了承包商在水利工程投标阶段遇到的各类风险,并针对性地提出了风险防范措施和投标对策.