基于Stackelberg博弈的动态频谱接入控制

为了解决多主用户和多次级用户共存网络的频谱资源分配问题,提出了一种基于斯塔科尔伯格（Stackelberg）博弈的动态频谱接入控制算法。该算法通过三阶段Stackelberg博弈模拟主用户频谱竞价,博弈过程中次级用户以最大化传输速率为目的接入主用户频谱,同时设计了一种迭代过程来求解纳什均衡。实验计算与结果分析证明了纳什均衡唯一存在性的充要条件,并说明了迭代过程的收敛性以及主用户最佳效用的影响因素。     

雷达智能抗干扰体系研究

干扰场景与反干扰手段的多样性,造成了雷达反干扰策略的千变万化,客观上要求雷达反干扰实现智能化。文中提出雷达智能化反干扰系统体系,归纳了构成该系统的要素:基于宽带与窄带干扰侦察相结合的干扰认知技术、基于博弈论的反干扰策略调度技术、系统级的干扰对抗技术。文章所提的认知型智能雷达反干扰体系可以解决雷达向认知方向发展的需求。     

对策论方法在信息网络资源分配中的应用

在研究复杂信息网络的资源分配问题时,网络资源提供者和用户之间对资源的使用存在不同的优化目标,导致对资源分配策略存在多种评价准则。为便于网络管理者进行分布式的资源管理和计费,采用对策论模型分析用户对资源的竞争和处理网络传输拥塞正日益受到广泛的重视。本文首先指出资源分配和计费管理的几个主要难点,比较了中心化与非中心化控制策略的差别,而后综述了采用对策论模型进行资源分配和管理的优点,重点讨论了在非中心化条件下对策均衡解与资源利用效率以及网络计费管理策略之间的关系,最后对基于对策论模型的信息网络流量控制与管理策略进行总体评述。     

The role of water in the device performance of n-type PTCDI-C8 organic field-effect transistors with solution-based gelatin dielectric

Gelatin is a natural protein, which works well as the gate dielectric for N,N-dioctyl-3,4,9,10-perylene tetracarboxylic diimide (PTCDI-C₈) organic field-effect transistors (OFETs). An aqueous solution process was applied to form the gelatin gate dielectric on poly(ethylene terephthalate) (PET) by spin-coating and subsequent casting. The field-effect mobility in the saturation regime (μ_FE,sat) and the threshold voltage (V_T) values of a typical 40 nm PTCDI-C₈ OFET are (0.22 cm² V⁻¹ s⁻¹, 55 V) in vacuum and (0.74 cm² V⁻¹ s⁻¹, 2.6 V) in air ambient. The maximum voltage shift in hysteresis is also reduced from 10 V to 2 V when the operation environment for PTCDI-C₈ OFETs is changed from vacuum to air ambient. Nevertheless, a slight reduction of electron mobility was found when the device was stressed in the air ambient. The change in the device performance has been attributed to the charged ions generation owing to water absorption in gelatin in air ambient.     

软件测试过程中的参与方关系分析

针对典型的第三方测试和内部测试情形进行建模,重点分析测试过程中参与方的合作关系问题.通过混合策略的贝叶斯纳什均衡给出第三方测试过程适用条件,采用沙普利值对参与方合作可能性进行探讨.根据内部测试与第三方测试过程的内在差别,利用重复博弈方法对其进行分析,提出了软件测试过程博弈分析的基本研究过程框架.     

An evolutionary game theory–based security model in vehicular ad hoc networks

The word population is growing on a daily basis; consequently, the growth of commute and transport, developing efficient and intelligent transportation systems (ITS), has become one of the most popular requirements and the most significant attempts in modern urban areas containing large population. A key component of intelligent transportation systems is a vehicular ad hoc network. Devising internet‐based practical programs such as awareness of climatic conditions, geographical location, practical programs like on‐line payment services in the vehicular ad hoc network has led to safer driving, prevention of deadly accidents, transportation improvement, more welfare and convenience for passengers, and even offering more commercial opportunities. The special features of vehicular ad hoc network, such as intense activity, constantly‐changing topology, the vehicles' high speed, etc, will lead to challenges in gaining security. Therefore, providing vehicular ad hoc networks with security is of extreme importance in terms of users' anonymity, identification, and data privacy. In this paper, a security model is presented using a method based on evolutionary games. This method, in every vehicle, is applied as a node in the network while interacting with other vehicles; it aims at distinguishing some common attacks and defending against attackers. In this method, defending (honest) vehicles and attacking vehicles take part in an asymmetrical game; each vehicle aims at gaining the most utility and achieving its goals. The proposed method is simulated using various scenarios. The simulation results reveal that the proposed method is efficient and it reaches equilibrium and convergence at the end of the game in each scenario.     

An evolutionary bargaining‐based approach for incentivized cooperation in opportunistic networks

Opportunistic networking enables users to communicate in an environment where connectivity is intermittent or unstable. However, such networking scheme assumes that mobile nodes voluntary cooperate, which cannot be guaranteed. Some nodes can simply exhibit selfish behavior and thus diminish the effectiveness of the approach. In this paper, a game scenario is formulated in which the nodes try to convince each other to participate in packets forwarding. Each node is considered as a player in this game. When a node comes in the communication range of another, a bargaining game starts between them as part of the message forwarding process. Both players try to have a mutual agreement on a price for message forwarding. We present a new incentive mechanism called evolutionary bargaining‐based incentive scheme (EBIS) to motivate selfish nodes to cooperate in data forwarding. In EBIS, a node negotiates with other nodes to obtain an agreeable amount of credit for its forwarding service. Nodes apply a sequential bargaining game and then adapt their strategies using an evolutionary model to maximize the probability of reaching an agreement. Unlike classical bargaining games, nodes in our model are boundedly rational. In addition, we use the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) concept to determine the adaptive strategies for the nodes. The comparison of EBIS with a benchmarked model demonstrates that EBIS performs better in terms of packet delivery ratio and average latency.     

Settlement of Internal Cutthroat Competition Amid IT Group Companies: Away from "Prisoners'' Dilemma" of Price Wars

Cutthroat competition amid subsidiary companies of IT Group Company due to immanent characteristics of IT industry and grouping management mechanism infringes upon the collective profits. Two ways to avoid cutthroat competition of group company with game theory are studied: the assessment objective made by IT group company for subsidiary companies focuses on profits not revenue;the supervisory department of group company shall intensify law enforcement strength and give severe punishment against illegal depreciation of the subsidiary company.     

Settlement of Internal Cutthroat Competition Amid IT Group Companies: Away from “Prisoners' Dilemma” of Price Wars

Cutthroat competition amid subsidiary companies of IT Group Company due to immanent characteristics of IT industry and grouping management mechanism infringes upon the collective profits. Two ways to avoid cutthroat competition of group company with game theory are studied:the assessment objective made by IT group company for subsidiary companies focuses on profits not revenue; the supervisory department of group company shall intensify law enforcement strength and give severe punishment against illegal depreciation of the subsidiary company.     

一种基于博弈论的无线mesh网络信道分配算法

无线mesh网络中的信道分配会极大地影响网络的性能。为了解决无线mesh网络中的信道分配问题,提出了一种基于博弈论的信道分配(GBCA)算法。该算法将网络中每一个节点模型化为一个博弈者,每个博弈者的策略为信道的分配方案,并将整个网络的吞吐量作为效用函数的目标,效用函数的物理意义则是在给定流量需求矩阵下传输的成功率。博弈者通过相互博弈来优化收益函数,以最大化网络吞吐量。并针对GBCA算法的不足,提出了一种改进算法———GBCA-TP算法。通过NS2.34仿真分析得出,GBCA算法和GBCA-TP算法在收敛性、分组丢失率和吞吐量上都要优于当前的算法。