网络演算的矩阵解释

网络演算是离散事件动态系统理论在计算机网络中的应用,网络演算通过到达曲线和服务曲线计算网络的性能参数,这两个概念封装了复杂的理论背景,从而易于在实际中应用,但对到达曲线和服务曲线概念的理论研究比较缺乏.文中采用幂等矩阵的角度描述到达曲线和服务曲线,演算的过程成为矩阵运算,通过结合矩阵双子理论和余理论的研究结果,得出了由矩阵表演算的基本定理.研究表明,幂等矩阵理论为网络演算提供了很好的理论解释.文中还提出一种基于变换矩阵的方法求某些网络元素的服务曲线.     

移动自组网中非完全信息节点风险评估

移动自组网是一种无中心、自组织以及多跳的无线网络,能否有效可靠地对通信节点进行风险评估是保障节点高质量通信的重要因素.当前基于可信度或是信誉的评估方法对评估样本都有特殊的要求,对评估对象提出种种假设,无法辨别间接样本的恶意推荐问题,在实际移动自组网中各个节点尤其是恶意节点对外暴漏的信息往往偏少,样本数量有限,无法明确判断其状态,大部分是非完全信息,从而导致评估结果缺乏客观性与可靠性.文中提出采用灰色系统理论描述通信节点非完全信息状态,根据灰类白化以及灰色聚类思想进行节点风险评估.方案针对自组网络通信需求对节点行为进行多关键属性划分,采用味集群方法收集原始样本,避免恶意推荐;将难以用数值精确刻画的关键属性以白化权函数量化,引入灰聚类的概念和计算方法,将实体的通信风险水平定义为实体关键属性值序列针对各评估灰类的聚类评估值,从而得到该实体通信风险水平的相对参考值.分析与实际计算表明该方法是一种适合移动自组网中非完全信息节点风险评估的有效方法.     

Matrix games with interval data

The conventional game theory is concerned with how rational individuals make decisions when they are faced with known payoffs. In the real world, sometimes the payoffs are not known and have to be estimated, and sometimes the payoffs are only approximately known. This paper develops a solution method for the two-person zero-sum game where the payoffs are imprecise and are represented by interval data. Since the payoffs are imprecise, the value of the game should be imprecise as well. A pair of two-level mathematical programs is formulated to obtain the upper bound and lower bound of the value of the game. Based on the duality theorem and by applying a variable substitution technique, the pair of two-level mathematical programs is transformed to a pair of ordinary one-level linear programs. Solving the pair of linear programs produces the interval of the value of the game. It is shown that the two players in the game have the same upper bound and lower bound for the value of the imprecise game. An example illustrates the whole idea and sheds some light on imprecise game.     

Institutional pressures and mindful IT management: The case of a container terminal in China

Although it has been only ten years in operations, Yantian International Container Terminals Limited (YICT) has evolved as a world-class container terminal and become the first Chinese port to receive the Best Global Container Port of the Year award for 2005–2006, as well as being designated China's best container terminal in terms of operational efficiency for 2008. A success factor of YICT is its extensive use of IT in managing and enhancing the productivity and services of the port operations. Premised upon Institutional Theory and the organizational mindfulness perspectives (preoccupation with failure and success, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and reliance on expertise over formal authority) and using case study methodology, we examined the institutional pressures faced by YICT in its IT management (ITM), and determined how YICT coped with its institutional pressures during its IT development.     

B2B e-commerce supply chain integration and performance: A contingency fit perspective on the role of environment

Drawing upon contingency theory “fit” research in the IT and supply chain management literature, we applied the “fit” concept to the relationship between B2B e-commerce supply chain integration and performance. The results demonstrated that the effect of B2B supply chain integration on financial, market, and operational performance decreased as product turbulence and demand unpredictability jointly increased. Managerial implications include the conditions under which IT investments yield performance improvement and the need for firms to actively manage demand uncertainty.     

Theoretical analysis of polarization properties for tilted fiber Bragg gratings

The polarization properties for tilted fiber Bragg gratings (TFBGs) are investigated theoretically based on coupled-mode theory and Mueller matrix method. The expression of wavelength-related polarizationdependent loss (PDL) for TFBGs with different tilt angles is derived and calculated. Simulation results are compared, and the results indicate that the polarization capability of TFBGs with 45° angle is stronger than other TFBGs with smaller angles. The degree of polarization for unpolarized light passing T...     

Strong mediated equilibrium

Stability against potential deviations by sets of agents is a most desired property in the design and analysis of multi-agent systems. However, unfortunately, this property is typically not satisfied. In game-theoretic terms, a strong equilibrium, which is a strategy profile immune to deviations by coalition, rarely exists. This paper suggests the use of mediators in order to enrich the set of situations where we can obtain stability against deviations by coalitions. A mediator is defined to be a reliable entity, which can ask the agents for the right to play on their behalf, and is guaranteed to behave in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the agents. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, agents can play in the game directly, without the mediator's help. A mediator generates a new game for the players, the mediated game. We prove some general results about mediators, and mainly concentrate on the notion of strong mediated equilibrium, which is just a strong equilibrium at the mediated game. We show that desired behaviors, which are stable against deviations by coalitions, can be obtained using mediators in several classes of settings.