Efficient revocable ID‐based encryption with cloud revocation server

The capability to efficiently revoke compromised/misbehaving users is important in identity‐based encryption (IBE) applications, as it is not a matter of if but of when that one or more users are compromised. Existing solutions generally require a trusted third party to update the private keys of nonrevoked users periodically, which impact on scalability and result in high computation and communication overheads at the key generation center. Li et al proposed a revocable IBE scheme, which outsources most of the computation and communication overheads to a Key Update Cloud Service Provider (KU‐CSP). However, their scheme is lack of scalability since the KU‐CSP must maintain a secret value for each user. Tseng et al proposed another revocable IBE scheme with a cloud revocation authority, seeking to provide scalability and improve both performance and security level. In this paper, we present a new revocable IBE scheme with a cloud revocation server (CRS). The CRS holds only one secret time update key for all users, which provides the capability to scale our scheme. We demonstrate that our scheme is secure against adaptive‐ID and chosen ciphertext attacks under the k‐CAA assumption and outperforms both schemes mentioned above, in terms of having lower computation and communication overheads.     

数据通信中常用的安全加密技术

基于对称密钥加密、公开密钥加密以及安全单向散列函数等基本安全技术和算法,数据通信通常采用以下几种安全加密技术来解决其应用中遇到的安全问题:采用数字信封技术保证数据的传输安全;采用数字签名和双重数字签名技术进行身份认证并同时保证数据的完整性、完成防抵赖;采用口令字技术或公开密钥技术进行身份认证.     

Biometric-based personal identity-authentication system and security analysis

1 Introduction Personal authentication system is a system that verifies a person’s identity, which he (she) claims to be, usually through login name or smart card, etc. Traditional authentication is based on the possession of a secret key, that is, once the user possesses the key, his (her) authenticity is established. Personal authentication based on PKI is one of the most prevalent authentication methods, which uses a private key to prove the user’s identity. Usually cryptographic keys a…     

一种基于半可信中心的双方不可否认协议

文章提出了一种基于半可信中心的双方不可否认协议,由半可信中心来动态产生时间标记,并对发送方身份进行验证,但不对通信双方的消息进行验证,很好地解决了电子商务系统性能的瓶颈—可信中心的计算能力、重放攻击威胁、通信双方密码泄漏造成的重建维护等问题。     

基于智能手机的机动车电子身份认证比对装置

针对传统机动车身份识别系统设备体积较大、不方便携带和移动的问题,文中开发了基于智能手机的机动车电子身份比对装置,其由微型便携超高频RFID读卡器、智能手机、手机APP及后台数据服务器共同组成。该装置充分利用了智能手机的拍摄、数据处理和通讯功能,配合微型RFID读卡器使用,具有方便携带、可同时完成机动车电子和传统号牌双重识别、可实时联网完成数据比对、价格低廉、工作稳定等特点。同时方便稽查人员随身携带使用,可完成对机动车辆身份的流动稽查、违章违法查处、盗抢套牌车辆查处等工作。     

再论坚持中国特色社会主义文化自信

坚持中国特色社会主义文化自信, 就是坚持对中国特色社会主义文化的认可、尊重、敬仰与传承、发扬、创新。坚持中国特色社会主义文化自信, 必须坚持习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想在意识形态领域的指导地位, 全面把握和深刻理解中国特色社会主义文化的构成及其组成部分之间的内在逻辑关系, 坚持把中华优秀传统文化、革命文化和社会主义先进文化有机结合起来, 因应中国特色社会主义建设实践而不断进行创新, 增进文化认同。     

移动互联网身份管理应用与隐私保护研究

近年来,随着智能终端在全球市场的成功推出,移动互联网的普及与应用得到了快速发展,并已成为日常生活中的重要组成部分,个人隐私泄露与保护问题也日益凸显。因此,亟需建立以身份管理为核心的信息网络基础设施,用于规范个人信息管理、提升政府的监管能力、促进ICT网络的融合与发展。本文从移动互联网面临的用户隐私信息保护问题入手,介绍了移动互联网中身份管理产业推进的情况,提出了身份管理作为信息网络重要基础设施的应对建议以及下一步的研究建议。     

一个新的基于公钥密码机制的安全协议的设计

为了解决网络中的安全传输和通信问题,提出一个新的基于公钥密码机制的安全协议。该安全协议的设计和分析采用了面向主体的逻辑方法。协议中引入了可信任的第三方,采用挑战/响应机制实现通信双方的身份认证,采用Diffie-Hellmam机制实现了密钥协商。通过Rubin逻辑形式化分析,验证了该协议具有一定的严密性,能够实现身份认证和密钥协商功能。     

融入唇语识别技术提升人脸识别安全性的研究

为了解决人脸识别的安全性问题,提高对恶意攻击人脸识别系统的安全防护,使人脸识别技术能够获得更广泛应用,本文提出了在人脸识别技术上融入一种基于深度神经网络的唇语识别技术的系统。与现有的唇语识别技术不同的是,该系统主要是识别用户的唇动习惯。运用本系统,用户在进行人脸识别的同时可按照检测方的提示,读出相应的内容,并在对用户的人脸进行验证的过程中,对用户通过唇动说出的内容分别实现唇动识别、比对,从而有效地提升人脸识别的安全性水平。实验结果表明,在故意针对人脸识别系统的攻击中,融入本技术的系统有更好的识别准确率。     

Cryptanalysis of an identity‐based authenticated key exchange protocol

Authenticated key exchange protocols represent an important cryptographic mechanism that enables several parties to communicate securely over an open network. Elashry, Mu, and Susilo proposed an identity‐based authenticated key exchange (IBAKE) protocol where different parties establish secure communication by means of their public identities.The authors also introduced a new security notion for IBAKE protocols called resiliency, that is, if the secret shared key is compromised, the entities can generate another shared secret key without establishing a new session between them. They then claimed that their IBAKE protocol satisfies this security notion. We analyze the security of their protocol and prove that it has a major security flaw, which renders it insecure against an impersonation attack. We also disprove the resiliency property of their scheme by proposing an attack where an adversary can compute any shared secret key if just one secret bit is leaked.