机会网络自私节点的Bertrand博弈与激励机制研究

在真实的网络环境中,很多节点可能是自私的,它们不愿意牺牲自己的资源为其他节点转发消息。针对这种情况,提出一种基于博弈论的激励机制,可以激励节点与其他节点相互合作。该机制为二阶段激励,激励节点接收消息以协助其他节点转发,同时激励节点转发更多的消息。把源节点与中继节点之间的竞争与合作模型化为Bertrand（伯特兰德）博弈,定义了源节点和中继节点的效用函数。求解了源节点的最佳定价策略和中继节点最佳的转发计划,验证了源节点与中继节点之间存在唯一的纳什均衡。模拟仿真结果表明提出的激励机制能够鼓励自私节点参与合作,能提高路由算法的传递率,同时降低了消息传递延迟。与基于声誉的激励机制相比,所提激励机制能使消息传递成功率提高31.4%、平均时延降低9.7%。     

A hierarchical framework of dynamic relay selection for mobile users and profit maximization for service providers in wireless relay networks

Although extensive research has been carried out on the issue of how to optimally select relays in wireless relay networks, relay selection for mobile users is still a challenging problem because of the requirement that the dynamic selection should adapt to user mobility. Moreover, because the selected relays consume their energy on relaying data for the users, it is required that the users have to pay for this relay service. The price of selecting relays will affect the users' decisions. Assuming that different relays can belong to different service providers, we consider the situation that the service providers can strategically set the prices of their relays to maximize their profits. In this paper, we jointly study the dynamic relay selection for mobile users and profit maximization for service providers. Also, we design a Stackelberg‐game hierarchical framework to obtain the solution. At the lower level, we investigate the relay selection problem for the mobile users under given prices of selecting the relays. It is formulated as a Markov decision process problem with the objective to minimize the mobile user's long‐term average cost (which consists of the payment to the relay service and the cost due to packet loss), and solved by applying the linear programming technique. At the upper level, we study the game of setting relay prices for the service providers, with the knowledge that the mobile users will make relay selections based on their given prices. Nash equilibrium is obtained as the solution. Our results can help to provide a guidance for service providers to compete for providing relay services. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于不对称Nash协商模型的供应链协作激励机制研究

建立了制造商与零售商组成的两级供应链,研究了供应链分散决策与协调决策下的合作双方收益问题,发现协调决策下整个供应链收益大于分散决策时整个供应链收益,但整个供应链的收益增加并不能保证合作各方的收益均增加,因此,有必要进行利益协调与激励。利用不对称Nash协商模型建立了激励供应商与分销商进行协作的利益协调模型,并通过案例分析验证了这种激励机制的有效性。     

计及输电线路约束的电力市场投标均衡点分析

计及输电线路传输约束的电力市场投标模型可将市场参与者的决策空间分成阻塞和无阻塞2个区域.基于Nash均衡的数学定义和一类投标模型,通过分析市场参与者的最优响应曲线的交点确定市场均衡点状态,以3节点市场为例,分析发现在阻塞情况下,市场若存在均衡点,则均衡点位于阻塞和无阻塞的边界上,且均衡点分布为连续的一段线段.通过一类动态投标模型的数值仿真,计算结果与分析结论一致.     

基于博弈论的多机器人任务分配算法

为了寻找一种合理有效的多机器人任务分配算法,基于多机器人协作救火任务环境,以博弈论纳什均衡为基础,研究多机器人的任务分配问题。根据任务模型特点和纳什均衡的主要特征提出了一种基于博弈论的任务分配算法。博弈的效用函数同时考虑了距离、火势和燃烧时间等因素,机器人根据此效用函数选择行为策略,促使机器人尽快扑灭惩罚值较大的火灾而获得较大的奖励值。利用任务总收益函数值的大小评价算法的优劣性。收益函数与火势、燃烧时间和机器人扑灭火灾数有关,这切合实际救火模型。实验结果证明了该任务分配算法的有效性。     

基于演化博弈论的无线传感网监测节点分群算法

针对大规模无线传感器网络多辐射源定位中,辐射源公共覆盖范围内监测节点能耗过高造成网络寿命降低的问题,提出一种基于演化博弈理论（EGT）的传感网监测节点分群算法。通过将最优节点集的搜索空间映射到博弈的策略组合空间,以博弈的效用函数为目标函数构建了非合作博弈模型;利用纳什均衡分析及均衡的扰动恢复过程实现目标优化;设计了分群算法以优化节点集组成相应的群参与最终的定位。以接收信号强度指示（RSSI）/信号到达时间差（TDOA）两轮定位为例,将该算法与典型的最近邻算法、基于离散粒子群优化（DPSO）的分群算法在定位精度和网络寿命方面作对比。仿真结果表明,该分群算法避免了多辐射源公共覆盖区域内节点能耗较高的问题,延长了网络寿命,同时保证了对辐射源的定位。     

基于局部信息交互的博弈学习算法

博弈理论在无线通信领域的应用愈加广泛并逐渐成为解决无线频谱资源分配的重要方法之一。论文关注5G通信系统中的异构信道选择问题,针对该问题传统集中式优化机制系统效率较优但优化开销大,而传统分布式优化机制优化开销较少但系统效率受限。为实现系统效率与优化开销的有效折衷,论文将问题建模为局部合作博弈,提出基于局部信息交互的博弈学习算法,实现了系统在分布式优化机制下达到最优性能。仿真结果验证了算法的最优性,收敛性和稳健性。     

线性二次闭环微分对策次优对策的双线性矩阵不等式方法

The suboptimal control program via memoryless state feedback strategies for LQ differential games with multiple players is studied in this paper. Sufficient conditions for the existence of the suboptimal strategies for LQ differential games are presented. It is shown that the suboptimal strategies of LQ differential games are associated with a coupled algebraic Riccati inequality. Furthermore, the problem of designing suboptimal strategies is considered. A non-convex optimization problem with BMI constrains is formulated to design the suboptimal strategies which minimizes the performance indices of the closed-loop LQ differential games and can be solved by using LMI Toolbox of MATLAB. An example is given to illustrate the proposed results.     

基于纳什均衡的网格资源管理模型

提出了一种基于纳什均衡的网格资源分配模型.该模型中,多个资源是合作博弈参与者,将任务在资源上的等待时间转化为一个极大极小问题,通过数学模型求得最优解,并据此提出了任务的分配算法.分析证明该算法可以实现合作博弈唯一的纳什均衡.     

地区间电力市场互联互通相关问题（二）基于双向差价合约的互联互通市场的纳什均衡分析

电力市场互联互通是拓展资源优化配置空间的有效方式。在互联互通电力市场模型研究的基础上，通过分析基于双向差价合约的互联互通市场成员的报价策略和博弈行为，发现当市场成员能够较准确预测互联互通区域市场出清价格时，其在分地区市场中的最优报价策略将转化为按互联互通市场出清价格报价，从而达到纳什均衡，互联互通电力市场最终将趋于统一电力市场。在此基础上，提出了逐步开放互联互通市场的政策建议，并用实际算例验证了其可行性和优越性。