Agent协商研究进展

自2001年Jennings研究协商以来,已经成为MAS研究的热点。介绍了协商的定义、研究内容、应用领域;分析了协商的复杂性;总结了通用的单议题协商和多议题协商协议的对策论模型;综述了Agent多议题协商的策略与学习算法;并分别介绍了两种典型的多议题协商：拍卖和并发协商,给出组合拍卖、多属性拍卖和并发协商的基本模型及其研究进展;最后探讨了协商存在问题和将来可能的发展方向,指出作为交互、竞争与合作的基础,协商需要继续深入的探讨,也必将成为多Agent系统研究的主流。     

基于代理和BPEL4WS的Web服务合成与实现

Web服务的交互和实现被推荐通过软件代理来实现.Web服务目前还不能很好地支持动态、自适应的服务组合和分布式业务流程.软件代理在建模、知识表达和交互等技术上的优势,能够强化Web服务的交互和动态应用能力.基于代理和面向流程建模的BPEL4WS,可以实现Web服务面向业务应用的合成与执行,支持多个协同的业务流程及其动态配置.系统分析了代理、BPEL4WS和Web服务整合的技术与实现方案,利用JADE平台开发了相关的测试模型,并且以网上拍卖为案例,验证了所提方案及实现.     

基于混合型多属性决策方法的目标威胁评估

针对目标属性信息存在不确定性的特点,通过对目标属性选取及其权重确定方法的全面分析,采用混合精确实数型指标和模糊区间型指标的决策模型,评价目标多属性并对目标威胁进行评估。最后给出仿真实例,仿真结果表明该方法简单、可靠,为目标威胁评估提供了又一有效途径。     

频谱拍卖中投标者共谋策略与多频段拍卖中共谋问题的讨论

本文通过对单频段拍卖中共谋问题的研究,从抑制共谋的角度,提出了最优的拍卖机制是第一价格封闭式拍卖,论证了频谱拍卖中投标者的最优共谋策略,给出了拍卖方基于保留价格的应对投标者共谋的对策。在单频段拍卖研究的基础上,进一步将频谱拍卖中的共谋问题引申到多频段拍卖中,讨论了当待售频段之间具有互补性和替代性时的共谋情况。     

多属性群决策在项目风险评价中的应用

工程项目的风险因素多,项目风险评价工作比较复杂.基于有序加权平均算子(0WA算子)和加权算术平均算子(CWAA算子)的多属性群决策,整合两种加权算子在纵向和横向集结的优点,对工程项目的风险值进行纵向与横向集结,可以比较有效地消除决策者主观因素的影响,并增加中间值的作用,使工程项目风险综合评价更加科学、合理.实例分析验证了该方法的可行性与有效性.     

多属性决策问题的一种新方法

研究了一类属性权重未知的多属性决策问题，提出了一种基于关联分析的多属性决策新模型。该模型中在确定属性权重时充分结合Delphi法和层次分析法的优点，给出了一种确定属性权重的新方法——带有专家可信度的非线性优化层次分析法。还给出了一个决策实例证明了该决策方法的可行性和合理性。     

Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price,Sealed-Bid Auctions within the Common-Value Paradigm

Within the common-value paradigm, I examine the magnitude of the differencein expected outcome between first-price and second-price, sealed-bid auctions.I limit myself to two empirical specifications of bidders' signals: Weibulland normal distribution. The optimal bid functions and the expected procurer'scost under both auction formats are derived. Simultions are undertaken toanalyze the impact that random draws of signals have on the differences inoutcome from the two auction formats. Using estimates from structuralestimation in previous empirical work on first-price auction data, whereWeibull and normal distributions of signals have been applied, thehypothetical expected gain from switching from a first-price, sealed-bidauction to a second-price, sealed-bid auction mechanism is computed.     

Grid resource management based on economic mechanisms

Resources in the grid context belong to different control organizations with different interest, therefore the economic interest of each grid participant should be considered. The economic mechanism can guarantee the interest of participants in the grid with fairness and efficiency. In this paper, an economic-based resource management framework is put forward for grid computing, and then how to determine the price of resources with the economic mechanism is studied. A general equilibrium method is presented for general resources and a double auction method is proposed for special resources in the grid environment, respectively. Simulations are performed and experimental results indicate that the two methods are effective for corresponding application scenarios. Expanded version of a paper presented at CCGrid 2005.     

Analysis and Future Prospects for Cross-border Congestion Management Methods for the European Electricity Market

This paper presents an analysis of current and potential cross-border congestion management methods for the EU electricity market. Many currently used techniques are reported and the main aspects of possible future are presented. The main steps of the newly established coordinated auction technique will be reported and an example of a real case for the South European Region will be implemented. Moreover, in order to eliminate loop flows, avoid congestions at the day ahead stage and increase the total transfer capacity of the south UCTE region (countries Greece, Albania and FYROM), it will be shown that Flexible Ac Transmission Systems technology can help market players to get access to more transfer capacity for their transactions, while security margins are being maintained.     

EFFECTS OF A RATIONING RULE ON THE AUSUBEL AUCTION: A GENETIC ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION

The increasing use of auctions as a selling mechanism has led to a growing interest in the subject. Thus both auction theory and experimental examinations of these theories are being developed. A recent method used for carrying out examinations on auctions has been the design of computational simulations. The aim of this article is to develop a genetic algorithm to find automatically a bidder optimal strategy while the other players are always bidding sincerely. To this end a specific dynamic multiunit auction has been selected: the Ausubel auction, with private values, dropout information, and with several rationing rules implemented. The method provides the bidding strategy (defined as the action to be taken under different auction conditions) that maximizes the bidder's payoff. The algorithm is tested under several experimental environments that differ in the elasticity of their demand curves, number of bidders and quantity of lots auctioned. The results suggest that the approach leads to strategies that outperform sincere bidding when rationing is needed.