浅谈"如何进行成功的商务谈判"

就商务谈判的准备工作、谈判的策略及如何成功的进行商务谈判作了探讨。     

Negotiation based on constraints in cooperation

This paper presents some aspects of cooperation in organizations. In the first part, we present the importance to coordination processes within an organization. Indeed, the information perceived by the company no longer pertains to the realm of the repetitive, predictable and programmable. In this context of limited rationality, how can one define an efficient and acceptable decision coordination and distribution structure? We argue that the intervention of man in the decisional process remains inescapable on account of the limitations of the coordination process, and define several forms of cooperation between decision centers on an industrial site. In the second part, the assumption retained is that for the management of a production system the decision is made through a network of decision centers. The approach presented puts forward the development of decision and cooperation aid tools only exploiting the information contained in the constraints linking together the decision variables so as to highlight the degrees of freedom effectively available to the decision maker. Finally, we discuss about cooperation and power, where the power issue cannot be disregarded.     

From self-prediction to self-defeat: Behavioral forecasting, self-fulfilling prophecies, and the effect of competitive expectations.

Four studies explored behavioral forecasting and the effect of competitive expectations in the context of negotiations. Study 1 examined negotiators' forecasts of how they would behave when faced with a very competitive versus a less competitive opponent and found that negotiators believed they would become more competitive. Studies 2 and 3 examined actual behaviors during a negotiation and found that negotiators who expected a very competitive opponent actually became less competitive, as evidenced by setting lower, less aggressive reservation prices, making less demanding counteroffers, and ultimately agreeing to lower negotiated outcomes. Finally, Study 4 provided a direct test of the disconnection between negotiators' forecasts for their behavior and their actual behaviors within the same sample and found systematic errors in behavioral forecasting as well as evidence for the self-fulfilling effects of possessing a competitive expectation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Novel Admission Control Algorithm Based on Negotiation and Price

1　Introduction　In a media server that supports Quality of Service (QoS),an admission control algorithm determines whether or not anew request can be admitted to the server such that all userswill receive their required performance[1]. In general, ad mission control algorithms can be divided into deterministic,observation based and statistical ones. Deterministic algo rithms guarantee the specific QoS requirement by reservingthe resources for the worst case requirement of each applic…     

对商务谈判策略和技巧的体会

采购是企业经营的重要环节 ,而商务谈判是采购不可或缺的重要组成部分。讲究谈判策略 ,提高谈判技巧 ,最终增强议价能力是降低采购成本的有效途径。本文试图通过举例来说明谈判的策略和技巧。     

Constraints and triggers: Situational mechanics of gender in negotiation.

The authors propose 2 categories of situational moderators of gender in negotiation: situational ambiguity and gender triggers. Reducing the degree of situational ambiguity constrains the influence of gender on negotiation. Gender triggers prompt divergent behavioral responses as a function of gender. Field and lab studies (1 and 2) demonstrated that decreased ambiguity in the economic structure of a negotiation (structural ambiguity) reduces gender effects on negotiation performance. Study 3 showed that representation role (negotiating for self or other) functions as a gender trigger by producing a greater effect on female than male negotiation performance. Study 4 showed that decreased structural ambiguity constrains gender effects of representation role, suggesting that situational ambiguity and gender triggers work in interaction to moderate gender effects on negotiation performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bargaining over multiple issues in finite horizon alternating-offers protocol

In this paper we study multi issue alternating-offers bargaining in a perfect information finite horizon setting, we determine the pertinent subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide an algorithm to compute it. The equilibrium is determined by making a novel use of backward induction together with convex programming techniques in multi issue settings. We show that the agents reach an agreement immediately and that such an agreement is Pareto efficient. Furthermore, we prove that, when the multi issue utility functions are linear, the problem of computing the equilibrium is tractable and the related complexity is polynomial with the number of issues and linear with the deadline of bargaining.      

Claiming a large slice of a small pie: Asymmetric disconfirmation in negotiation.

Three studies show that negotiators consistently underestimate the size of the bargaining zone in distributive negotiations (the small-pie bias) and, by implication, overestimate the share of the surplus they claim (the large-slice bias). The authors explain the results by asymmetric disconfirmation: Negotiators with initial estimates of their counterpart's reservation price that are "inside" the bargaining zone tend to behave consistently with these estimates, which become self-fulfilling, whereas negotiators with initial "outside" estimates revise their perceptions in the face of strong disconfirming evidence. Asymmetric disconfirmation can produce a population-level bias, even when initial perceptions are accurate on average. The authors suggest that asymmetric disconfirmation has implications for confirmation bias and self-fulfilling-prophecy research in social perception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

引进设备自控系统应注意的问题

通过引进设备在安装调试中几个特殊实例，介绍引进设备自控系统在技术谈判中应注意的问题。