图像识别技术在3D-RPG游戏开发中的应用

基于OGRE(Object-oriented Graphics Rendering Engine)设计开发一个3D-RPG(Role-Playing Game)游戏引擎RPGGE(RPG Game Engine)。在RPGGE中融入图像识别技术,使玩家可以通过摄像头识别手势来增加游戏交互。RPGGE开发包括渲染系统、输入输出系统、声音系统、识别系统。     

基于Moran过程的竞争性舆情信息的网络传播博弈模型

新的媒体环境下,在享受不同形式在线社交网络提供便捷信息互动渠道的同时,需要加强对信息传播的管理与引导,防止其发展成为负面舆情信息肆意滋生的温床。结合传统演化博弈论与复杂网络理论,提出了竞争性舆情信息的网络传播博弈模型,并理论分析了正面舆情信息传播占优的收益条件及群体规模;随后,结合实际案例,通过仿真实验对比分析三种博弈环境下网络舆情的演化特征。三种博弈环境下,正面舆情信息传播策略占优条件均与收益有关,弱选择情境对收益参数的要求最为严格;强、弱选择情景下策略占优的条件还与群体规模有关,且强选择情景对群体规模的要求更为严格。     

Searching minimax game trees under memory space constraint

Games such as CHESS, GO and OTHELLO can be represented by minimax game trees. Among various search procedures to solve such game trees,- and SSS^* are perhaps most well known. Although it is proved that SSS^* explores only a subset of the nodes explored by-, - is commonly believed to be faster in real applications, since it requires very little memory space and hence its storage management cost is low. Contrary to this folklore, however, this paper reports, using the OTHELLO game as an example, that SSS^* is much faster than-. It is also demonstrated that SSS^* can be modified to make the required memory space controllable to some extent, while retaining the high efficiency of the original SSS^*.This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan, under a Scientific Grant-in-Aid.     

The Peer’s Dilemma: A general framework to examine cooperation in pure peer-to-peer systems

The exploration of social dilemmas is being considered a major foundation for encountering the enforced necessities of cooperation in self-organizing environments. Such environments are characterized by self-interested parties and the absence of trusted third parties. Recent approaches apply evolutionary socio-inspired games to formally prove the existence and further prolongation of cooperation patterns within communities. For instance, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game has thus provided a rich opportunity to examine self-interested behaviors in pure peer-to-peer networks. However, assuming a total absence of coalitions, incentives and punishment mechanisms, several works argue against a durable maintenance of cooperation neither at single-shot nor repeated-scenarios. In this article, we formally and experimentally demonstrate a counterexample for the latter by applying evolutionary game theory and a particular instance of the Rock–Scissors–Paper game. Our framework proves that the cyclic dominance of certain type of nodes within a P2P system has an impact and introduces a strategic aspect to the evolution of the overall community.     

证券市场中庄家与散户间的确定性微分博弈

基于确定性微分博弈理论,建立了一种庄家与散户间的连续时间的博弈模型.首先将所有散户作为一个整体与庄家进行博弈,以博弈双方持股率的动态关系作为动态系统方程,并以此构建了一个确定性微分博弈模型; 然后运用开环纳什均衡和反馈纳什均衡分别求解出满足共态函数的常微分方程组和满足价值函数的Issacs - Bellman偏微分方程,以此得到庄家与散户博弈的开环纳什均衡策略和反馈纳什均衡策略.该结果可为金融监管部门监管证券市场和证券市场投资者买卖股票提供参考.     

工程计价方式"双轨制"下的寻租博弈行为分析

由于渐进式改革形成的工程计价方式“双轨制”及市场的不完善性和无序性,为寻租行为的产生提供了环境。本文作者通过建立投资方、项目执行者、承包方三方之问的寻租博弈模型,求解混合策略纳什均衡解,根据均衡解分析在不同条件下三方的最优策略,并提出了防止寻租行为的对策。     

考虑新能源消纳及需求响应不确定性的配电网主从博弈经济调度

针对当前配电网侧风电消纳率较低的问题,运用Stackelberg动态博弈理论,提出一种以配电网侧为主体、负荷侧为从体的主从博弈模型.通过分析用户负荷特性,建立用户负荷特性模型;运用三角模糊数描述需求响应的不确定性,建立价格型需求响应不确定性模型;以配电网侧配电网运行成本最小及风电消纳最大、负荷侧用户电费最低为目标建立配电网主从博弈经济模型,二者通过优化配电网侧的准实时电价策略集及负荷侧需求响应策略集达到博弈均衡;以修改后的IEEE 30节点系统为算例,采用改进型教与学优化算法求得该主从博弈模型的均衡解.算例仿真分析表明,所建模型能够有效提高配电网风电消纳能力,减少配电网运行成本和用户电费,实现主、从体双方社会效益与经济效益最优化.     

Internal structure of coalitions in competitive and altruistic graphical coalitional games

This paper introduces a certain graphical coalitional game where the internal topology of the coalition depends on a prescribed communication graph structure among the agents. The game Value Function is required to satisfy four Axioms of Value. These axioms make it possible to provide a refined study of coalition structures on graphs by defining a formal graphical game and by assigning a Positional Advantage, based on the Shapley value, to each agent in a coalition based on its connectivity properties within the graph. Using the Axioms of Value the graphical coalitional game can be shown to satisfy properties such as convexity, fairness, cohesiveness, and full cooperativeness. Three measures of the contributions of agents to a coalition are introduced: marginal contribution, competitive contribution, and altruistic contribution. The mathematical framework given here is used to establish results regarding the dependence of these three types of contributions on the graph topology, and changes in these contributions due to changes in graph topology. Based on these different contributions, three online sequential decision games are defined on top of the graphical coalitional game, and the stable graphs under each of these sequential decision games are studied. It is shown that the stable graphs under the objective of maximizing the marginal contribution are any connected graph. The stable graphs under the objective of maximizing the competitive contribution are the complete graph. The stable graphs under the objective of maximizing the altruistic contribution are any tree.