Transmission access and pricing with multiple separate energyforward markets

California's congestion management protocols provide comparable access and prices to all users of the transmission system (power exchange and bilateral contract parties). The users implicitly bid for capacity on major transmission paths between zones. The independent system operator (ISO) allocates the available transmission capacity on these paths so that it maximizes the value of this capacity as measured by the users' bids. Everyone scheduling flow on a congested path is charged the marginal-cost-based price for using the path. The ISO keeps each party's portfolio of generation and load individually in balance when adjusting schedules to relieve congestion on interzonal paths. By keeping the portfolios of the different parties separate, the ISO clears its transmission market without arranging energy trades between parties. Parties are responsible for arranging their own trades. The ISO does not become involved in the energy forward markets     

Evaluation of transmission network capacity use for wheelingtransactions

The authors describe the principles and the implementation of a methodology to evaluate the transmission network capacity use for firm transmission services including wheeling transactions. In this methodology, transmission network capacity use of a transaction is a function of the magnitude of electric power, the length of the transmission lines, and the type of facility involved in the transaction. This capacity value provides an equitable means of allocating the cost of transmission facilities among users of the firm transmission service. Through examples, it is shown that this methodology, called the MW-mile methodology, is more reflective of the actual usage of the transmission network in allocating the transmission network capacity cost than the now widely used postage stamp rate procedure. Also indicated is the potential for realizing greater economic efficiencies through the use of this methodology     

Transmission rights and transmission expansions

In this paper, we propose a new method of defining rights that may be assigned to the developer of a transmission expansion project. They include a right to collect the value of the capacity provided by the expansion project as well as the value arising from the admittance of the expansion project. This approach not only ties the rights allocation to actual physical characteristics of the transmission project but also allows such allocation to remain independent both of the order in which the projects are treated and of any previously allocated transmission rights.