Design of a methodology for impact assessment of energy efficiency programs: measuring indirect effects in the Chilean case

Today, many countries are promoting energy efficiency (EE) measures as part of their energy strategy. Among the goals sought with these actions are producing a decoupling between economic growth and energy consumption, reducing the dependence on fossil fuels as a primary energy source, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Measuring direct, indirect, and co-benefit effects of EE programs is crucial. However, in the current literature and practice, assessments of EE programs have focused on direct impacts (i.e., impacts whose energy savings can be directly and instantaneously quantified) due to their objectivity and simplicity to put evaluations in a cost-effectiveness framework. Moreover, several assessment methodologies studying the indirect effects of EE programs only focus on identifying the effects and quantifying a proxy of the effects in terms of the number of activities developed or the number of people attending EE training or dissemination events. Some few existing methodologies correctly assess the indirect effects of EE measures, but they often require a significant budget. We propose a new methodology to assess the impacts of EE programs, especially focusing on indirect effects (i.e., long-term effects on energy use), that is suitable for low-budget programs. We focus on those indirect effects having the capability of mobilizing long-term energy savings through transformations in energy markets. We attempt to measure the potential future energy savings that are sustainable in the long term due to a behavioral transformation of energy markets. In order to measure these indirect effects, we use three axes: presence, valuation, and mobilizing capacity. This methodology was applied to 12 EE programs (implemented during 2011 and 2012 in Chile) in order to obtain their indirect impact assessment.     

Valuation of the Economic Impact of the Initial Allocation of Tradable Emission Permits in Air Pollution Control

One of the key concerns about applying emission permits systems in air pollution control is the initial allocation of entitlements. In this paper, a model that captures the interaction between strategic firms and a permit-allocating authority to assess social-welfare implications of the initial allocation regimes of tradable emission permits is introduced. In particular, a three-period model is formulated for studying how the exercise of market power by oligopolistic firms affects the pollution control technology investments and, in this way, the valuation of different initial allocation proposals. The analysis shows that a proactive allocation of initial entitlements may improve social welfare with respect to a distribution that ignores the interactions between the initial allocation of emission permits and the firms’ strategic response in pollution control technology investment. The results are illustrated in the context of a sulfur dioxide emission permits system for the thermal electricity generation industry in Chile.     

Intertemporal Planning of Transmission Expansions in Restructured Electricity Markets

In the new environmental era, electricity markets change rapidly, requiring dynamic strategic responses from market agents and regulators. In this paper, we study the intertemporal dimension of the network planner decision process. In particular, we formulate a dynamic model of transmission investments and use this model to compare the behavior of a network planner when considering and when ignoring the dynamic nature of transmission investments. This paper’s analysis focuses on the situation faced by some hubs with growing demand which meet their demand with power generated by distant sources subject to uncertainty. This is the case of a large city, which demand is satisfied by hydro or wind power supplied from sources located far away. For this kind of systems (typified as a simple two-node network that satisfies certain properties), we characterize the structure of a socially efficient transmission investment policy. It is shown that, in such a network, an optimal open-loop transmission investment policy has a multiperiod (s,S) structure. The results are illustrated with a numerical example.     

Do generation firms in restructured electricity markets have incentives to support social-welfare-improving transmission investments?

This paper examines the incentives that generation firms have in restructured electricity markets for supporting long-term transmission investments. In particular, we study whether generation firms, which arguably play a dominant role in the restructured electricity markets, have the incentives to fund or support incremental social-welfare-improving transmission investments. We examine this question in a two-node network and explore how such incentives are affected by the ownership of financial transmission rights (FTRs) by generation firms. In the analyzed two-node network, we show both (i) that the net exporter generation firm has the correct incentives to increase the transmission capacity incrementally up to a certain level and (ii) that, although a policy that allocates FTRs to the net exporter generation firm can be desirable from a social point of view, such a policy would dilute the net-importer-generation-firm's incentives to support transmission expansion. Moreover, if all FTRs were allocated or auctioned off to the net exporter generation firm, then it is possible to increase both consumer surplus and social welfare while keeping the net exporter generation firm revenue neutral.     

Economic Criteria for Planning Transmission Investment in Restructured Electricity Markets

From an economic perspective, a common criterion for assessing the merits of a transmission investment is its impacts on social welfare. The underlying assumption in using this criterion is that side payments may be used to distribute the social gains among all market players. In reality, however, since the impacts of an electricity transmission project on different players may vary, such side payments are rather difficult to implement. This paper focuses on different economic criteria that should be considered when planning electricity transmission investments. We propose an electricity transmission investment assessment methodology that is capable of evaluating the economic impacts on the various effected stakeholders and account for strategic responses that could enhance or impede the investment's objectives. We formulate transmission planning as an optimization problem under alternative conflicting objectives and investigate the policy implications of divergent expansion plans resulting from the planner's level of anticipation of strategic responses. We find that optimal transmission expansion plans may be very sensitive to supply and demand parameters. We also show that the transmission investments have significant distributional impact, creating acute conflicts of interests among market participants. We use a 32-bus representation of the main Chilean grid to illustrate our results.     

Inhibition of InsP3R with Xestospongin B Reduces Mitochondrial Respiration and Induces Selective Cell Death in T Cell Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia Cells

T-cell acute lymphoblastic leukemia (T-ALL) is an aggressive hematological malignancy whose chemoresistance and relapse persist as a problem despite significant advances in its chemotherapeutic treatments. Mitochondrial metabolism has emerged as an interesting therapeutic target given its essential role in maintaining bioenergetic and metabolic homeostasis. T-ALL cells are characterized by high levels of mitochondrial respiration, making them suitable for this type of intervention. Mitochondrial function is sustained by a constitutive transfer of calcium from the endoplasmic reticulum to mitochondria through the inositol 1,4,5-trisphosphate receptor (InsP3R), making T-ALL cells vulnerable to its inhibition. Here, we determine the bioenergetic profile of the T-ALL cell lines CCRF-CEM and Jurkat and evaluate their sensitivity to InsP3R inhibition with the specific inhibitor, Xestospongin B (XeB). Our results show that T-ALL cell lines exhibit higher mitochondrial respiration than non-malignant cells, which is blunted by the inhibition of the InsP3R. Prolonged treatment with XeB causes T-ALL cell death without affecting the normal counterpart. Moreover, the combination of XeB and glucocorticoids significantly enhanced cell death in the CCRF-CEM cells. The inhibition of InsP3R with XeB rises as a potential therapeutic alternative for the treatment of T-ALL.     

Electric-systems integration in the Andes community: Opportunities and threats

This paper identifies some sustainable and technically feasible alternatives for electric exchange through interconnections among the electric systems of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In particular, we assess such interconnections from both technical and economic perspectives, and identify the main technological, commercial and regulatory barriers for their development. The analysis is carried out at the pre-feasibility level from both private and social point of views, based on the assessment of different investment alternatives in the transmission systems among the aforementioned countries.