Similarity as an explanatory construct

Theories can be found throughout cognitive science that give an explanatory role to similarity. Such theories can be contrasted with those that model thought using abstract rules. We lay out four possible explanatory roles for similarity. We then review the computational pros and cons of similarity- and rule-based models and outline the empirical work that speaks to the psychological plausibility of the two frameworks. We conclude that an adequate model of human thought must take advantage of both the flexibility of similarity-based inference and the compositionality and certainty associated with rule-based inference.     

Cognitive processes in propositional reasoning.

Propositional reasoning is the ability to draw conclusions on the basis of sentence connectives such as "and," "if," "or," and "not." A psychological theory of propositional reasoning explains the mental operations that underlie this ability. The ANDS (A Natural Deduction System) model, described in this article, is one such theory that makes explicit assumptions about memory and control in deduction. ANDS uses natural deduction rules that manipulate propositions in a hierarchically structured working memory and that apply in either a forward or a backward direction (from the premises of an argument to its conclusion or from the conclusion to the premises). The rules also allow suppositions to be introduced during the deduction process. A computer simulation incorporating these ideas yields proofs that are similar to those of untrained Ss, as assessed by their decisions and explanations concerning the validity of arguments. The model also provides an account of memory for proofs in text and can be extended to a theory of causal connectives. (65 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice.

People tend to attach less value to a good if they know a delay will occur before they obtain it. For example, people value receiving $100 tomorrow more than receiving $100 in 10 years. We explored one reason for this tendency (due to Parfit, 1984): In terms of psychological properties, such as beliefs, values, and goals, the decision maker is more closely linked to the person (his or her future self) receiving $100 tomorrow than to the person receiving $100 in 10 years. For this reason, he or she prefers his or her nearer self to have the $100 rather than his or her more remote self. Studies 1 and 2 showed that the greater the rated psychological connection between 2 parts of a participant’s life, the less he or she discounted future monetary and nonmonetary benefits (e.g., good days at work) over that interval. In Studies 3–5, participants read about characters who undergo large life-changing (and connectedness-weakening) events at different points in their lives and then made decisions about the timing of benefits on behalf of these characters. All 5 studies revealed a relation between perceived psychological connectedness and intertemporal choice: Participants preferred benefits to occur before large changes in connectedness but preferred costs to occur after these changes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Parts of activities: Reply to Fellbaum and Miller (1990).

If people believe that one activity is a kind of another, they also tend to believe that the second activity is a part of the first. For example, they assert that deciding is a kind of thinking and that thinking is a part of deciding. C. Fellbaum and G. A. Miller's (see record 1991-03356-001) explanation for this phenomenon is based on the idea that people interpret part of in the domain of verbs as a type of logical entailment. Their explanation, however, suffers from at least 2 deficiencies. First, it fails to account for parallel effects with nouns (e.g., a contest is a kind of an activity, and an activity is a part of a contest). Second, it contains a flaw that incorrectly predicts many activities to be parts of each other (e.g., coming is part of going and going part of coming). However, a hypothesis L. J. Rips and F. G. Conrad (see record 1989-24843-001) originally proposed for the kind–part reciprocal effect avoids both of these difficulties. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning and conversation.

Informal arguments take place when individuals exchange views on whether it is worthwhile to believe some assertion or take some action. Debates between friends or family members, classroom sparring about an idea, scientific exchanges about empirical results or theories, and critical discussions and responses in many fields can all be instances of arguments. This article describes the structure of these arguments in terms of the conversational moves that participants can make within them—for example, asking for a justification, giving a reason, offering an objection, or conceding a point. The central part of the article proposes a model for the way people determine to which of the argument's claims each participant is committed. According to the model, commitment is the result of rules defined over the sequence of conversational moves. A participant's commitment to claims that occur later in the argument has well-defined implications for commitment to claims that occurred earlier. Predictions from the model compare well with people's judgments of commitment over a range of argument types. The analysis of argument commitment also illuminates concepts such as burden of proof that are difficult to define within current reasoning theories that treat just a single side of an issue. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Folk psychology of mental activities.

A central aspect of people's beliefs about the mind is that mental activities—for example, thinking, reasoning, and problem solving—are interrelated, with some activities being kinds or parts of others. In common-sense psychology, reasoning is a kind of thinking and reasoning is part of problem solving. People's conceptions of these mental kinds and parts can furnish clues to the ordinary meaning of these terms and to the differences between folk and scientific psychology. In this article, we use a new technique for deriving partial orders to analyze subjects' decisions about whether one mental activity is a kind or part of another. The resulting taxonomies and partonomies differ from those of common object categories in exhibiting a converse relation in this domain: One mental activity is a part of another if the second is a kind of the first. The derived taxonomies and partonomies also allow us to predict results from further experiments that examine subjects' memory for these activities, their ratings of the activities' importance, and their judgments about whether there could be "possible minds" that possess some of the activities but not others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)