Self-organized public-key management for mobile ad hoc networks

In contrast with conventional networks, mobile ad hoc networks usually do not provide online access to trusted authorities or to centralized servers, and they exhibit frequent partitioning due to link and node failures and to node mobility. For these reasons, traditional security solutions that require online trusted authorities or certificate repositories are not well-suited for securing ad hoc networks. We propose a fully self-organized public-key management system that allows users to generate their public-private key pairs, to issue certificates, and to perform authentication regardless of the network partitions and without any centralized services. Furthermore, our approach does not require any trusted authority, not even in the system initialization phase.     

Nash equilibria of packet forwarding strategies in wireless ad hoc networks

In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multihop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist without incentive mechanisms. We propose a model,based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and noncooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios.. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stab le-cooperation needs to be encouraged.     

Secure vehicular communication systems: implementation, performance, and research challenges

Vehicular communication systems are on the verge of practical deployment. Nonetheless, their security and privacy protection is one of the problems that have been addressed only recently. In order to show the feasibility of secure VC, certain implementations are required. In [1] we discuss the design of a VC security system that has emerged as a result of the European SeVe- Com project. In this second article we discuss various issues related to the implementation and deployment aspects of secure VC systems. Moreover, we provide an outlook on open security research issues that will arise as VC systems develop from today?s simple prototypes to fullfledged systems.     

Node cooperation in hybrid ad hoc networks

A hybrid ad hoc network is a structure-based network that is extended using multihop communications. Indeed, in this kind of network, the existence of a communication link between the mobile station and the base station is not required: A mobile station that has no direct connection with a base station can use other mobile stations as relays. Compared with conventional (single-hop) structure-based networks, this new generation can lead to a better use of the available spectrum and to a reduction of infrastructure costs. However, these benefits would vanish if the mobile nodes did not properly cooperate and forward packets for other nodes. In this paper, we propose a charging and rewarding scheme to encourage the most fundamental operation, namely packet forwarding. We use "MAC layering" to reduce the space overhead in the packets and a stream cipher encryption mechanism to provide "implicit. authentication" of the nodes involved in the communication. We analyze the robustness of our protocols against rational and malicious attacks. We show that-using our solution-collaboration is rational for selfish nodes. We also show that our protocols thwart rational attacks and detect malicious attacks.     

Peptide growth factors in normal and hypertrophied bladder

The pharmacokinetics of oral zidovudine in HIV-infected children and adults are reported. Fourty-six patients were investigated. For data analysis three groups of similar size were formed: young children 4 months-4 years, n = 15 (group 1), older children up to 13 years, n = 16 (group 2) and young adults, n = 15 (group 3). After a single oral dose repeated blood samples were taken 1/2 hourly during a period of 4 hours and zidovudine concentrations in plasma were determined by high performance liquid chromatography. For better comparison of dose dependent parameters peak concentrations (Cmax) and the area under the time-concentration curves (AUC) were normalized either to the dose/body weight (bw) or the dose/body surface area (bs), respectively. Time to reach peak concentrations and mean terminal elimination half-life times (t1/2 beta = 63.4 +/- 47.6, 74.9 +/- 54.9 and 56.9 +/- 16.4 min in group 1, 2 and 3, respectively, mean +/- SD) were not significantly different between the three groups. With normalization to dose/bw young children in comparison to adults had significantly lower Cmax (2.7 +/- 1.3 vs. 4.6 +/- 2.4 mumol/l, p = 0.016) and AUC (226 +/- 108 vs. 373 +/- 224 mumol.min/l, p = 0.038). Group 2 gave intermediate values. However, with normalization to dose/bs differences in Cmax (6.5 +/- 3.3, 7.3 +/- 4.2 and 6.8 +/- 3.6 mumol/l, in group 1, 2, and 3, respectively) and AUC (563 +/- 313, 691 +/- 351 and 555 +/- 342 mumol.min/l, in group 1, 2 and 3) were not significant between the three groups. It is likely that changes in body water content with age may account for most of these differences observed. In conclusion, a similar pharmacokinetic profile was found in children older than 3 months as compared to older children or adults.     

Extensions to an authentication technique proposed for the globalmobility network

We present three attacks on the authentication protocol that has been proposed for the so-called global mobility network in the October 1997 issue of the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. We show that the attacks are feasible and propose corrections that make the protocol more robust and resistant against two of the presented attacks. The aim is to highlight some basic design principles for cryptographic protocols, the adherence to which would have prevented these attacks     

Abnormal prostate development in C3(1)-bcl-2 transgenic mice

Two bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG)-susceptible mouse strains, BALB/c and C57BL/6, were infected intravenously with Mycobacterium intracellulare, M. avium or M. scrofulaceum and monitored during 3 months for mycobacterial replication and antibody and Th1-type cytokine production in response to cytoplasmic and secreted antigens from M. bovis BCG. Whereas initial colony-forming unit (CFU) counts of M. intracellulare and M. avium were higher in lungs than in spleen, the opposite was observed for M. scrofulaceum. Mycobacterium intracellulare was the most virulent species and its replication could not be controlled in either mouse strain. It also induced the strongest antibody response. Mycobacterium avium was eliminated in both mouse strains and M. scrofulaceum finally was eliminated in C57BL/6 but multiplied in spleen from BALB/c mice. Significant sustained interleukin-2 and interferon-gamma production towards BCG antigens was only found in M. scrofulaceum infection. As in BCG-vaccination, M. scrofulaceum-infected C57BL/6 mice demonstrated a higher response towards whole BCG culture filtrate, BCG extract and purified antigen 85 complex (Ag85) from BCG than did BALB/c mice. The data suggest that the presence of M. scrofulaceum in the environment may possibly interfere in genetically predisposed subjects with BCG vaccine and its protective efficacy against M. tuberculosis.     

Removing the financial incentive to cheat in micropayment schemes

Micropayment schemes usually do not provide fairness, which means that either the payer or the payee, or both, can cheat the other and gain a financial advantage by misbehaving in the protocols. The authors propose an extension to a family of micropayment schemes that removes the financial incentive to cheat. The proposed extension does not provide true fairness, but it renders misbehaving practically futile for both the payer and the payee. This is achieved without any substantial loss in efficiency in most practical cases     

A pessimistic approach to trust in mobile agent platforms

The problem of protecting an execution environment from possibly malicious mobile agents has been studied extensively, but the reverse problem, protecting the agent from malicious execution environments, has not. We propose an approach that relies on trusted and tamper-resistant hardware to prevent breaches of trust, rather than correcting them after the fact. We address the question of how to base trust on technical reasoning. We present a pessimistic approach to trust that tries to prevent malicious behavior from occurring in the first place, rather than correcting it after it has occurred