Memory scanning: Are fixed and varied sets scanned concurrently or successively?

Subjects were timed as they decided whether individually presented probe letters were or were not contained in pairs of memorized sets of one, two, or four letters. One set was fixed in advance of a block of trials, while the other varied from trial to trial. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects responded positively if the probe was in either set and negatively otherwise; in Experiment 3 they made different responses to fixed-set, varied-set, and negative probes. In all three experiments, reaction time (RT) to varied-set probes depended more on the size of the varied set than of the fixed set, whereas RT to fixed-set and negative probes depended more on the size of the fixed set. These results were generally consistent with the hypothesis that scanning of the two sets was at least to some extent concurrent rather than successive, with the fixed set scanned more slowly than the varied set. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissociating Processes Supporting Causal Perception and Causal Inference in the Brain.

An understanding of relations between causes and effects is essential for making sense of the dynamic physical world. It has been argued that this understanding of causality depends on both perceptual and inferential components. To investigate whether causal perception and causal inference rely on common or on distinct processes, the authors tested 2 callosotomy (split-brain) patients and a group of neurologically intact participants. The authors show that the direct perception of causality and the ability to infer causality depend on different hemispheres of the divided brain. This finding implies that understanding causality is not a unitary process and that causal perception and causal inference can proceed independently. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The left-right problem in psychology.

The first half of the paper makes some general observations on the difficulty of telling left from right. In particular, it is suggested that the problem of discriminating mirror-image stimuli, such as b and d, is not a problem of perception, but is rather one of remembering which label applies to which stimulus. The paper then discusses three different theories of left-right confusion, which share the common idea that coding is left-right reversed between the two halves of the brain. The theories proposed by Orton and by Noble are rejected in favour of a compromise theory which states that there is veridical exchange of perceptual information between the cerebral hemispheres, but that there is a left-right reversal in the transfer of memory traces from one hemisphere to the other. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Lexical access and phonological decoding in adult dyslexic subtypes.

Lexical access and phonological decoding were tested in 100 normal adult readers and 21 adult dyslexic individuals. Within the dyslexic sample, 11 dysphonetic dyslexic and 10 dyseidetic dyslexic participants were classified on the basis of spelling patterns. In the 1st experiment, adult dyseidetic readers showed a marked deficit on the lexical-access decision task in comparison with adult dysphonetic readers. In the 2nd experiment, the phonological-decoding decision task did not separate the subtypes. A lexical-access deficit in adult dyseidetic dyslexia cannot be explained in terms of a developmental delay. A phonological-decoding deficit in adult dyseidetic dyslexia may be explained by increased involvement of the lexical procedure in phonological assembly under an analogy strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of the anterior commissure in callosal agenesis.

Two individuals with callosal agenesis (J.P. and M.M.) and 10 neurologically normal participants were tested on tasks requiring interhemispheric visual integration. M.M., whose anterior commissure was within normal limits, was much worse at matching colors and letters between visual fields than within visual fields, whereas J.P., whose anterior commissure was greatly enlarged, showed no evidence of interhemispheric disconnection. This suggests that in some cases of callosal agenesis, probably a minority, an enlarged anterior commissure may compensate for the lack of the corpus callosum. Neither acallosal participant showed interhemispheric disconnection on tasks requiring integration of location and orientation, however, suggesting that the anterior commissure plays no role in such tasks. These tasks may depend on subcortical commissures, such as the intertectal commissure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The genetics and evolution of handedness

At some point in hominid evolution, a mutation may have produced a "dextral" (D) allele, strongly biasing handedness in favor of the right hand and control of speech toward the left cerebral hemisphere. An alternative (chance [C]) allele is presumed directionally neutral, although there are probably other genes that influence asymmetries and that may create a weak bias toward right-handedness (and other asymmetries). Simulations show that the D allele could have spread quite quickly through a population, given even a minuscule advantage of CD heterozygotes over CC and DD homozygotes in terms of reproductive fitness. This heterozygotic advantage would also explain the apparent stability in the relative proportions of left-handers and right-handers. This putative, uniquely human allele may have emerged with the evolution of Homo sapiens in Africa some 150,000 to 200,000 years ago.     

Memory scanning: Can subjects scan two sets at once?

In a critique of W. Schneider and R. M. Shiffrin's (see record 1977-20305-001) view that memory scanning is a controlled process, C. Ryan (see record 1983-22634-001) has purported to demonstrate that Ss can scan 2 memorized sets concurrently and independently. Ryan's contention is based on the mistaken premise that successive scanning of 2 sets should result in an increase in the slope of the function relating reaction time (RT) to the size of either set, compared with the slope obtained from scanning either set alone. It is suggested that Ryan's data are more compatible with successive than with concurrent scanning of 2 sets. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Laterality and human evolution.

The question of whether there is a fundamental discontinuity between humans and other primates is discussed in relation to the predominantly human pattern of right-handedness and left-cerebral representation of language. Both phenomena may go back at least to Homo habilis, 2–3 million years ago. However, a distinctively human mode of cognitive representation may not have emerged until later, beginning with H. erectus and the Acheulean tool culture about 1.5 million years ago and culminating with H. sapiens sapiens and rapid, flexible speech in the last 200,000 years. It is suggested that this mode is characterized by generativity, with multipart representations formed from elementary canonical parts (e.g., phonemes in speech, geons in visual perception). Generativity may be uniquely human and associated with the left-cerebral hemisphere. An alternative, analogue mode of representation, shared with other species, is associated with the right hemisphere in humans. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)