排序方式: 共有2条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Fugard Andrew J. B.; Pfeifer Niki; Mayerhofer Bastian; Kleiter Gernot D. 《Canadian Metallurgical Quarterly》2011,37(3):635
We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a 6-sided die and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upward when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the sides of each die. In 2 experiments (N? = 66, N? = 65), the conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and material conditional responses were negligible. In both experiments, the percentage of participants giving a conditional event response increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with most participants shifting from a conjunction interpretation. The shift was moderated by the order of shape and color in each conditional's antecedent and consequent: Participants were more likely to shift if the antecedent referred to a color. In Experiment 2 we collected response times: Conditional event interpretations took longer to process than conjunction interpretations (mean difference = 500 ms). We discuss implications of our results for mental models theory and probabilistic theories of reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved) 相似文献
2.
Bundy A Jamnik M Fugard A 《Philosophical transactions. Series A, Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences》2005,363(1835):2377-88; discussion 2388-91
To those brought up in a logic-based tradition there seems to be a simple and clear definition of proof. But this is largely a twentieth century invention; many earlier proofs had a different nature. We will look particularly at the faulty proof of Euler's Theorem and Lakatos' rational reconstruction of the history of this proof. We will ask: how is it possible for the errors in a faulty proof to remain undetected for several years-even when counter-examples to it are known? How is it possible to have a proof about concepts that are only partially defined? And can we give a logic-based account of such phenomena? We introduce the concept of schematic proofs and argue that they offer a possible cognitive model for the human construction of proofs in mathematics. In particular, we show how they can account for persistent errors in proofs. 相似文献
1