Social validation of everyday knowledge: Heterogeneity and consensus functionality.

This article presents evidence supporting the idea that laypeople use specific types of informational cues about the composition of groups to derive and attribute validity to the knowledge conveyed by these groups. A pilot study and two experimental studies analyzed the role of consensus and heterogeneity information when participants attribute validity to the positions of opposing groups. We predicted that consensus information is moderated by heterogeneity information. When two groups are described as equally consensual, greater validity is attributed to the more heterogeneous group, while when one group is described as more consensual than the other heterogeneity information will not contribute to the validation of groups' opinions. Our studies support this prediction in different scenarios and with different manipulations of groups' composition in terms of their internal heterogeneity. These findings are discussed in the context of the role played by social metacognitive beliefs in everyday knowledge validation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Resolving the apparent discrepancy between the incongruency effect and the expectancy-based illusory correlation effect: The TRAP model.

The incongruency effect and the expectancy-based illusory correlation effect seem contradictory because they describe apparently contrasting consequences of previously held expectancies: better recall of incongruent than congruent items but overestimation of congruent items. This article resolves this dilemma by presenting a model that is able to simultaneously predict both of these effects. The Twofold Retrieval by Associative Pathways (TRAP) model adopts the encoding assumptions of person memory models but distinguishes between two different retrieval processes, exhaustive and heuristic, hypothesized to underlie recall and frequency estimation, respectively. Experiment 1 showed that expectancy-based illusory correlation effects and incongruency effects are compatible in that they were produced simultaneously. Experiments 2 and 3 tested and rejected alternative explanations for the obtained pattern of results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stereotypes: Static Abstractions or Dynamic Knowledge Structures?

Stereotypes have been assumed to be long-lasting knowledge structures that persist even in the face of contrary evidence. However, there is almost no within-participant research relevant to this assumption. The authors describe 4 studies (N=267), the first 3 of which assessed within-participant stereotype stability over a few weeks with measures of stereotypic trait verification, typicality ratings of exemplar sets, and exemplar retrieval. In the 4th study, the authors manipulated context stability. Overall, results showed only low-to-moderate stereotype stability. The stability obtained was a function of the perceived centrality of traits or exemplars and of context constancy. The authors discuss the implications of these results for abstractionist, exemplar, mixed, and connectionist models and identify possible mechanisms that underlie within-participant stereotype instability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The Impact of Stereotype-Incongruent Information on Perceived Group Variability and Stereotype Change." Correction to Garcia-Marques and Mackie (1999).

Reports an error in "The impact of stereotype-incongruent information on perceived group variability and stereotype change" by Leonel Garcia-Marques and Diane M. Mackie (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999[Nov], Vol 77[5], 979-990). In this article, Table 3 (p. 987) contained an error. The row "Number of subgroups" was inadvertently omitted. The corrected table appears in this erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1999-01257-006.) Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exhaustive and heuristic retrieval processes in person cognition: Further tests of the TRAP model.

The twofold retrieval by associative pathways (TRAP) model (L. Garcia-Marques & D. L. Hamilton, 1996) proposes that two distinct modes of retrieval typically underlie recall and frequency estimation. The model accounts for the simultaneous occurrence of greater recall of incongruent information and higher frequency estimation of congruent information. Three experiments provided further tests of the TRAP model. Experiment 1 manipulated cognitive load (at encoding and at retrieval) and the selectivity of the retrieval goal. Under either high load or a selective retrieval goal, incongruent items ceased to be better recalled. Experiment 2 manipulated the accessibility of expectancy-congruent, -incongruent, or -neutral episodes and found corresponding effects in frequency estimates. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that providing part-list retrieval cues inhibits recall but increases frequency estimates. The TRAP model predicted these results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making.

The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of stereotype-incongruent information on perceived group variability and stereotype change.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 78(4) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2007-17406-001). In this article, Table 3 (p. 987) contained an error. The row "Number of subgroups" was inadvertently omitted. The corrected table appears in this erratum.] Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of repetition-induced familiarity on agreement with weak and strong arguments.

Repeated statements are perceived as more valid than novel ones, termed the illusion of truth effect, presumably because repetition imbues the statement with familiarity. In 3 studies, the authors examined the conditions under which and the processes by which familiarity signals from repetition and argument quality signals from processing of message content influenced agreement with persuasive arguments. Participants with low or high motivation to process information were presented persuasive arguments seen once or twice. In all 3 studies, repetition increased the persuasiveness of weak and strong arguments when little processing of message content occurred. Two of the studies used a process dissociation procedure to reveal that both greater controlled processing (which reflected argument content) and the greater automatic influence of familiarity (which reflected repetition) were associated with increased acceptance of strong arguments but that greater controlled processing dissipated the benefits of familiarity for agreement with weak arguments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)