Role playing variations and their informational value for person perception.

The hypotheses were offered that the degree to which an individual conforms to a role (a set of behavior expectancies), the less he reveals about himself; in complete identity with the role, S's behavior is almost entirely determined by what he experiences to be expected of him; and behavior inconsistent with role expectancy is generally determined by idiosyncratic attitudes. Ss listened to recorded interviews between a psychologist and a "job applicant." The positions were that of submariner and astronaut; both, as described, involved different personality types. Tapes were made between interviewer and interviewee for the 2 positions, from which 4 tapes were produced: 2 with the actual answers, and 2 with answers of 1 spliced to questions of the other halfway through the tape. Ss tended to perceive the out-of-role answers as revealing more of the interviewee's personality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The coming of creative confluence in therapeutic practice.

In recent decades we have witnessed a broad convergence among therapeutic schools toward a common concern with human meaning. This concern first centered on individual subjectivity, but more recently shifted to meaning within relationship. At the same time, this latter move, often identified as social constructionist, questions the possibility of rational or empirical foundations for practice. With this shift in emphasis toward pluralism and collaboration, the door opened to a broader array of therapeutic possibilities. In a first wave are therapies expanded to include political, spiritual, and bodily concerns. However, the ultimate direction is toward creative confluence, in which therapists draw from multiple domains of cultural life to create unique combinations of treatment activity. While holding enormous promise, such a condition may also be perilous to the profession. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Neuropsychological differentiation of depression and anxiety.

The high comorbidity of depression and anxiety is well established empirically but not well understood conceptually, in terms of either psychological or biological mechanisms. A neuropsychological model of regional brain activity in emotion provides contrasting hypotheses for depression and anxiety, with depression associated with a relative decrease and anxiety with a relative increase in right-posterior activity. These hypotheses received support in a comparison of individuals diagnosed with depression and community controls, and also in a separate study of nonpatients administered a measure of perceptual asymmetry. Hierarchical regressions revealed that depression and anxiety were uniquely and jointly associated with perceptual asymmetry. In light of consistent empirical support for the model, implications for conceptualizations of the comorbidity of depression and anxiety are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Right-posterior face processing anomaly in depression.

Evidence of a right-posterior brain anomaly was found in a study of 19 individuals with major depression and 15 controls. Participants performed a recognition-memory task involving positive, neutral, and negative face and word stimuli. Scalp brain wave topography suggested a region-specific anomaly in the depressed group. Individuals with major depression demonstrated a reduction in the N200 component of the event-related brain potential to faces and not words. Furthermore, results indicate that the regional anomaly is specific to positive facial stimuli. Findings are interpreted in light of a model of regional brain specialization in emotion and psychopathology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental illness, predictability, and affective consequences as stimulus factors in person perception.

Before and after attempting to predict the behavior of a stimulus person (SP) in a choice situation, 64 Ss were asked to record their impressions of him on a trait rating scale. By design (a) the SP was presented as normal or mentally ill, (b) his behavior was predictable or unpredictable, and (c) errors of prediction were or were not signaled by a noxious buzzer. As predicted, evaluative judgments of the mentally ill SP did not vary as a function of predictability unless predictive failures were accompanied by unpleasant consequences, and unless the SP himself had control over the delivery of these consequences. Judgments of the normal SP were solely a function of his predictability, regardless of the consequences of predictive failure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exploring the postmodern: Perils or potentials?

In an attempt to rescue the self from the ravages of postmodern analysis, M. B. Smith (see record 1994-37277-001) called into action traditional investments in science and moral vision. However, not only are the grounds for these investments found wanting, they themselves harbor threats to human well-being. Furthermore, by understanding the postmodern conception of language as relational, a certain place can be made for both empirical research and moral deliberation. At the same time, postmodern thought opens new vistas for psychology and new horizons for the self. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response to book reviews: Relating to my reviewers.

Responds to the reviews by K. O'Doherty (see record 2011-04026-005) and J. W. Clegg (see record 2011-04026-006) of the current author's book, Relational being: Beyond self and community (see record 2009-10534-000). One of my chief reactions to the resistances represented in these reviews is that the volume failed to make clear a vision of how we might go on together in the academic world where different viewpoints dominate. To elaborate: both reviewers take issue with my relational account in terms of its seeming dismissal or eradication of cherished concepts—including for Clegg, personal experience, genuine selfknowledge, and independent moral agency; and for O’Doherty, individual awareness, agency, and causality. In a certain sense their resistances are justified. My account raises critical concerns with such concepts, and in certain cases offers a radical reconceptualization. Both reviewers also suggest that these are questions of fundamental ontology, and offer arguments against what they see as my faulty foundations. However, as I tried to explain in the work, I approach theory development from a social constructionist perspective. This means replacing the traditional goal of the theorist to “tell the truth” about the world, with the attempt to generate an intelligibility that may foster different—and possibly more viable—forms of life. In effect, I am not attempting to articulate a final philosophy; I neither propose nor wish to argue ontology. From a constructionist perspective such arguments are futile; on what grounds other than those we construct could we settle such differences? Now to be fair, both Clegg and O’Doherty recognize this constructionist background, and my attempt to avoid eliminating alternative traditions or conceptions. However, this recognition does not deter them from returning to questions of fundamentals; they seem to want a knock-down conflict in which “justified true belief” will win out. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The social constructionist movement in modern psychology.

Discusses the social constructionist movement in modern psychology, noting that social constructionism views discourse about the world not as a reflection or map of the world but as an artifact of communal interchange. Both as an orientation to knowledge and to the character of psychological constructs, constructionism presents a significant challenge to conventional understanding. Although the roots of constructionist thought may be traced to long-standing debates between empiricist and rationalist schools of thought, constructionism moves beyond the dualism of these traditions and places knowledge within the process of social interchange. Although the role of psychological explanation is problematic, a fully developed constructionism could furnish a means for understanding the process of science and invites the development of alternative criteria for the evaluation of psychological inquiry. (100 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Postmodern psychology: Resonance and reflection.

K. J. Gergen comments on the reactions to his exchange (see record 1994-37275-001) with M. B. Smith (see record 1994-37277-001) from R. L. Russell and M. D. Gaubatz (see record 1995-36714-001); B. Denner (see record 1995-36711-001); D. Mente (see record 1995-36713-001); and D. White and A. Wang (see record 1995-36716-001). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)