The Emotional Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum.

H. D. Saltzstein and T. Kasachkoff (2004) (see record 2004-21519-004) critique the social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) (see record 2001-18918-008), but the model they critique is a stripped-down version that should be called the "possum" model. They make 3 charges about the possum model that are not true about the social intuitionist model: that it includes no role for reasoning, that it reduces social influence to compliance, and that it does not take a developmental perspective. After a defense of the honor of the social intuitionist model, this article raises 2 areas of legitimate dispute: the scope and nature of moral reasoning and the usefulness of appealing to innate ideas, rather than to learning and reasoning, as the origin of moral knowledge. This article presents 3 clusters of innate moral intuitions, related to sympathy, hierarchy, and reciprocity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.

How and why do moral judgments vary across the political spectrum? To test moral foundations theory (J. Haidt & J. Graham, 2007; J. Haidt & C. Joseph, 2004), the authors developed several ways to measure people’s use of 5 sets of moral intuitions: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. Across 4 studies using multiple methods, liberals consistently showed greater endorsement and use of the Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity foundations compared to the other 3 foundations, whereas conservatives endorsed and used the 5 foundations more equally. This difference was observed in abstract assessments of the moral relevance of foundation-related concerns such as violence or loyalty (Study 1), moral judgments of statements and scenarios (Study 2), “sacredness” reactions to taboo trade-offs (Study 3), and use of foundation-related words in the moral texts of religious sermons (Study 4). These findings help to illuminate the nature and intractability of moral disagreements in the American “culture war.” (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emotional dog does learn new tricks: A reply to Pizarro and Bloom (2003).

D. A. Pizarro and P. Bloom (see record 2002-08416-009) argued against the social intuitionist model of moral judgment in the current author's article (see record 2001-18918-008) and for a modified rationalist model. This reply responds to their 2 main arguments by demonstrating that an intuitionist model allows for malleability and flexibility in judgment, and it allows for cases of moral deliberation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond reciprocity: Gratitude and relationships in everyday life.

The emotion of gratitude is thought to have social effects, but empirical studies of such effects have focused largely on the repaying of kind gestures. The current research focused on the relational antecedents of gratitude and its implications for relationship formation. The authors examined the role of naturally occurring gratitude in college sororities during a week of gift-giving from older members to new members. New members recorded reactions to benefits received during the week. At the end of the week and 1 month later, the new and old members rated their interactions and their relationships. Perceptions of benefactor responsiveness predicted gratitude for benefits, and gratitude during the week predicted future relationship outcomes. Gratitude may function to promote relationship formation and maintenance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog?

Explored whether disgusting or disrespectful actions are judged to be moral violations, even when these actions are harmless. Stories about victimless yet offensive actions (such as cleaning one's toilet with a flag) were presented to Brazilian and US adults and children of high and low SES (N?=?360). Results show that college students at elite universities judged these stories to be matters of social convention or of personal preference. Most other Ss, especially in Brazil, took a moralizing stance toward these actions. For these latter Ss, moral judgments were better predicted by affective reactions than by appraisals of harmfulness. Results support the claims of cultural psychology (R. A. Shweder, 1991) and suggest that cultural norms and culturally shaped emotions have a substantial impact on the domain of morality and the process of moral judgment. Suggestions are made for building cross-culturally valid models of moral judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Viewing cute images increases behavioral carefulness.

Infantile physical morphology—marked by its “cuteness”—is thought to be a potent elicitor of caregiving, yet little is known about how cuteness may shape immediate behavior. To examine the function of cuteness and its role in caregiving, the authors tested whether perceiving cuteness can enhance behavioral carefulness, which would facilitate caring for a small, delicate child. In 2 experiments, viewing very cute images (puppies and kittens)—as opposed to slightly cute images (dogs and cats)—led to superior performance on a subsequent fine-motor dexterity task (the children's game “Operation”). This suggests that the human sensitivity to those possessing cute features may be an adaptation that facilitates caring for delicate human young. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What (and Why) Is Positive Psychology?

Positive psychology is the study of the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning of people, groups, and institutions. In this brief introduction, the authors give examples of current work in positive psychology and try to explain why the positive psychology movement has grown so quickly in just 5 years. They suggest that it filled a need: It guided researchers to understudied phenomena. The authors close by addressing some criticisms and shortcomings of positive psychology, such as the relative lack of progress in studying positive institutions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)