More on the psychology of false confessions.

Responds to comments by J. T. McCann (see record 1998-00122-001) and A. Reifman (see record 1998-00122-002) concerning S. M. Kassin's article (see record 1997-07781-003) on the psychology of false confessions. It is stated that these commentaries offer interesting perspectives with which to expand what is currently known about the psychology of confession evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the "general acceptance" of eyewitness testimony research: A new survey of the experts.

In light of recent advances, this study updated a prior survey of eyewitness experts (S. M. Kassin, P. C. Ellsworth, & V. L. Smith, 1989). Sixty-four psychologists were asked about their courtroom experiences and opinions on 30 eyewitness phenomena. By an agreement rate of at least 80%, there was a strong consensus that the following phenomena are sufficiently reliable to present in court: the wording of questions, lineup instructions, confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, postevent information, child witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication, the cross-race bias, weapon focus, the accuracy–confidence correlation, the forgetting curve, exposure time, presentation format, and unconscious transference. Results also indicate that these experts set high standards before agreeing to testify. Despite limitations, these results should help to shape expert testimony so that it more accurately represents opinions in the scientific community. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The psychology of confession evidence.

Basic questions are raised concerning police interrogations, the risk of false confessions, and the impact that such evidence has on a jury. On the basis of available research, it was concluded that the criminal justice system currently does not afford adequate protection to innocent people branded as suspects and that there are serious dangers associated with confession evidence. The specific problems are threefold: (a) The police routinely use deception, trickery, and psychologically coercive methods of interrogation; (b) these methods may, at times, cause innocent people to confess to crimes they did not commit; and (c) when coerced self-incriminating statements are presented in the courtroom, juries do not sufficiently discount the evidence in reaching a verdict. It is argued that the topic of confession evidence has largely been overlooked by the scientific community and that further research is needed to build a useful empirical foundation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The "general acceptance" of psychological research on eyewitness testimony: A survey of the experts.

63 experts on eyewitness testimony were surveyed about their courtroom experiences and opinions on various issues. There was a strong consensus indicated by an agreement rate of at least 80% that the data on the following topics are reliable enough to present in court: the wording of questions, lineup instructions, misleading postevent information, the accuracy–confidence correlation, attitudes and expectations, exposure time, unconscious transference, showups, and the forgetting curve. Over 70% of the experts also endorsed lineup fairness, the cross-race identification bias among White witnesses, and the tendency to overestimate the duration of events. Although most eyewitness experts who have testified have done so on behalf of criminal defendants, they were just as likely to consent for the prosecution as for the defense; moreover, they were more likely to agree to testify in civil cases than in criminal. Concerning their role in court, most respondents indicated that their main objective is to educate the jury, and that juries are more competent with the aid of experts than without. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the power of confession evidence: an experimental test of the fundamental difference hypothesis

In Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), a U.S. Supreme Court majority stated that confessions are similar to, not fundamentally different from, other types of evidence. To evaluate this claim, three mock juror studies compared the impact of confessions to other common forms of evidence. In Experiment 1, participants read summaries of four criminal trials (murder, rape, assault, theft), each of which contained a confession, an eyewitness identification, character testimony, or none of the above. Significantly, the confessions produced the highest conviction rates. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants read a murder or assault trial containing all three types of evidence and made a series of midtrial judgments. Results indicated that the confession was seen as the most incriminating, followed by the eyewitness and character testimony. Although the comparisons we made are limited in certain respects, our findings suggest that confessions are uniquely potent.     

Children's use of the discounting principle: A perceptual approach.

Introduced a perceptual analog technique in a developmental investigation of the discounting principle. In Exp I, 60 kindergartners, 2nd and 4th graders, and college students watched animated films depicting the simultaneous movements of 2 triangles toward a goal—one that was pushed by an external object (facilitative cause present) and one that was not (facilitative cause absent). Although undergraduates understood the discounting principle, the younger Ss did not. However, because many children (mis)interpreted the "push" as an aversive stimulus, a 2nd experiment illustrated a sequence in which 1 of 2 triangles was "carried" toward a goal. For this version, 80 kindergartners; 2nd, 4th, and 6th graders; and college students all made the discounting-consistent choice, and kindergartners tended to do the same. Age differences emerged only in Ss ability to explain their responses. The development of a multiple sufficient cause schema and the animated film technique are discussed. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Eyewitness researchers as experts in court: responsive to change in a dynamic and rational process": Comment.

Responds to the comments by M. L. McCullough (see record 2002-12932-018) on the original article (see record 2001-17140-001) which discussed eyewitness testimony. The current author states that McCullough's commentary rests on a foundation of assumptions that were both na?ve and erroneous. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Consensus information, prediction, and causal attribution: A review of the literature and issues.

Suggests that it is useful to distinguish between 2 types of consensus information—normative expectancies (e.g., E. E. Jones and D. McGillis's 1976 prior probability concept) and explicit base rates (e.g., H. H. Kelley's 1967 conception of observed covariation across actors). Normative expectancies, which may be derived from a knowledge of one's own behavior (i.e., the false-consensus effect) or the behavior of others, provide a basis for prediction and causal inference. Explicit, sample-based consensus may also be employed, but under somewhat restrictive conditions: (a) when prior expectations are neutralized and/or (b) when the consensus manipulation is particularly strong, salient, easily translatable, representative of the criterial population, and causally relevant. Additional issues are reviewed (e.g., the cognitive strategies by which observers reject base rates), and recommendations for research (e.g., how normative expectancies develop) are noted. (62 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the requirements of proof: The timing of judicial instruction and mock juror verdicts.

At the close of a trial, the judge instructs the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent, that the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of criticisms that the judge's charge has no effect on jury decisions, the present study examined whether the timing of judicial instruction mediates its efficacy. 107 mock jurors (undergraduates) watched a 1-hr videotape of a trial and were instructed by the judge either before the evidence, after the evidence, or not at all. Results for posttrial measures indicated that although the timing manipulation had no significant effect on the standards of reasonable doubt adopted by Ss, those who were instructed before the evidence viewed the defendant as less likely to have committed the crime and demonstrated a lower conviction rate than Ss in the instructions-after and no-instructions groups. Results for a series of midtrial judgments of 54 Ss further indicate that preinstructed Ss were less likely to convict throughout the trial. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Eyewitness identification: Retrospective self-awareness and the accuracy–confidence correlation.

Conducted 4 experiments to test the hypothesis that retrospective self-awareness (RSA) would increase the correlation between eyewitness identification accuracy and confidence. Undergraduate students (48, 33, 75, and 72 in Exps I–IV, respectively) participated as Ss. In all studies, Ss watched a staged crime; immediately afterwards, they were asked to identify the culprit from a photospread and to indicate their confidence in that judgment. In an RSA condition, Ss also viewed a videotape of their performance before rating their confidence. Collectively, the results show an average correlation of .04 in the control groups and .48 in the RSA condition. The data tentatively support a self-perception hypothesis that this manipulation is effective because it alerts Ss to valid but previously unobserved aspects of their own overt behavior (e.g., response latency). Findings are discussed for their theoretical and forensic implications. (50 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)