Theories of Conditional Reasoning: A Developmental Examination of Competing Hypotheses.

Children and adolescents were presented with problems that contained deontic (i.e., if action p is taken, then precondition q must be met) or causal (i.e., if event p occurs, then event q will transpire) conditionals and that varied in the ease with which alternative antecedents could be activated. Results showed that inferences were linked to the availability of alternative antecedents and the generation of "disabling" conditions (claims that the conditionals were false under specific circumstances). Age-related developments were found only on problems involving indeterminate inferences. Correlations among inferences differed for children and adolescents. The findings provide stronger support for domain-general theories than for domain-specific theories of reasoning and suggest, under some conditions, age-related changes in the roles of implicit and explicit processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of quantitative reasoning and gender biases.

One hundred twenty-seven 7-, 9-, and 11-year-old children were presented large or small samples of own-gender enhancing or other-gender enhancing observations. Children read arguments based on the observations, rated argument intelligence, judged the number of other children to whom the observations could be generalized, and provided verbal justifications for their judgments. Own-gender reasoning biases declined with age; these declines were, however, partially accounted for by declines in the strength of self-reported gender affiliations. Reasoning biases-demonstrated by problem-to-problem shifts in reasoning quality-were constrained by sample size, indicating a modest degree of rationality even among 7-year-olds. Specifically, biases co-existed with reasonably extensive generalization from large samples of other-gender evidence. Children were thus able to satisfy motivations for own-gender favoritism and reason in accord with the law of large numbers. Several explanations of the findings-based on changes in the salience of gender, multiple classification skills, and the ability to reason independently from beliefs-are offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias in adolescents' everyday reasoning and its relationship with intellectual ability, personal theories, and self-serving motivation.

The author presented 60 9th and 12th graders with hypothetical arguments that contained logical fallacies. Arguments were either consistent or inconsistent with participants' theories. Participants rated the quality and truth of each argument, identified perceived strengths and weaknesses in the arguments, and verbally described hypothetical experiments that could lead to evidence falsifying the claims made in the arguments. Results indicated that intellectual ability, particularly verbal ability, was the best predictor of each index of everyday reasoning. However, neither the ability measures nor age were related to biases in everyday reasoning. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that, for each reasoning variable, adolescents' personal theories accounted for the most variance in reasoning biases. These findings are discussed in terms of the roles that intellectual ability and theory-driven motivation play in everyday reasoning and self-serving adolescent reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Role of content domain, logic training, and IQ in rule acquisition and transfer.

Four experiments were conducted to examine the hypothesis that when incorrect strategies for solving domain-specific problems were contradicted, a domain-general rule would be induced and would subsequently facilitate transfer to problems outside of the original domain. Experiments involved examining transfer from problems designed to elicit the "permission" and the "causal" schemata described by P. W. Cheng and K. J. Holyoak (1985). Results indicated that (1) training might have led to the construction of a domain-independent rule only when source problems were causal, (2) transfer was more likely when source problems were causal than when source problems were permissions, and (3) transfer from causal problems was weakly related to IQ, whereas transfer from permissions was strongly related to IQ. The facilitative effects of domain-independent rules on spontaneous transfer are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning schema effects on adolescent rule acquisition and transfer.

P. W. Cheng and K. J. Holyoak's (1985) pragmatic reasoning theory was used to inform hypotheses relevant to the transfer of deductive reasoning rules during adolescence. In Exps 1 and 2, Ss were trained on either permission or causal versions of P. C. Wason's (1966) selection task, and transfer to arbitrary problems was examined. In Exps 3 and 4, the effect of training on permission or arbitrary problems to target causal problems was examined. Transfer was more likely from source causal and arbitrary problems than from permission problems. Also, there were developmental progressions in source problem performance. The findings are discussed in terms of the domain specificity of the reasoning rules induced during acquisition and in terms of the effects of training on pragmatic reasoning schemata. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Goal-oriented critical reasoning and individual differences in critical reasoning biases.

In 4 experiments, the relationship among critical reasoning, personal goals, general intellectual ability, and information-processing style were explored. Three critical reasoning competencies were investigated: the law of large numbers, the intuitive analysis of covariance, and the ability to detect flaws in experimental designs. Participants were presented problems that involved goal-enhancing, goal-neutral, and goal-threatening evidence. There were 2 main findings: (a) Although general ability predicted 2 components of critical reasoning, biases in reasoning were better predicted by information processing style (i.e., rational vs. intuitive). (b) Reasoning on the goal-enhancing and neutral problems was less sophisticated than reasoning on threatening problems. Depth of processing seems to be a primary mechanism underlying motivated reasoning. In addition, information processing style is an individual difference variable that moderates the extent of reasoning biases. Similar results were obtained across different forms of critical thinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Representations as mediators of adolescent deductive reasoning

In Experiment 1, preadolescents, middle adolescents, and late adolescents were presented 3 deductive reasoning tasks. With some important exceptions, conditional reasoning improved with age on problems containing permission conditional relations, and reasoning fallacies increased with age on problems containing causal conditional relations. The results of Experiments 2a and 2b indicated that problem type (i.e., permission or causal) does not mediate the activation of conditional reasoning skills. Rather, valid conditional inferences are more common on problems for which plausible alternative antecedents can be generated than on problems for which alternative antecedent generation is difficult. Conditional rules for which alternative antecedent generation is difficult may be misrepresented as biconditionals, resulting in biconditional rather than conditional reasoning.     

Personal theories, intellectual ability, and epistemological beliefs: Adult age differences in everyday reasoning biases.

Age-related differences in everyday reasoning biases were explored. In each of 2 social domains, examination of theoretical beliefs and biases along 2 dimensions of scientific reasoning, involving the law of large numbers and the evaluation of experimental evidence, revealed that, across age groups, scientific reasoning was used to reject evidence that contradicted prior beliefs; relatively cursory reasoning was used to accept belief-consistent evidence. Biased reasoning was more common among middle-aged and older adults than among young adults. Dispositions to engage in analytic processing were negatively related to biases, but intellectual abilities and bias were not related. The findings support a 2-process view of adult cognitive development and suggest that the tendency to rely on heuristic information processing increases with age. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of scientific reasoning biases: Cognitive versus ego-protective explanations.

Two conflicting perspectives have dominated the literature on self-serving reasoning biases. One maintains that individuals have difficulty objectively processing information relevant to their personal theories because they are reluctant to relinquish their cause-effect beliefs relevant to that domain. The ego-protective view claims that such biases arise because they enhance or protect individuals' self-views. These opposing positions were studied with 5th, 8th, and 11th graders. Scientific reasoning improved with age. Analyses of biases, indicated by ratings of evidence quality and written justifications, yielded mixed results regarding developmental trends in reasoning biases. Both theoretical beliefs and ego-protective motivations predicted reasoning biases. An accuracy motivation led to more complex justifications but failed to reduce reasoning biases. Adolescents appear to selectively apply their scientific reasoning skills. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)