Memory organization of action events and its relationship to memory performance.

Previous research yielded inconsistent results regarding the memory organization of self-performed actions. The authors propose that task performance changes the very basis of memory organization. Enactment during study and test (Experiment 1) yielded stronger enactive clustering (based on motor-movement similarities), whereas verbal encoding yielded stronger conceptual clustering (based on semantic-episodic similarities). Enactment enhanced memory quantity and memory accuracy. Both measures increased with enactive clustering under self-performance instructions but with conceptual clustering under verbal instructions. Enactment only during study (Experiment 2) or only during testing (Experiment 3) also enhanced enactive clustering. It is proposed that different conditions affect the relative salience of different types of memory organization and their relative contribution to recall. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Monitoring and control processes in the strategic regulation of memory accuracy.

When people are allowed freedom to volunteer or withhold information, they can enhance the accuracy of their memory reports substantially relative to forced-report performance. A theoretical framework addressing the strategic regulation of memory reporting is put forward that delineates the mediating role of metamemorial monitoring and control processes. Although the enhancement of memory accuracy is generally accompanied by a reduction in memory quantity, experimental and simulation results indicate that both of these effects depend critically on (a) accuracy incentive and ( b ) monitoring effectiveness. The results are discussed with regard to the contribution of metamemory processes to memory performance, and a general methodology is proposed that incorporates these processes into the assessment of memory-accuracy and memory-quantity performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comparing objective and subjective learning curves: Judgments of learning exhibit increased underconfidence with practice.

When participants studied a list of paired associates for several study-test cycles, their judgments of learning (JOLs) exhibited relatively good calibration on the 1st cycle, with a slight overconfidence. However, a shift toward marked underconfidence occurred from the 2nd cycle on. This underconfidence-with-practice (UWP) effect was very robust across several experimental manipulations, such as feedback or no feedback regarding the correctness of the answer, self-paced versus fixed-rate presentation, different incentives for correct performance, magnitude and direction of associative relationships, and conditions producing different degrees of knowing. It was also observed both in item-by-item JOLs and in aggregate JOLs. The UWP effect also occurred for list learning and for the memory of action events. Several theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive effect are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Monitoring one's own knowledge during study: A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning.

How do people monitor their knowledge during acquisition? A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning (JOLs) is outlined, distinguishing 3 types of cues for JOLs: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. In 4 experiments using paired-associates learning, item difficulty (intrinsic) exerted similar effects of JOLs and recall. In contrast, the extrinsic factors of list repetition, item repetition within a list, and stimulus duration affected JOLs less strongly than recall, supporting the proposition that extrinsic factors are discounted in making JOLs. Although practice impaired calibration, increasing underconfidence, it did improve resolution (i.e., the recall-JOL correlation). This improvement was seen to reflect a shift in the basis of JOLs with practice, from reliance on intrinsic factors, towards greater reliance on mnemonic-based heuristics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Knowledge Sharing Analytics: The Case of IT Workers

ABSTRACT

The current study proposes a new framework for knowledge sharing (KS) analytics among information technology (IT) workers, based on an electronic source of collaborative software used by IT developers. It attempts to formulate a new objective way to measure actual KS. The findings confirm previous reports of differences in KS motivation between internal and external IT workers. The metrics of electronic source footprints proposed in this study have confirmed that the KS level of external IT workers is significantly lower than that of internal IT workers. Several practical implications for better knowledge management (KM) are discussed, including the measuring of KS levels on an ongoing basis, and practices that should be considered when employing external IT workers, in order to motivate collaborative behaviors and team work in IT departments.     

Strategic regulation of grain size memory reporting.

To increase their report accuracy, rememberers may either withhold information that they feel unsure about or provide relatively coarse information that is unlikely to be wrong. In previous work (A. Koriat & A Goldsmith, 1996c), the authors delineated the metacognitive monitoring and control processes underlying the decision to volunteer or withhold particular items of information (report option) and examined how these processes are used in the strategic regulation of memory accuracy. This article adapts that framework to address control over the grain size (precision- coarseness) of the information that people report. Results show that rememberers strategically regulate the grain of their answers to accommodate the competing goals of accuracy and informativeness. The metacognitive processes underlying this regulation are elucidated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The intricate relationships between monitoring and control in metacognition: Lessons for the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior.

Do we run away because we are frightened, or are we frightened because we run away? The authors address this issue with respect to the relation between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control. When self-regulation is goal driven, monitoring effects control processes so that increased processing effort should enhance feelings of competence and feelings of knowing. In contrast, when self-regulation is data driven, such feelings may be based themselves on the feedback from control processes, in which case they should decrease with increasing effort. Evidence for both monitoring-based control and control-based monitoring occurring even in the same situation is presented. The results are discussed with regard to the issue of the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The combined contributions of the cue-familiarity and accessibility heuristics to feelings of knowing.

A model for the basis of feeling of knowing (FOK) is proposed, which combines 2 apparently competing accounts, cue familiarity (L. M. Reder, see record 1987-12470-001) and accessibility (A. Koriat, see record 1994-04361-001). Both cue familiarity and accessibility are assumed to contribute asynchronously to FOK, but whereas the effects of familiarity occur early, those of accessibility occur later and only when cue familiarity is sufficiently high to drive the interrogation of memory for potential answers. General information questions were used to orthogonally manipulate cue familiarity and accessibility. As expected, both familiarity and accessibility enhanced FOK judgments, but the effects of accessibility were found mostly when familiarity was high. This interactive pattern was replicated when FOK judgments were delayed but not when they were immediate. The results support the proposed cascaded model of FOK but also imply a differentiation between 2 variants of the accessibility heuristic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Subjective confidence in perceptual judgments: A test of the self-consistency model.

Two questions about subjective confidence in perceptual judgments are examined: the bases for these judgments and the reasons for their accuracy. Confidence in perceptual judgments has been claimed to rest on qualitatively different processes than confidence in memory tasks. However, predictions from a self-consistency model (SCM), which had been confirmed for general-information questions (Koriat, 2010) and social attitudes (Koriat & Adiv, 2010), are shown to hold true also for perceptual judgments. In SCM, confidence is modeled by the procedure for assessment of statistical level of confidence: For a 2-alternative, forced-choice item, confidence is based on the consistency with which the choice is favored across a sample of representations of the item, and acts as a monitor of the likelihood that a new sample will yield the same choice. Assuming that these representations are drawn from commonly shared populations of representations associated with each item, predictions regarding the basis of confidence were confirmed by results concerning the functions relating confidence and choice latency to interparticipant consensus and to intraparticipant consistency for majority and minority choices. With regard to the confidence-accuracy (C/A) relationship, the consensuality principle, documented for general-knowledge tasks (Koriat, 2008a), was replicated for perceptual judgments: Confidence correlated with the consensuality of the choice rather than with its correctness, suggesting that the C/A correlation is due to the relationship between confidence and self-consistency and is positive only as long as the correct choices are the consistently made choices. SCM provides a general model for the basis and accuracy of confidence judgments across different domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Illusions of Competence in Monitoring One's Knowledge During Study.

The monitoring of one's own knowledge during study suffers from an inherent discrepancy between study and test situations: Judgments of learning (JOLs) are made in the presence of information that is absent but solicited during testing. The failure to discount the effects of that information when making JOLs can instill a sense of competence during learning that proves unwarranted during testing. Using a paired-associates task, the authors examined aspects of the cue-target relationships that seemed likely contributors to such illusions of competence. These aspects have the potential to create differential strengths of a priori and a posteriori associations, that is, the probability with which a cue, when presented alone, elicits the corresponding target versus the perceived association between the cue and the target when both are present. The authors argue that the former has the greater influence on later recall, whereas the latter has the greater influence on JOLs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)