Starting low but ending high: A reversal of the anchoring effect in auctions.

Counter to the "start high, end high" effect of anchors in individual judgments and dyadic negotiations, 6 studies using a diverse set of methodologies document how and why, in the social setting of auctions, lower starting prices result in higher final prices. Three processes contribute to this effect. First, lower starting prices reduce barriers to entry, which increase traffic and generate higher final prices. Second, lower starting prices entice bidders to invest time and energy (creating sunk costs) and, consequently, escalate their commitments. Third, the traffic generated by lower starting prices can lead bidders to infer value in the item, thereby explaining previous findings that traffic begets more traffic. The authors show that barriers to entry that limit traffic (e.g., a misspelled brand name) lead to anchoring's normal assimilative effect rather than its reversal. By broadening the understanding of anchors to extended social interactions and open markets, the authors identify when and why starting prices anchor. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 96(1) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-18683-006). An incorrect DOI was printed. The correct DOI is provided in the erratum.] Groups and organizations face a fundamental problem: They need cooperation but their members have incentives to free ride. Empirical research on this problem has often been discouraging, and economic models suggest that solutions are unlikely or unstable. In contrast, the authors present a model and 4 studies that show that an unwaveringly consistent contributor can effectively catalyze cooperation in social dilemmas. The studies indicate that consistent contributors occur naturally, and their presence in a group causes others to contribute more and cooperate more often, with no apparent cost to the consistent contributor and often gain. These positive effects seem to result from a consistent contributor's impact on group members' cooperative inferences about group norms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas": Correction to Weber and Murnighan (2008).

Reports an error in "Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas" by J. Mark Weber and J. Keith Murnighan (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2008[Dec], Vol 95[6], 1340-1353). An incorrect DOI was printed. The correct DOI is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-16429-007.) Groups and organizations face a fundamental problem: They need cooperation but their members have incentives to free ride. Empirical research on this problem has often been discouraging, and economic models suggest that solutions are unlikely or unstable. In contrast, the authors present a model and 4 studies that show that an unwaveringly consistent contributor can effectively catalyze cooperation in social dilemmas. The studies indicate that consistent contributors occur naturally, and their presence in a group causes others to contribute more and cooperate more often, with no apparent cost to the consistent contributor and often gain. These positive effects seem to result from a consistent contributor's impact on group members' cooperative inferences about group norms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player.

Tested the predictions of 3 models of coalition behavior. 120 graduate students played each of 4 games, rotating among the 5 player positions (including a veto player) between games. The games were played under 1 of 3 time pressure/default conditions: (a) no time pressure, (b) a condition such that the constant payoff to coalitions was lost if an agreement was not reached in 3 attempts, and (c) a condition such that the payoff for no agreement was fixed at 60 points for the veto player and 10 for the other players. The veto players' payoffs varied over games and tended to increase as play continued, at times approaching the entire payoff. Thus, the weighted probability (S. S. Komorita, 1974) and Roth-Shapley (A. E. Roth, 1977; L. S. Shapley, 1953) models were not supported; the core model received some support. The default conditions had little effect. The likelihood of socially beneficial behavior in competitively motivating situations is discussed. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Models of coalition behavior: Game theoretic, social psychological, and political perspectives.

Reviews 3 classes of game theoretic solution concepts (solutions, subsolutions, and the core; bargaining set models; and the Shapley value), 4 social psychological models of coalition formation (minimum resource theory, minimum power theory, bargaining theory, and the weighted probability model), and 3 sets of political coalition models (minimum size, minimum range, and policy distance minimization). The research on characteristic function games, experimental coalition situations involving more than 3 players, and on coalition governments is summarized, and the models are evaluated. The advantages of collaboration among the 3 areas are discussed. (89 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of group size and communication availability on coalition bargaining in a veto game.

Examined the effects of manipulating the size of groups of 250 male undergraduate negotiators and their ability to communicate with one another in a game in which 1 player held veto power (i.e., had to be included in any winning coalition). The predictions of 3 models (core, value, and weighted probability) were tested. The game, in which the veto player could form a winning coalition with any other single player, was repeated for a series of 10 winning coalitions (trials). The effects for group size indicate significant differences between 3-person groups and 4-, 5-, and 6-person groups, and between all of these groups and 7-person groups. The increasing payoffs over trials were significant in the no-communication conditions, but no significant increases occurred in the conditions in which communication was available. The increasing payoffs for the veto player when communication opportunities were not available yielded the only support for the predictions of the core model; the overall payoffs consistently supported the predictions of the value and the weighted probability models. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)