On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness: James's ubiquitous feeling aspect.

Among problems psychologists of consciousness face is how to conceive of those mental states, events, or processes with which people have an intimate familiarity in their own case. Psychologists must not only determine the causal roles these occurrences play, but also their intrinsic properties. This article seeks to contribute to understanding what and how the conscious mental occurrences are in themselves, starting from W. James's conception of them, according to which every basic durational component of the stream, each successive state of consciousness, is an integral pulse of mentality possessing a feeling aspect and a cognitive aspect. Attention is also given to their reflexive aspect, wherein one has inner awareness of their occurrence and, often, of their type and content. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Converging operations for perceptual defense.

Discusses some recent experimental attempts to provide converging operations for a concept of perceptual defense. For present purposes, perceptual defense is defined as a relative failure of perception per se due to the emotional character of the stimulus. Experiments are evaluated and discussed mainly in terms of their ability to eliminate as an explanation the response-bias hypothesis for differential accuracy between neutral and emotional words. In addition, following Blum, a stimulus-effect hypothesis is described and applied; all the experiments discussed require, if differences in accuracy of recognition are to be attributed to perceptual variation, converging operations to eliminate this hypothesis. It is argued as well that the search for converging operations for perceptual defense has implications for methodology in other areas of perception. (20 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An ecological and phenomenological perspective on consciousness and perception: Contact with the world at the very heart of the being of consciousness.

Owing to the intentional nature of consciousness, people possess a special kind of contact with the real world. They apprehend part of it in a qualitative and cognitive manner at the ontological level suitably described as corresponding to the psychological. At the core of the visual system's molar activities, a stream of visual awareness flows and is the very form wherein direct visual reference to the world is accomplished. Also a function of the visual system, when it is operating in the mode called "viewing" or "reflective seeing," is one's immediate apprehension of visual perceptual experience per se. Using an approach that draws on both ecological and phenomenological thought, the author seeks to make progress toward a conceptual structure for consciousness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Concerning "residual subjectivity."

Further considers residual subjectivity in response to a critique by T. C. Hein (1979) of an earlier analysis of consciousness (T. Natsoulas, see record 1979-22877-001). The author proposed that it is possible to know by objective means all there is to be known about an experience. Such knowledge, however, is anchored by a residual subjectivity that stems from one's first-hand contact with and knowledge of that experience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Consciousness.

Reviews attempts to define consciousness and suggests that scientific theory is the best method to explore this concept. The following 7 definitions of consciousness from the Oxford English Dictionary are discussed: joint or mutual knowledge, internal knowledge or conviction, awareness, direct awareness, personal unity, normal waking state, and double consciousness. It is concluded that the last definition may be the most valuable since it requires that consciousness be defined according to situations. This is considered to lead to the integration of 2 or more basic senses and to scientific concept formation at a new level of sophistication. (64 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Generalization of interpersonal similarity.

Ss were led to believe that their preferences (among eight pairs of tunes) were similar to those of 1 of 2 other individual's preferences. Subsequently, it was discovered that S tended to show similar preference for other stimuli (nonsense syllables, pairs of girl's names) to those of the individual with whom they initially agreed. The results were interpreted in terms of a cognitive theory of identification and related to the conditions under which projection and introjection might take place. From Psyc Abstracts 36:04:4HJ50S. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Addendum to "Consciousness."

The author extends his previous discussion (see record 1979-22877-001) to encompass the role of a concept of awareness in each of 7 ordinary concepts of consciousness: joint or mutual knowledge, internal knowledge or conviction, awareness, direct awareness, personal unity, normal waking state, and double consciousness. In each case, the crucial involvement of a certain concept of awareness is brought out and references are included of authors who have used similar scientific concepts that implicate the same concept of awareness. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On homogeneous retinal stimulation and the perception of depth.

A review of recent experiments showing that where the perception of voluminous fog does not occur consistently under conditions attempting homogeneity of visual stimulation, there are sources of inhomogeneity which can produce the impression of a surface. As homogeneity is approached, the volume experience becomes more reliable. A view of this phenomenon, other than Gibson's—which does not deal with it on the grounds of poor reliability—or Koffka's—which attributes it to the fundamental nature of the perceptual system, is presented. It is based on kinesthetic stimulation as a likely source of visual space anisotropy with respect to perceived distance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Basic problems of consciousness.

In the interests of (a) forestalling the historically familiar "solution" to the problem of consciousness; (b) showing that there are problems of consciousness, not just one, requiring the scientific attentions of psychologists; and (c) enlisting the energy and wisdom of psychologists and allied scientists in the effort to solve these problems, the present article reviews and discusses an array of problems of consciousness that have been recently introduced into the literature. They are the problems of conscious experience, intentionality, imagination, awareness, introspection, personal unity, the subject, "consciousness" (as more or less), the normal waking state, conscious behavior, and explicit consciousness. Each main section is devoted to one of these problems and focuses on one or a few authors who have addressed it. The article concludes with a brief section on the future of consciousness. (5 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)