Subjective Probability Intervals: How to Reduce Overconfidence by Interval Evaluation.

Format dependence implies that assessment of the same subjective probability distribution produces different conclusions about over- or underconfidence depending on the assessment format. In 2 experiments, the authors demonstrate that the overconfidence bias that occurs when participants produce intervals for an uncertain quantity is almost abolished when they evaluate the probability that the same intervals include the quantity. The authors successfully apply a method for adaptive adjustment of probability intervals as a debiasing tool and discuss a tentative explanation in terms of a naive sampling model. According to this view, people report their experiences accurately, but they are naive in that they treat both sample proportion and sample dispersion as unbiased estimators, yielding small bias in probability evaluation but strong bias in interval production. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

High-level reasoning and base-rate use: Do we need cue-competition to explain the inverse base-rate effect?

Previous accounts of the inverse base-rate effect (D. L. Medin & S. M. Edelson, see record 1988-31640-001) have revolved around the concept of cue-competition. In this article, the authors propose that high-level reasoning in the form of an eliminative inference mechanism may contribute to the effect. A quantitative implementation of this idea demonstrates that it has the power by itself to produce the pattern of base-rate effects in the Medin and Edelson (1988) design. Four predictions are derived that contradict the predictions by attention to distinctive input (ADIT; J. K. Kruschke, see record 1996-02680-001), up to date the most successful account of the inverse base-rate effect. Results from 3 experiments disconfirm the predictions by ADIT and demonstrate the importance of high-level reasoning in designs of the Medin and Edelson kind. Implications for the interpretation of the inverse base-rate effect and the attention-shifting mechanisms presumed by ADIT are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty.

Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Linda is not a bearded lady: Configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors.

This article explores the configural weighted average (CWA) hypothesis suggesting that extension biases, like conjunction and disjunction errors, occur because people estimate compound probabilities by taking a CWA of the constituent probabilities. The hypothesis suggests a process consistent with well-known cognitive constraints, which nonetheless achieves high robustness and bounded rationality in noisy real-life environments. Predictions by the CWA hypothesis are that in error-free data, conjunction and disjunction errors should be the rule rather than the exception when pairs of statements are randomly sampled from an environment, the rate of extension errors should increase when noise in data is decreased, and that adding a likely component should increase the probability of a conjunction. Four experiments generally verify the predictions by the hypothesis, demonstrating that extension errors are frequent also when tasks are selected according to representative design. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cue abstraction and exemplar memory in categorization.

In this article, the authors compare 3 generic models of the cognitive processes in a categorization task. The cue abstraction model implies abstraction in training of explicit cue-criterion relations that are mentally integrated to form a judgment, the lexicographic heuristic uses only the most valid cue, and the exemplar-based model relies on retrieval of exemplars. The results from 2 experiments showed that, in lieu of the lexicographic heuristic, most participants spontaneously integrate cues. In contrast to single-system views, exemplar memory appeared to dominate when the feedback was poor, but when the feedback was rich enough to allow the participants to discern the task structure, it was exploited for abstraction of explicit cue-criterion relations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The confidence–hindsight mirror effect in judgment: An accuracy-assessment model for the knew-it-all-along phenomenon.

This article presents a model for the "knew-it-all-along effect": the accuracy-assessment model. The model is based on the assumption that participants in hindsight studies use the strategy of trying to reproduce the distribution of correct and wrong responses that seem appropriate in view of their assessment of the expected accuracy. The model provides precise, quantitative, parameter-free predictions about the extent and direction of hindsight bias. In particular, the model predicts good calibration in hindsight and a systematic relation between over/underconfidence in foresight and hindsight bias, referred to as the confidence-hindsight mirror effect. A novel and unique prediction by the model is a reversal of the knew-it-all-along effect in judgment domains characterized by underconfidence in foresight. This reversed hindsight phenomenon and other predictions by the model were tested and confirmed in 4 experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Calibration and diagnosticity of confidence in eyewitness identification: Comments on what can be inferred from the low confidence–accuracy correlation.

The relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy as measured by the ψ point-biserial correlation has been described as poor or even nonexistent in the literature on lineup identifications. In this article, 3 arguments are made. First, a low point-biserial correlation is compatible with good or even perfect calibration (realism) of confidence, and the correlation provides no information about whether witnesses over- or underestimate the probability of a correct identification. Second, point-biserial correlations provide almost no information about whether confidence is diagnostic in the sense that it should be taken into account by the court when evaluating eyewitness identifications. Third, useful information is provided by calibration analysis and computation of diagnosticity indices. These arguments are illustrated with data from an experiment with photo-confrontations that rely on photo material used by the Swedish Police and where foils were selected by experienced police officers in the manner of routine investigations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can Attentional Theory Explain the Inverse Base Rate Effect? Comment on Kruschke (2001).

In J. K. Kruschke's (2001; see record 2001-18940-005) study, it is argued that attentional theory is the sole satisfactory explanation of the inverse base rate effect and that eliminative inference (P. Juslin, P. Wennerholm, & A. Winman, 2001; see record 2001-07828-016) plays no role in the phenomenon. In this comment, the authors demonstrate that, in contrast to the central tenets of attentional theory, (a) rapid attention shifts as implemented in ADIT decelerate learning in the inverse base-rate task and (b) the claim that the inverse base-rate effect is directly caused by an attentional asymmetry is refuted by data. It is proposed that a complete account of the inverse base-rate effect needs to integrate attention effects with inference rules that are flexibly used for both induction and elimination. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Naive empiricism and dogmatism in confidence research: A critical examination of the hard–easy effect.

Two robust phenomena in research on confidence in one's general knowledge are the overconfidence phenomenon and the hard-easy effect. In this article, the authors propose that the hard-easy effect has been interpreted with insufficient attention to the scale-end effects, the linear dependency, and the regression effects in data and that the continued adherence to the idea of a "cognitive overconfidence bias" is mediated by selective attention to particular data sets. A quantitative review of studies with 2-alternative general knowledge items demonstrates that, contrary to widespread belief, there is (a) very little support for a cognitive-processing bias in these data; (b) a difference between representative and selected item samples that is not reducible to the difference in difficulty; and (c) near elimination of the hard-easy effect when there is control for scale-end effects and linear dependency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Environmental determinants of memory improvement in late adulthood.

Conducted 2 studies with 99 nursing home residents (mean age ranges 76.2–80.7 yrs) to determine whether memory could be improved. This was accomplished by increasing the cognitive demand of the environment and then varying the extent to which Ss were motivated to attend to and remember these environmental factors. In Study 1, motivation to practice recommended cognitive activities was manipulated by varying the degree of reciprocal self-disclosure offered by interviewers in a series of dyadic interactions. In Study 2, motivation to practice recommended cognitive activities was manipulated by varying whether positive outcomes were contingent on attending to and remembering these activities, which increased in demand over time. In both studies, engaging in cognitive activity resulted in improvement on standard short-term memory tests, including probe recall and pattern recall, as well as in improvement on nurses' ratings of alertness, mental activity, and social adjustment for experimental groups relative to controls. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)