Space-efficient recognition of sparse self-reducible languages

Mahaney and others have shown that sparse self-reducible sets have time-efficient algorithms, and have concluded that it is unlikely that NP has sparse complete sets. Mahaney's work, intuition, and a 1978 conjecture of Hartmanis notwithstanding, nothing has been known about the density of complete sets for feasible classes until now. This paper shows that sparse self-reducible sets have space-efficient algorithms, and in many cases, even have time-space-efficient algorithms. We conclude that NL, NC ^k , AC ^k , LOG(DCFL), LOG(CFL), and P lack complete (or even Turing-hard) sets of low density unless implausible complexity class inclusions hold. In particular, if NL (respectively P, _k , or NP) has a polylog-sparse logspace-hard set, then NLSC (respectively PSC, _k , or PHSC), and if P has subpolynomially sparse logspace-hard sets, then PPSPACE.     

Generalized modal satisfiability

It is well known that modal satisfiability is PSPACE-complete (Ladner (1977) [21]). However, the complexity may decrease if we restrict the set of propositional operators used. Note that there exist an infinite number of propositional operators, since a propositional operator is simply a Boolean function. We completely classify the complexity of modal satisfiability for every finite set of propositional operators, i.e., in contrast to previous work, we classify an infinite number of problems. We show that, depending on the set of propositional operators, modal satisfiability is PSPACE-complete, coNP-complete, or in P. We obtain this trichotomy not only for modal formulas, but also for their more succinct representation using modal circuits. We consider both the uni-modal and the multi-modal cases, and study the dual problem of validity as well.     

Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe,manipulate, and control

Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have received much attention recently, and the former has quickly become a quite widely used election system. For many cases these systems have been proven resistant to bribery, control, or manipulation, with ranked pairs being particularly praised for being NP-hard for all three of those. Nonetheless, the present paper shows that with respect to the number of candidates, Schulze and ranked-pairs elections are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, control, and manipulate: we obtain uniform, polynomial-time algorithms whose running times’ degrees do not depend on the number of candidates. We also provide such algorithms for some weighted variants of these problems.     

Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets

We show that many NP-hard sets have heuristic polynomial-time algorithms with high probability weight of correctness with respect to generalizations of Procaccia and Rosenschein’s junta distributions.     

Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time

We prove that every distributional problem solvable in polynomial time on the average with respect to the uniform distribution has a frequently self-knowingly correct polynomial-time algorithm.     

Robust Reductions

We continue the study of robust reductions initiated by Gavaldà and Balcázar. In particular, a 1991 paper of Gavaldà and Balcázar [7] claimed an optimal separation between the power of robust and nondeterministic strong reductions. Unfortunately, their proof is invalid. We re-establish their theorem. Generalizing robust reductions, we note that robustly strong reductions are built from two restrictions, robust underproductivity and robust overproductivity, both of which have been separately studied before in other contexts. By systematically analyzing the power of these reductions, we explore the extent to which each restriction weakens the power of reductions. We show that one of these reductions yields a new, strong form of the Karp—Lipton theorem. Received November 1997, and in final form March 1999.     

Isomorphic Implication

We study the isomorphic implication problem for Boolean constraints. We show that this is a natural analog of the subgraph isomorphism problem. We prove that, depending on the set of constraints, this problem is in P, or is NP-complete, or is NP-hard, coNP-hard, and in P_‖^NP. We show how to extend the NP-hardness and coNP-hardness to P_‖^NP-hardness for some cases, and conjecture that this can be done in all cases. Supported in part by grants NSF-CCR-0311021 and DFG VO 630/5-1 and VO 630/5-2. An extended abstract of this paper appears in Proceedings of the 30th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2005), pp. 119–130, Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science #3618, August 2005. Work of M. Bauland done in part while visiting CASCI’s Laboratory for Complexity at Rochester Institute of Technology. Work of E. Hemaspaandra done in part while on sabbatical at the University of Rochester.     

Easy sets and hard certificate schemes

Can easy sets only have easy certificate schemes? In this paper, we study the class of sets that, for all NP certificate schemes (i.e., NP machines), always have easy acceptance certificates (i.e., accepting paths) that can be computed in polynomial time. We also study the class of sets that, for all NP certificate schemes, infinitely often have easy acceptance certificates. In particular, we provide equivalent characterizations of these classes in terms of relative generalized Kolmogorov complexity, showing that they are robust. We also provide structural conditions – regarding immunity and class collapses – that put upper and lower bounds on the sizes of these two classes. Finally, we provide negative results showing that some of our positive claims are optimal with regard to being relativizable. Our negative results are proven using a novel observation: We show that the classical “wide spacing” oracle construction technique yields instant non-bi-immunity results. Furthermore, we establish a result that improves upon Baker, Gill, and Solovay's classical result that holds in some relativized world. Received: 12 January 1996 / 9 January 1997     

Manipulation Complexity of Same-System Runoff Elections

Do runoff elections, using the same voting rule as the initial election but just on the winning candidates, increase or decrease the complexity of manipulation? Does allowing revoting in the runoff increase or decrease the complexity relative to just having a runoff without revoting? For both weighted and unweighted voting, we show that even for election systems with simple winner problems the complexity of manipulation, manipulation with runoffs, and manipulation with revoting runoffs are independent. On the other hand, for some important, well-known election systems we determine what holds for each of these cases. For no such systems do we find runoffs lowering complexity, and for some we find that runoffs raise complexity. Ours is the first paper to show that for natural, unweighted election systems, runoffs can increase the manipulation complexity.     

The complexity of online voter control in sequential elections

Previous work on voter control, which refers to situations where a chair seeks to change the outcome of an election by deleting, adding, or partitioning voters, takes for granted that the chair knows all the voters’ preferences and that all votes are cast simultaneously. However, elections are often held sequentially and the chair thus knows only the previously cast votes and not the future ones, yet needs to decide instantaneously which control action to take. We introduce a framework that models online voter control in sequential elections. We show that the related problems can be much harder than in the standard (non-online) case: For certain election systems, even with efficient winner problems, online control by deleting, adding, or partitioning voters is \(\mathrm {PSPACE}\)-complete, even if there are only two candidates. In addition, we obtain (by a new characterization of coNP in terms of weight-bounded alternating Turing machines) completeness for \({\mathrm {coNP}}\) in the deleting/adding cases with a bounded deletion/addition limit, and we obtain completeness for \({\mathrm {NP}}\) in the partition cases with an additional restriction. We also show that for plurality, online control by deleting or adding voters is in \({\mathrm {P}}\), and for partitioning voters is \({\mathrm {coNP}}\)-hard.