基于社会规范准则和联合抵制的节点激励机制研究

P2P网络中的节点由于固有的理性将产生个人利益与系统性能相冲突的搭便车行为,从而极大地降低网络的性能和效用。在社会规范的基础上结合联合抵制敌我规则的思想,建立了一套应用于P2P网络的社会规范准则模型,该模型惩戒违反社会规范准则的节点,激励节点选择合作策略,并通过博弈收益分析给出模型均衡于合作策略的条件。仿真实验结果表明,该模型能够有效地激励节点协作和抑制节点搭便车行为。     

P2P网络中基于节点负载度的均衡控制算法研究

在非结构化P2P网络中,为了抑制“搭便车“行为,需要寻找网络中的集散节点。在参考传统集散节点连接数的基础上,还考虑了不同节点的负载能力差异,引入了负载度概念,将负载度高的节点称为重载节点。在此基础上提出了一种节点负载均衡控制算法,将重载节点的负载向一些轻载节点转移。仿真实验表明,本算法能有效地控制网络中各节点的负载,使之尽可能合理均衡分布,以此抑制“搭便车”行为,从而维护和提高网络性能。     

P2P中应用平衡机制抑制搭便车行为的研究

针对近年来P2P网络中存在大量“搭便车”节点的问题,在判断一个节点是否是搭便车节点时提出一种基于平衡机制的算法,其不仅考虑节点自身的理性行为方面,还考虑节点所处的物理环境特征,并采用降低搭便车节点下载资源速度的方法来抑制其搭便车行为。仿真实验表明,该平衡机制算法可以有效降低网络中搭便车节点的数量,并提高网络的下载成功率,同时增强网络的公平性、稳定性,达到抑制搭便车行为的目的。     

CDF-based Reliability Insurance Contracts Considering Free-riding

As a result of many disadvantages faced by the regulator in current regulatory schemes, reliability insurance scheme (RIS) has been introduced as a new regulatory scheme. This scheme allows consumers to determine their coverage levels according to their value for reliability services (i.e., cost incurred for outages), and pay corresponding premiums to the utility. The utility is then required to reimburse consumers for outages according to their outage cost. The consumer’s outage cost is extremely dependent on the duration of outages and this dependency is well defined by a function known as a Customer Damage Function (CDF). To enable consumers to fully cover the reliability risks, utility should provide consumers with contracts which allow them to select coverage levels according to their CDF.Due to the inflexibility of electrical grids, most utilities cannot differentiate the reliability services at the household level and so the public good aspects of the reliability services are emphasized. In such circumstances, selfish consumers can misrepresent their willingness to pay for the reliability services and benefit from their neighbors’ choices (i.e. free-ride on the reliable services provided for their neighbors). Free-riding may lead to the underinvestment in the grid. In this paper, primarily, CDF-based insurance contracts are designed and in following, a method for solving the free-riding problem is presented.     

基于声誉的P2P匿名通信方案研究

P2P匿名通信系统需要系统成员共同参与信息转发,而部分不积极参与通信的成员的Free-riding行为将导致匿名系统性能降低。针对P2P匿名系统中部分成员不积极参与匿名转发信息的自私行为,基于区分服务思想提出一种基于声誉的匿名通信方案,该方案通过成员之间互相监督发送信息次数,降低了不积极参与信息转发成员的声誉值,使不同声誉值的成员获得的匿名性能不一样。理论分析和计算数据表明,应用声誉机制能确保正常成员的匿名度不变,但降低自私成员的匿名度,从而有效减少部分成员不积极参与转发匿名信息的自私行为。