基于环上误差学习问题的新型后量子认证密钥交换协议

针对量子计算机技术的迅速发展使得传统公钥密码体制的安全性面临严重威胁的现实性问题,提出一种新型的基于环上误差学习（RLWE）问题的后量子认证密钥交换协议。协议通过使用Peikert式误差协调机制,双方通过计算可直接得到均匀分布的共享比特值,从而使得通信双方得到相同的会话密钥。使用理想格上的解码基对协议正确性进行了分析,并设置合理参数从而保证协议双方以显著概率得到相同密钥值。该协议在BR （Bellare-Rogaway）模型下可证明安全并达到弱的完美前向安全性。协议安全性归约为格上RLWE困难问题,可抵御量子攻击。与现有基于RLWE问题设计的认证密钥交换协议相比,该协议中参数值模数的大小由亚指数级降低至多项式级,相应计算量和通信量显著减小,是一种更加简洁高效的后量子认证密钥交换协议。     

RLWE同态加密算法的多候选人电子投票协议

使用安全协议保护选民隐私、保证投票公正有效是投票电子信息化的基础,安全协议的复杂度则是电子投票应用的最大阻碍。提出了一种基于RLWE同态加密算法的多候选人电子投票协议,可支持多候选人,也能满足对选民隐私的保护。该协议利用基于RLWE的同态加密算法的加法同态性质在计票环节使用密文计票保护选民的私密,利用中国剩余定理的性质对选票进行批处理,提升计票能力。该投票协议能支持多候选人投票并最终知晓每个候选人最终票数,并设置公示机构公示投票过程中的每个步骤,用于公开验证。     

RLWE-based key-policy ABE scheme

Based on the attribute-based encryption(ABE) scheme which was proposed by Brakerski and constructed on the LWE problem,a RLWE-based key-policy ABE scheme was presented.Efficiency and key size of this scheme over-takes old ones which are based on the LWE problem.Under the RLWE assumption,this scheme supports attributes of unbounded length and semi-adaptive security.Moreover,a compiler was constructed and could compile ABE scheme that meets its demand into an attribute-based fully homomorphic encryption (ABFHE) scheme.     

基于RLWE的生物特征认证密钥交换协议

在后量子密码学中,针对密钥交换协议存在口令容易丢失以及难以实现相互认证的安全缺陷,提出了一个新的基于环上误差学习的生物特征认证密钥交换协议。该协议根据环上误差学习问题构造的密码体制具有密钥及密文尺寸短、运行效率高等优势,并采用生物特征和口令作为长期密钥,同时通过Peikert式错误协调机制从各自的环元素中协调出随机均匀的会话密钥,实现了服务器对客户的显式认证。性能分析结果表明,该方案可抵抗用户假冒攻击,安全属性更高,提高了通信效率。     

Attribute-based fully homomorphic encryption scheme over rings

The fully homomorphic encryption has important applications in the area of data security and privacy security of cloud computing,but the size of secret keys and ciphertext in most of current homomorphic encryption schemes were too large,which restricted its practical.To improve these drawbacks,a recoding scheme and a attribute-based encryption scheme based on learning with errors problem over rings were provided,then a attribute-based fully homomorphic encryption was constructed.The new scheme overcame the above mentioned drawbacks,because it did't need public key certificate,meanwhile,it can achieve the fine-grained access control to the ciphertext.Compared with similar results,proposed method decreases the size of keys and ciphertext greatly.     

RLWE-based ciphertext-policy attribute proxy re-encryption

To solve LWE-based proxy re-encryption schemes cannot achieve fine-grained access and low efficiency problem,a ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption scheme was proposed.The scheme based on linear secret sharing scheme,RLWE and attribute encryption could shorten the key size,reduce the ciphertext space and improve the efficiency of encryption and decryption.At the same time,the linear secret sharing matrix was used as an access matrix to meet the requirements of authorized person fine-grained commissioning control and to resist the collusion between the agent and the authorized person.In addition,the proposed scheme is shown to be secure under the ring learning with errors assumption in the standard model.     

一种基于费马模数的RLWE加解密电路及其FPGA实现

随着量子计算机的发展,传统加密算法受到严重的威胁。为了对抗量子攻击,同态加密技术引起了关注,其中环错误学习(RLWE)的加密方案具有加密效率高、硬件实现简单等优点,在硬件加密上具有巨大的潜力。本文提出并实现了一种RLWE加解密电路,采用了费马数变换、访存优化和分时复用等方法。实验结果表明,在同等安全参数集下,所提出的RLWE加解密电路的硬件资源效率分别可达到6.01和12.03。     

Efficient fully homomorphic encryption from RLWE with an extension to a threshold encryption scheme

In this paper, we present an effective fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) from ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption without using Gentry’s standard squashing and bootstrapping techniques. Our FHE scheme is to modify the recent FHE scheme of Brakerski. We use the re-linearization technique to reduce the length of ciphertext considerably, and use the modulus reduction technique to manage the noise level and decrease the decryption complexity without introducing additional assumptions. Furthermore, with the key-homomorphic property, we extend our FHE scheme to a threshold fully homomorphic encryption (TFHE), which allows parties to cooperatively decrypt a ciphertext without learning anything but the plaintext. The TFHE scheme can be protected from related-key attacks, as long as we add extra smudging noise during sensitive operations.