BSLPSDN: Base station location privacy via software-defined networking (SDN) in wireless sensor networks

Base station's location privacy in a wireless sensor network (WSN) is critical for information security and operational availability of the network. A key part of securing the base station from potential compromise is to secure the information about its physical location. This paper proposes a technique called base station location privacy via software-defined networking (SDN) in wireless sensor networks (BSLPSDN). The inspiration comes from the architecture of SDN, where the control plane is separated from the data plane, and where control plane decides the policy for the data plane. BSLPSDN uses three categories of nodes, namely, a main controller to instruct the overall operations, a dedicated node to buffer and forward data, and lastly, a common node to sense and forward the packet. We employ three kinds of nodes to collaborate and achieve stealth for the base station and thus protecting it against the traffic-analysis attacks. Different traits of the WSN including energy status and traffic density can actively be monitored by BSLPSDN, which positively affects the energy goals, expected life of the network, load on common nodes, and the possibility of creating diversion in the wake of an attack on the base station. We incorporated multiple experiments to analyze and evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithm. We use single controller with multiple sensor nodes and multiple controllers with multiple sensor nodes to show the level of anonymity of BS. Experiments show that providing BS anonymity via multiple controllers is the best method both in terms of energy and privacy.     

基于秘密共享模数的一般性多方求逆协议

Catalano、Gennaro和Halevi提出了一个实用的基于秘密共享模数的分布式求逆协议,然而他们仅仅考虑了门限敌手结构的情况.文中考虑了一般敌手结构的情况,针对半诚实敌手和恶意敌手,利用Damgard和Thorbek提出的线性整数秘密共享方案,分别构造了一个多方模求逆协议.该协议在敌手结构是Q2(对应Q3以及强RSA假设)的条件下针对半诚实(对应恶意)敌手是安全的.该协议是Catalano等人方案的一个推广,可以用来分布式地计算RSA私钥以及构造标准模型下安全的分布式Gennaro-Halevi-Rabin、Cramer-Shoup和Mames-Joye签名方案.另外,文中的构造方法也是对环上的安全多方协议构造方法的一个有力补充.     

Bounded memory protocols

It is well-known that the Dolev–Yao adversary is a powerful adversary. Besides acting as the network, intercepting, decomposing, composing and sending messages, he can remember as much information as he needs. That is, his memory is unbounded. We recently proposed a weaker Dolev–Yao like adversary, which also acts as the network, but whose memory is bounded. We showed that this Bounded Memory Dolev–Yao adversary, when given enough memory, can carry out many existing protocol anomalies. In particular, the known anomalies arise for bounded memory protocols, where although the total number of sessions is unbounded, there are only a bounded number of concurrent sessions and the honest participants of the protocol cannot remember an unbounded number of facts or an unbounded number of nonces at a time. This led us to the question of whether it is possible to infer an upper-bound on the memory required by the Dolev–Yao adversary to carry out an anomaly from the memory restrictions of the bounded protocol. This paper answers this question negatively (Theorem 8).     

Q2攻击结构下环上的积性MSP

用重构向量定义了环上MSP的积性，证明了这个定义与文献[1]中的定义是等价的。基于该定义，给出了Q2攻击结构下环上积性MSP的有效构造。     

On designing an unaided authentication service with threat detection and leakage control for defeating opportunistic adversaries

Unaided authentication services provide the flexibility to login without being dependent on any additional device. The power of recording attack resilient unaided authentication services (RARUAS) is undeniable as, in some aspects, they are even capable of offering better security than the biometric based authentication systems. However, high login complexity of these RARUAS makes them far from usable in practice. The adopted information leakage control strategies have often been identified as the primary cause behind such high login complexities. Though recent proposals havemade some significant efforts in designing a usable RARUAS by reducing its login complexity, most of them have failed to achieve the desired usability standard. In this paper, we have introduced a new notion of controlling the information leakage rate. By maintaining a good security standard, the introduced idea helps to reduce the login complexity of our proposed mechanism − named as Textual-Graphical Password-based Mechanism or TGPM, by a significant extent. Along with resisting the recording attack, TGPM also achieves a remarkable property of threat detection. To the best of our knowledge, TGPM is the first RARUAS, which can both prevent and detect the activities of the opportunistic recording attackers who can record the complete login activity of a genuine user for a few login sessions. Our study reveals that TGPM assures much higher session resiliency compared to the existing authentication services, having the same or even higher login complexities. Moreover, TGPM stores the password information in a distributed way and thus restricts the adversaries to learn the complete secret from a single compromised server. A thorough theoretical analysis has been performed to prove the strength of our proposal from both the security and usability perspectives. We have also conducted an experimental study to support the theoretical argument made on the usability standard of TGPM.     

Some comments on "Scientific method and the adversary model": Reply.

Replies to comments by R. P. Youtz (see record 1990-57141-001) on the original article by M. Levine (see record 1977-09339-001) advocating the adversary model of research. The author responds to several specific statements by Youtz, including issues regarding scientific investigation and operationalism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

实用的可否认加密方案及安全性证明*

分析了一比特消息可否认加密方案和发送者（或接收者）可否认的加密方案,发现这些方案是不实用的。基于二次剩余问题,使用一个可信第三方,提出了一个方案,实现了发送者和接收者都可否认的加密,可以对多比特消息加密,并且证明语义是安全的。该方案是实用的。     

对抗环境下的线性分类器对抗性比较

机器学习算法为很多安全应用提供了良好的解决方案,然而机器学习算法本身却面临被敌手攻击的威胁。为分析敌手攻击对机器学习算法造成的影响,本文提出符合某些特定场合的敌手攻击模型,并在该模型下比较几种线性分类器的对抗性。最后在垃圾邮件过滤公开数据库上进行测试,实验结果表明,支持向量分类器具有相对较好的对抗性。     

A killer adversary for quicksort

Quicksort can be made to go quadratic by constructing input on‐the‐fly in response to the sequence of items compared. The technique is illustrated by a specific adversary for the standard C qsort function. The general method works against any implementation of quicksort – even a randomizing one – that satisfies certain very mild and realistic assumptions. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.