Quantum computation based bundling optimization for combinatorial auction in freight service procurements

Combinatorial auction is a useful trade manner for transportation service procurements in e-marketplaces. To enhance the competition of combinatorial auction, a novel auction mechanism of two-round bidding with bundling optimization is proposed. As the recommended the auction mechanism, the shipper/auctioneer integrates the objects into several bundles based on the bidding results of first round auction. Then, carriers/bidders bid for the object bundles in second round. The bundling optimization is described as a multi-objective model with two criteria on price complementation and combination consistency. A Quantum Evolutionary Algorithm (QEA) with β-based rotation gate and the encoding scheme based on non-zero elements in complementary coefficient matrix is developed for the model solution. Comparing with a Contrast Genetic Algorithm, QEA can achieve better computational performances for small and middle size problems.     

反拍卖采购:一种新的采购模式

反拍卖采购技术以其新的理念和对信息技术的融合，能够使企业采购成本大幅度降低。通过对我国传统采购模式与反拍卖采购模式的对比分析，可以了解到反拍卖采购技术的应用前景。     

Collaborating freight forwarding enterprises

The paper presents a model for the collaboration among independent freight forwarding entities. In the modern highly competitive transportation branch freight forwarders reduce their fulfillment costs by exploiting different execution modes (self-fulfillment and subcontraction). For self-fulfillment they use their own vehicles to execute the requests and for subcontracting they forward the orders to external freight carriers. Further enhancement of competitiveness can be achieved if the freight forwarders cooperate in coalitions in order to balance their request portfolios. Participation in such a coalition gains additional profit for the entire coalition and for each participant, therefore reinforcing the market position of the partners. The integrated operational transport problem as well as existing collaboration approaches are introduced. The presented model for collaboration is based on theoretical foundations in the field of combinatorial auctions and operational research game theory. It is applicable for coalitions of freight forwarders, especially for the collaboration of Profit Centres within large freight forwarding companies. The proposed theoretical approach and the presented collaboration model are suitable for a coalition of freight forwarding companies with nearly similar potential on the market.     

基于规则引擎的电子采购逆向竞拍的研究

近年来规则引擎技术已广泛应用于金融、电子商务及制造业等领域。当前大型企业的采购方式越来越多样化,传统采购系统所采用的逆向竞拍方案已不能满足现有需求。本文研究了规则引擎技术在企业电子采购系统中的应用,以将程序代码和业务规则分离开来。企业可以按照不同采购需求个性化配置采购规则,规则引擎控制整个拍卖过程,拍卖结束后系统再利用规则引擎自动对报价进行评分,帮助企业选择最优供应商,使其在采购过程中降低成本,提高采购效率。     

P2P网络中的匿名电子拍卖协议研究*

在P2P网络中实现电子拍卖的功能对于P2P技术具有重要意义,这将意味着电子商务同样可以在P2P网络中广泛应用.然而,匿名性、投标价保密性、抗勾结性等安全问题一直是电子拍卖研究的难点问题,一种合理的解决方法是将盲签名、知识证明、可验证的数字签名加密算法引入到电子拍卖协议中.这样不仅可以很好地解决P2P网络无中心服务器的不足,还使得系统的安全性能得到显著提高.     

基于异构能源区块链的综合能源系统交易模型

综合能源系统是对电、气、热、冷能进行统一规划调度的综合系统,顺应了供给侧改革的趋势.目前综合能源系统的用户呈现个体化、分散化的趋势,传统的单向集中式输配电服务模式逐渐不适应这种趋势.基于区块链技术,设计了一种综合能源系统交易模型.采用异构能源区块链的结构模式,利用智能合约建立了基于价格约束的匹配拍卖机制,保障了清洁能源用户的供能优先级,并采用双重认证机制,保障了交易的可靠性.在实验环境下对所设计模型进行分析,仿真结果验证了所提综合能源系统交易模型的有效性和可行性.     

Double auction mechanisms on Markovian networks

This paper studies the double auction (DA) mechanism in Ma and Li (2011) for a class of exchange economies. We extend their results to more general cases where sellers and buyers each form a complex time non-homogeneous Markovian chain, as specified in Ram et al. (2009), in the communication of their private information. A numerical example is also provided. Both bubbles and crashes are observed in the example, consistent with results of our theorems. Our example and theoretical results provide new evidence that a DA mechanism, widely utilized in real exchange markets, may contribute to the excess volatility identified in Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981).     

Online double auction mechanism for perishable goods

One-sided auctions are used for market clearing in the spot markets for perishable goods because production cost in spot markets is already “sunk.” Moreover, the promptness and simplicity of one-sided auctions are beneficial for trading in perishable goods. However, sellers cannot participate in the price-making process in these auctions. A standard double auction market collects bids from traders and matches the higher bids of buyers and lower bids of sellers to find the most efficient allocation, assuming that the value of unsold items remains unchanged. Nevertheless, in the market for perishable goods, sellers suffer a loss when they fail to sell their goods, because their salvage values are lost when the goods perish. To solve this problem, we investigate the suitable design of an online double auction for perishable goods, where bids arrive dynamically with their time limits. Our market mechanism aims at improving the profitability of traders by reducing trade failures in the face of uncertainty of incoming/departing bids. We develop a heuristic market mechanism with an allocation policy that prioritizes bids of traders based on their time-criticality, and evaluate its performance experimentally using multi-agent simulation. We find out that our market mechanism realizes efficient and fair allocations among traders with approximately truthful behavior in different market situations.     

改进生成树算法的多机器人在线地图覆盖

研究在线多机器人地图覆盖。在单机器人生成树STC算法基础上做出改进,融入了市场拍卖算法,使机器人团体扩散地生成树,并沿各自生成树完成地图覆盖。通过两种不同环境地图覆盖仿真,结果验证改进后的IMPSTC算法,能够使机器人团队在更少的时间和重复覆盖区域情况下完成在线覆盖地图任务。