| 代建工程业主对代建人的组合激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵文义,王选仓.代建工程业主对代建人的组合激励机制研究[J].河北工业大学学报,2008,37(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵文义 王选仓 |
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| 作者单位： | 长安大学,公路学院,陕西,西安,710064 |
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| 基金项目： | 陕四省交通科技项目
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| 摘 要： | 介绍了代建制工程项目管理模式的内涵和信息经济学中委托代理理论的基本逻辑,构建了代建工程业主对代建人的组合激励机制模型.分析结果表明:考虑了代建人机会主义行为这个变量,代建人对代建工程投资节余的分享系数应该增大;业主并不是在代建人机会主义行为不存在时才能实现自身的效用最大化;在报酬契约生效后,业主还可以运用一些方法来提高代建人的工作积极性或者是抑制代建人的机会主义行为.
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| 关 键 词： | 代建工程 业主 代建人 委托代理理论 组合激励机制 生产性努力 分配性努力 |
Research on Combined Incentive Mechanism of Substitute Engineering Owner to Agent |
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| ZHAO Wen-yi,WANG Xuan-cang.Research on Combined Incentive Mechanism of Substitute Engineering Owner to Agent[J].Journal of Hebei University of Technology,2008,37(6). |
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| Authors: | ZHAO Wen-yi WANG Xuan-cang |
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| Affiliation: | ZHAO Wen-yi,WANG Xuan-cang(School of Highway,Chang\'an University,Xi\'an 710064,China) |
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| Abstract: | The connotation of management mode of substitute project and basic logic of principal-agent theory in infor-mation economics were introduced.Combined incentive mechanism model of substitute engineering owner to agent is established.Analysis results show that considering the variable,ie opportunism behavior of agent,participated coefficient of angent to investment surplus about substitute engineering should be increased.Agent can realize self-utility maximiza-tion under the condition of unnecessary consideri... |
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| Keywords: | substitute engineering owner agent principal-agent theory combined incentive mechanism producing effort sharing effort |
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