存货质押委托监管模式下基于双边道德风险的收益分配模型研究

存货质押融资作为一项多主体的融资业务,道德风险是其不可忽视的一种重要风险。在存货质押委托监管模式的初始授信环节,银行与物流企业的努力程度为隐匿信息,因此银行与物流企业双方都有可能存在道德风险问题,收益分配作为一种激励机制,可以对双方道德风险起到一定约束作用。本文在存货质押融资委托监管模式下,基于委托代理理论,研究了考虑初始授信环节中银行与物流企业存在双边道德风险时的收益分配问题,建立了银行与物流企业的收益分配模型,推导出银行与物流企业间的最优收益分配比例,以防范银行与物流企业的双边道德风险。最后通过数值算例进一步对收益分配比例随物流企业实力变动的趋势进行了分析。

Research on Profit Distribution Model based on Double Moral Hazard under the Inventory Financing with Delegated Supervision

Inventory pledge financing was a multi-agent financing business and moral hazard was an important risk that can′t be ignored in inventory financing.In initial credit under delegated supervision mode of inventory financing,the efforts of banks and logistics enterprises were hidden information,therefore both banks and logistics enterprises may have moral hazard problems.As an excitation mechanism,profit distribution can play a certain role in restraining the moral hazard of both sides.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper built the model of profit distribution when banks and logistics enterprises both had moral hazard problems in initial credit under delegated supervision mode of inventory financing,and derived optimal income distribution ratio of preventing the double moral hazard of banks and logistics enterprises.Finally,a numerical example was used to further analyze the trend of optimal income distribution ratio with the strength of logistics enterprises.