Simulatable certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol |
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Authors: | Lei Zhang Futai Zhang Qianhong Wu Josep Domingo-Ferrer |
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Affiliation: | a Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Computer Engineering and Mathematics, UNESCO Chair in Data Privacy, Av. Pa?¨sos Catalans 26, E-43007 Tarragona, Catalonia, Spain b Nanjing Normal University, School of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing 210097, PR China c Jiangsu Engineering Research Center on Information Security and Privacy Protection Technology, Nanjing, PR China d Wuhan University, School of Computer, Key Lab. of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, PR China |
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Abstract: | Key agreement (KA) allows two or more users to negotiate a secret session key among them over an open network. Authenticated key agreement (AKA) is a KA protocol enhanced to prevent active attacks. AKA can be achieved using a public-key infrastructure (PKI) or identity-based cryptography. However, the former suffers from a heavy certificate management burden while the latter is subject to the so-called key escrow problem. Recently, certificateless cryptography was introduced to mitigate these limitations. In this paper, we first propose a security model for AKA protocols using certificateless cryptography. Following this model, we then propose a simulatable certificateless two-party AKA protocol. Security is proven under the standard computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumptions. Our protocol is efficient and practical, because it requires only one pairing operation and five multiplications by each party. |
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Keywords: | Information security Protocol design Certificateless cryptography Authenticated key agreement Provable security |
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