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证券投资基金管理者与监管者行为的博弈分析
引用本文:赵倩. 证券投资基金管理者与监管者行为的博弈分析[J]. 西安邮电学院学报, 2008, 13(4)
作者姓名:赵倩
作者单位:西北大学经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710127
摘    要:证券投资基金作为我国证券市场上的一种投资工具,有效满足了中小投资者的投资需求,对于促进经济发展有着重要作用。但一系列基金管理者违规操作的发生,反映出我国基金监管方面的严重缺陷。利用博弈分析工具,对证监会、基金托管银行、基金持有人等证券投资基金主要监管者与基金管理者之间的行为进行分析,并在此基础上,针对如何健全和完善我国的基金监管体系提出相关政策建议。

关 键 词:证券投资基金  监管  博弈

Game analysis on behaviors between investment fund governors and supervisors
ZHAO Qian. Game analysis on behaviors between investment fund governors and supervisors[J]. Journal of Xi'an Institute of Posts and Telecommunications, 2008, 13(4)
Authors:ZHAO Qian
Affiliation:ZHAO Qian(School of Economics and Management; Northwest University; Xi an 710127; China);
Abstract:Security investment fund,an investment tool in China's security business,effectively satisfies the investment demand from investors and small and medium sized enterprises,and plays a significant role in promoting the economy development.However,the rule-breaking operations of some fund governors show the serious defects existing in China's fund supervision field.From the perspective of games,this paper tends to analyze the behaviors made between fund governors and its supervisors such as Securities Regulatory Commission,fund custody banks and fund holders,and tries to make some suggestions on how to improve China's fund supervision systems.
Keywords:security investment fund  supervision  games
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