Predicting behavior in economic games by looking through the eyes of the players. |
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Authors: | Mellers, Barbara A. Haselhuhn, Michael P. Tetlock, Philip E. Silva, José C. Isen, Alice M. |
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Abstract: | Social scientists often rely on economic experiments such as ultimatum and dictator games to understand human cooperation. Systematic deviations from economic predictions have inspired broader conceptions of self-interest that incorporate concerns for fairness. Yet no framework can describe all of the major results. We take a different approach by asking players directly about their self-interest—defined as what they want to do (pleasure-maximizing options). We also ask players directly about their sense of fairness—defined as what they think they ought to do (fairness-maximizing options). Player-defined measures of self-interest and fairness predict (a) the majority of ultimatum-game and dictator-game offers, (b) ultimatum-game rejections, (c) exiting behavior (i.e., escaping social expectations to cooperate) in the dictator game, and (d) who cooperates more after a positive mood induction. Adopting the players' perspectives of self-interest and fairness permits better predictions about who cooperates, why they cooperate, and when they punish noncooperators. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
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Keywords: | affect cooperation dictator game emotions ultimatum game economics |
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