信息不对称下双渠道供应链服务合作激励机制研究

旨在研究信息不对称条件下，双渠道供应链中的制造商与零售商的差异化服务合作激励机制，运用委托代理理论，建立了制造商将直销渠道服务交由零售商完成的服务合作决策模型，得出了信息对称和信息不对称两种情形下的制造商最优固定支付及最优利润分享比率，并分析了不对称信息对合作绩效的影响。研究发现，信息不对称时制造商的利润降低，零售商即使提供低服务水平也能保持利润不变从而导致供应链系统效率降低。

Service Cooperation Incentive Mechanism in a Dual-channel Supply Chain under Asymmetry Information

Aiming to investigate the incentive mechanism for different service levels provided by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain, the decision models of service cooperation are developed using the principal-agent theory on the assumption that the manufacturer′s service demand is achieved by the retailer. Then, the optimal fixed payments and the optimal profit-sharing ratios are obtained under symmetric information and asymmetric information, in addition to influence analysis of asymmetric information on cooperation performance. The conclusion implies that the manufacturer′s profit decreases under asymmetric information, the retailer′s profit remains the same even when lower service level is provided. However, the system performance of the supply chain decreases.