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航权资源双边谈判的序贯互惠博弈建模与分析
引用本文:赵俊,陈旭梅,刘志硕,栾迪. 航权资源双边谈判的序贯互惠博弈建模与分析[J]. 哈尔滨工业大学学报, 2022, 54(3): 1-11
作者姓名:赵俊  陈旭梅  刘志硕  栾迪
作者单位:北京交通大学 交通运输学院,北京 100044 ;综合交通运输大数据应用技术交通运输行业重点实验室北京交通大学, 北京 100044
基金项目:北京首都国际机场股份有限公司项目(T20L01310)
摘    要:针对国际航权资源双边谈判问题,对谈判双方基于战略谈判关系和价值对等原则的博弈关系进行研究,提出了基于谈判方议价能力、关联产业补偿、产业空间预留价值和资源空置价值耗损4个维度的指标来描述航权资源议题的价值,建立适用于针对不同类型议题的物质收益函数,基于互惠偏好理论,提出互惠动机和单方面施惠动机来描述双方在战略谈判关系下博...

关 键 词:航权资源  双边谈判  互惠心理  序贯博弈
收稿时间:2021-12-10

Modeling and analysis of sequential reciprocal game problem of bilateral negotiation for air traffic rights resources
ZHAO Jun,CHEN Xumei,LIU Zhishuo,LUAN Di. Modeling and analysis of sequential reciprocal game problem of bilateral negotiation for air traffic rights resources[J]. Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology, 2022, 54(3): 1-11
Authors:ZHAO Jun  CHEN Xumei  LIU Zhishuo  LUAN Di
Affiliation:School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China ;Key Laboratory of Transport Industry of Big Data Application Technologies for Comprehensive Transport Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China
Abstract:Considering the problem of negotiation of air traffic rights resources, this paper studies the game relation between the two sides of the negotiation based on the strategic negotiation relationship and the principle of equivalence of value. On the basis of the bargaining power, compensation of related industries, value of reserved space, and lost value by resource vacancy, a method was proposed to describe the value of the issue of air traffic rights resources, and the material income matrix aimed at different types of issues was established. Based on the theory of reciprocal preference, the reciprocal motivation and ex-parte-patronage motivation were proposed to describe the psychological utility brought by the game behaviors of the negotiators in the context of strategic negotiation relationship, and the sequential reciprocal game model based on reciprocal psychological utility was constructed. Numerical simulation was carried out and the validity of the model was verified. Results show that when the two sides of the negotiation were in a reciprocal relationship, the game behavior strategy was decided by the reciprocity sensitivity coefficient, issue scale of air traffic rights resources, and the relationship between the value of reserved space and the lost value by resource vacancy. The negotiation problem was identified to correspond to six value game scenarios, which were mainly determined by the value range of the issue.
Keywords:air traffic rights resources   bilateral negotiation   reciprocity   sequential game
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