Impact of risk attitudes and perception on game theoretic driving interactions and safety |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue W., Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1;2. Zachary Department of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA;3. Department of Statistics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA;1. Biostatistics and Bioinformatics Branch, Division of Intramural Population Health Research, Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA;2. Health Behavior Branch, Division of Intramural Population Health Research, Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA;3. University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA;1. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Alberta, 4-110 NREF, Edmonton, AB, Canada;2. City of Edmonton Assistant Professor of Urban Traffic Safety, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Alberta, 3-004 NREF, Edmonton, AB, Canada;1. Texas A&M University, 3135 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-3135, United States;2. Texas A&M Transportation Institute, 3500 NW Loop 410, San Antonio, TX 78229, United States |
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| Abstract: | This study employs game theory to investigate behavioural norms of interaction between drivers at a signalised intersection. The choice framework incorporates drivers’ risk perception as well as their risk attitudes. A laboratory experiment is conducted to study the impact of risk attitudes and perception in crossing behaviour at a signalised intersection. The laboratory experiment uses methods from experimental economics to induce incentives and study revealed behaviour. Conflicting drivers are considered to have symmetric disincentives for crashing, to represent a no-fault car insurance environment. The study is novel as it uses experimental data collection methods to investigate perceived risk. Further, it directly integrates perceived risk of crashing with other active drivers into the modelling structure. A theoretical model of intersection crossing behaviour is also developed in this paper. This study shows that right-of-way entitlements assigned without authoritative penalties to at-fault drivers may still improve perceptions of safety. Further, risk aversion amongst drivers attributes to manoeuvring strategies at or below Nash mixed strategy equilibrium. These findings offer a theoretical explanation for interactive manoeuvres that lead to crashes, as opposed to purely statistical methods which provide correlation but not necessarily explanation. |
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| Keywords: | Signalized intersection Red light running Game theory Risk perception Risk attitudes Experimental economics |
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