| 基于演化博弈的食品安全监管分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨青,施亚能.基于演化博弈的食品安全监管分析[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2011,33(4):670-672,676. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨青 施亚能 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉理工大学管理学院,湖北武汉,430070 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(NSFC2010,91024020) |
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| 摘 要： | 鉴于当前我国食品安全问题比较突出,政府监管必须加强。运用演化博弈理论构建了食品安全监管模型,通过复制动态方程的动态趋势和稳定性分析对食品安全监管模型进行了深入讨论。研究结果表明:降低食品企业成本,增加企业收入,加大对不合格品的处罚力度,控制监管费用,提高监管部门的监管效益等都将使食品安全监管博弈向着更有利于食品安全的方向演化。
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| 关 键 词： | 食品安全 政府监管 演化博弈 演化稳定战略 复制动态 |
Analysis of Food Safety Regulation Based on Revolutionary Game |
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| YANG Qing,SHI Yaneng.Analysis of Food Safety Regulation Based on Revolutionary Game[J].Journal of Wuhan University of Technology(Information & Management Engineering),2011,33(4):670-672,676. |
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| Authors: | YANG Qing SHI Yaneng |
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| Affiliation: | YANG Qing,SHI Yaneng Prof.,School of Management,WUT,Wuhan 430070,China. |
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| Abstract: | In view of the fact that food safety problem is quite serious in China,the government regulation must be strengthened.The evolutionary game theory was utilized to construct the food safety regulation model.In-depth discussion on the food safety regulation model was carried on through the dynamic tendency of duplicator dynamic equation and stability analysis.The analysis indicates that food safety regulation game can evolve toward favorable direction if we can reduce the production cost,increase enterprise i... |
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| Keywords: | food safety government regulation revolutionary game ESS replicator dynamics |
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