负荷聚合商多类型需求侧资源激励价格制定一般模型及应用

负荷聚合商通过整合需求侧可调资源参与系统运行交易获利,是开展电力需求响应的专业机构。实现多类型需求响应资源的个性化激励定制对进一步灵活管理需求侧资源和增加需求响应效益至关重要,是负荷聚合商核心业务。基于主从博弈原理建立了负荷聚合商激励价格定制通用模型,选取了电动汽车用户及楼宇空调用户,考虑舒适度价格随削减负荷变化情况,在主从博弈架构下构建了含不同舒适度价格需求的楼宇空调用户优化模型和电动汽车充放电行为优化模型。结合Karush-Kuhn-Tucker条件、对偶定理和线性松弛等方法,在负荷聚合商经济损失最小基础上推导出含楼宇空调和电动汽车需求响应激励价格制定的单层混合整数线性规划优化模型。算例表明,所提出的模型可用于负荷聚合商定制楼宇空调用户和电动汽车用户动态激励价格,为负荷聚合商开展需求响应提供参考。

A General Incentive Pricing Model and Its Application for Multi-type Demand-Side Resources of Load Aggregators

A load aggregator is a professional organization to develop power demand response, which integrates demand-side adjustable resources to participate in system operation and market transactions to gain profits. It is very important for further flexible management of demand-side resources and increasing demand-response benefit to realize personalized incentive customization of multiple types of demand-response resources. It is also the core business of load aggregators. In this paper, a general model of incentive price customization for load aggregators is established according to the principle of stackelberg game. Electric-vehicle users and building air-conditioning users are selected as the research object. Considering the impact of comfort price changing with load shedding, an optimization model of building air-conditioning users with different comfort prices and a model for optimizing the charge and discharge behavior of electric vehicles are constructed under the framework of stackelberg game model. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, dual theorem and linear relaxation are used to derive a two-level mixed integer linear programming model with the minimum economic loss of load aggregator. The results show that the proposed model can be effectively used to customize dynamic incentive price of building air-conditioning users and electric-vehicle users for load aggregators, and provide new ideas for demand response.