An informational theory of security |
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Authors: | Norman R. Bottom Jr. |
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Affiliation: | Editor, Journal of Security Administration, 10501 S.W. 99th Street, Miami, FL 33176, USA; teleph.: (305) 279–9437 |
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Abstract: | This presentation of a systems theory is applicable to security in the private sector which is profit dependent. At a time of heightened security specialization, it is necessary to establish a professional consensus that all private security areas are unified at the basic conceptual level. Business and industry face numerous threats to profitability. Threats applicable to the mission of security have been organized here by the WAECUP (waste, accident, error, crime, unethical practice) acronym. WAECUP threats are shown to be so interrelated that a security department that ignores even one threat is bound to fail. Computer security and all private sector security are shown linked in efforts to make loss control (the author's term for modern security) effective. The most common fallacy about private security is to equate it with police activity. This myth is dismantled and security is defined by a careful comparison between law enforcement and private security with respect to their clients, goals, focus, environmental restructuring abilities, and movement (access) controls. A graphic Loss Control Model is offered to explain how informational transfer minimizes loss and tends to stabilize any corporation. It is an open-ended systems model that all private security practitioners can identify with and utilize as a heuristic tool. |
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Keywords: | Unethical practices law enforcement loss control computer crime waste |
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