Current perspective on fast reactor containment

The concept of “containment” is to provide a series of physical barriers between the radioactive products of the fission process and the public. All nuclear reactors have several such barriers and LMFBRs have more than most. These barriers are, successively:

1. fuel, which retains fission products;

2. fuel cladding, which encloses the fuel;

3. sodium coolant, which absorbs fission products released through fuel caldding;

4. primary coolant boundary, which has energy absorption and leakage control capabilities;

5. containment building, hereafter referred to as containment, which provides the final engineered barrier for control of radioactive releases;

6. exclusion distance, which provides space for natural attenuation of radioactive releases before reaching the public.

These barriers, along with the design approaches and features which protect their integrity under normal and accident conditions, assure that the public is adequately protected from the potential hazards of radioactivity residing in the core. It is only in the case of hypothesized core disruptive accidents (HCDAs) that these successive barriers can be sufficiently threatened as to pose a significant threat to the public. These HCDAs involve an extremely low probability sequence of successive failures resulting in core cooling imbalances which lead to fuel overheating. Under such conditions, the fuel and cladding barriers can be lost and energy sources can be generated which threaten the primary coolant boundary and containment. This paper addresses current perspectives on containment of HCDAs with emphasis on the approach and programs in the US.