| 供应链中供需节点企业相互激励模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 裴勇,王勇,刘飞. 供应链中供需节点企业相互激励模型研究[J]. 工业工程, 2006, 9(6): 76-80,90 |
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| 作者姓名： | 裴勇 王勇 刘飞 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044;重庆大学,机械工程学院,重庆,400044 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金 , 教育部人文社会科学基金 , 重庆市自然科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 供应链中供需节点企业之间的协作问题是供应链管理的核心问题.在考虑制造商因建立过剩的供货能力而承担一定风险的情况下,考察由一个制造商和一个销售商组成的简单供应链中的协作状况.在供货能力作为内生变量的情况下,提出了一种制造商和销售商之间相互激励模型,结果表明该模型可以有效增加制造商和销售商的收益.采用数值算例验证了该激励模型的有效性.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 协作 激励 回收合约 风险共担合约 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-7375（2006）06-0076-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-07-11 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-07-11 |
Study of Mutual Incentive Model Between Vendor-purchaser Enterprises in Supply Chain |
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| PEI Yong,WANG Yong,LIU Fei. Study of Mutual Incentive Model Between Vendor-purchaser Enterprises in Supply Chain[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2006, 9(6): 76-80,90 |
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| Authors: | PEI Yong WANG Yong LIU Fei |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics and Business Administration; 2. School of Mechanical Engineering, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China |
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| Abstract: | The coordination between vendor-purchaser node enterprises is the core problem of supply chain management. Considering that the manufacturer would take risks because of over-supply ability, this paper explores the coordination situation of a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. A mutual incentive model is designed ,in which the supply ability is endogenous, and the model can improve the profits of manufacturer and retailer. In the end, a numerical example is given to verify the validity of the model. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain coordination incentive buy back contract risk-sharing contract |
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